National Defence Committee on Feb. 26th, 2021

[The Chair, Liberal, Karen McCrimmon]

Good afternoon.

I'm calling this meeting to order. Welcome to meeting number 17 of the House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence.

Today's meeting is taking place in a hybrid format, pursuant to the House order of January 25, 2020, and members will be attending in person or participating through the Zoom application.

The proceedings will be published on the House of Commons website. For your information, the webcast will always show the person speaking rather than the entire committee.

I think we have enough experience working in this current format, so I'm going to skip some of the detailed health procedures.

Please, before you speak, wait until I recognize you by name. All comments by members should be addressed through the chair. When speaking, please speak slowly and clearly. When you are not speaking, your mike should be on mute.

Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2) and the motion adopted by the committee on Tuesday, February 9, 2021, the committee is resuming its study of addressing sexual misconduct issues in the Canadian Armed Forces, including the allegations against former chief of the defence staff Jonathan Vance.

With us today by video conference are Dr. Allan English, retired captain from the Canadian Forces; Dr. Alan Okros, also retired captain from the Canadian Forces; and Dr. Stéfanie von Hlatky, who is currently the honorary lieutenant-colonel of the Princess of Wales regiment.

Up to six minutes will be given for opening remarks.

I would like to start by welcoming Dr. Allan English to start with his opening remarks, please.

[Dr. Allan English, Professor, Department of History, Faculty of Arts and Sciences, Queen's Univeristy, As an Individual]

Thank you.

Madam Chair and members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to speak today. I am Allan English and I teach Canadian military history in the history department at Queen's University. I have also taught senior officers at the Canadian Forces College in Toronto. I served 25 years in the RCAF and CAF as an air navigator on the C-130 Hercules, as well as on a number of instructional tours.

The title of my presentation, “Culture Eats Policy Every Time - Sexual Misconduct in the CAF”, comes from a statement by former Supreme Court of Canada Justice Michel Bastarache, when referring to attempts to change the RCMP's culture through policy changes. His statement applies equally to the CAF, which over the last 30 years has attempted to address sexual misconduct through policy changes and added training without successfully implementing what Justice Marie Deschamps referred to in her report on sexual misconduct and sexual harassment in the CAF as the “comprehensive cultural change” necessary to eliminate harmful and inappropriate sexual behaviour within the CAF.

In evaluating the success of Operation Honour in testimony before a Senate committee in May 2018, almost three years after the operation started, Justice Deschamps made these comments, which she reiterated in her testimony here this week. She said, “...in the public policies, the changes that have been made to them are so minor as to be virtually superficial. Much more could have been done in three years.... What I see is that not a lot of progress has been made.”

In August 2015, in the Operation Honour campaign plan, General Vance required the vice chief of the defence staff to complete a comprehensive strategy by September 30, 2015. However, no strategy was produced until 2020. Lacking a guiding strategy, much like Operation Minerva, one of the CAF's piecemeal and uncoordinated plans to implement mandated gender integration and to respond to its “rape crisis” in the 1990s, its actions in response to Justice Deschamps' report have been uncoordinated and unprioritized. While many early changes made by Operation Honour were positive and addressed the CAF's initial priority of meeting victims' needs, they only addressed the symptoms of the problem, they did not deal with its main cause, the CAF's “hostile organizational culture that is disrespectful and demeaning to women”.

Leader buy-in is essential if desired culture change is to be made and successfully implemented. Yes, despite emphatic public statements promising to eliminate sexual misconduct in the CAF, we now know that its senior leadership did not fully accept Justice Deschamps' conclusions, starting with the response to her report by the CDS at the time, General Tom Lawson, who said, “I do not accept from any quarter that this type of behaviour is part of our military culture.”

Recently former vice chief of the defence staff, retired Lieutenant-General Guy Thibault, who was charged with the oversight of Operation Honour during its first year, said, “I know that I and many of my colleagues initially had a hard time believing the picture painted by Justice Marie Deschamps in her 2015 report on sexual misconduct as her descriptions of the CF work environment simply did not match our lived experience in the forces.”

It is reported that the current CDS, Admiral Art McDonald, also recently acknowledged that as a senior leader, “he was himself guilty—even though it was unintentional—of having perpetuated some of the problems that the military is now trying to address.”

The latest allegations of sexual misconduct against General Vance are not the first indications of his lack of acceptance of the Deschamps report's findings. His reaction to the December 2017 “party flight” cast doubt on the CAF's commitment to eliminating sexual misconduct.

In response to media reports of inappropriate behaviour on the “party flight”, Vance said that what happened on the flight might have been exaggerated. That statement, combined with the lack of action to stop inappropriate behaviour by the senior CAF leaders on the party flight indicated to many that two years after being implemented and just over five months into Operation Honour's final maintain-and-hold phase, the CAF initiative to eliminate sexual misconduct in its ranks had failed.

In case there is any doubt that the CAF still does not fully accept Justice Deschamps' conclusions, “The Path to Dignity and Respect: The Canadian Armed Forces Strategy to Address Sexual Misconduct”, released in October 2020, only calls for “realigning” the CAF's culture, not comprehensive culture change.

In conclusion, until the CAF makes the comprehensive culture change called for by Justice Deschamps, any change made by the bureaucratic methods used to date will be ephemeral and inconsequential, as was the case with Operation Minerva in the 1990s.

Unless the CAF addresses the cause of its problems, its culture, not just its symptoms, and has its actions monitored by effective external oversight, it is likely to face disappointment and problems in the future as the sources of the CAF's sexualized and hostile culture remain in place.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Karen McCrimmon]

Thank you very much.

We'll move to Dr. von Hlatky, please.

[Dr. Stéfanie von Hlatky, Associate Professor and Director, Centre for International and Defence Policy, Queen's University, As an Individual]

Hello, everyone.

I am a professor of political studies and Canada research chair on gender, security and the armed forces at Queen's University.

I'd like to start with a question: Can a large organization like the Canadian Armed Forces transform its culture in five years, guided by an external review and driven by an order to eradicate sexual misconduct within the ranks? It might seem impossible, but in many ways the military, as a total organization, might be better suited than most when it comes to adapting quickly in the face of adversity. CAF personnel are trained to make and carry out decisions in complex environments.

So why is this reputation for operational excellence not carrying over organizationally? That's because military culture can have unintended consequences. It can also be gamed by predators. It can be idealized and made to look untouchable by routines, traditions and rigidly hierarchical command structures.

At this time, military leaders need to re-engage with the external review authority report, also known as the Deschamps report, and think more boldly about implementing its recommendations fully. Five years might not be enough time to implement deep, transformative cultural change, but it's certainly long enough to uncover the failings of the current approach.

I have chosen four specific issues to discuss with you today. First, there should be a greater focus on abuses of power. What I am referring to here is a social dynamic that is interlinked with sexual misconduct in highly asymmetric professional relationships. This kind of implicit or explicit pressure is far more endemic and ingrained in the culture than is currently acknowledged.

While the survey on sexual misconduct in the Canadian Armed Forces has provided useful data, more is needed to examine how sexual misconduct interacts with consent in asymmetric professional relationships. A woman, or any harassed person, not speaking out against behaviour that is inappropriate does not mean that behaviour is welcome or that she is providing consent. There are many legitimate reasons for going along with these unwelcome interactions and staying silent. Many of these reasons are outlined in the Deschamps report.

People who are more junior or in more precarious employment conditions fear for their job. They might fear other types of consequences at work, like not being believed by their peers or being socially ostracized for speaking out. Another reason for not coming forward is not trusting the reporting process, or not believing you'll secure a fair outcome. The next step is to have this more nuanced talk about consent and about consent when power dynamics are at play. Some of those power dynamics are inherent to military culture. Some of those dynamics are about rank, and translate into abuses of power. Both types of power dynamics disproportionately impact women.

Regarding training, Operation Honour training should be improved to pull data from the StatsCan surveys to tailor the content to those receiving the training. The information in the training should be personalized by making clear that sexual misconduct affects friends and colleagues in the armed forces. Service members should engage in and practice difficult scenarios so that they know when to intervene and how. The resentment of mostly male service members who feel they are unfairly targeted by Operation Honour is common and unfortunate. At the same time, the training is too focused on the perpetrator, while it could engage with military culture, militarized masculinity, the under-representation of women, consent, the needs of victims and survivors, and empowering bystanders in small interactive sessions led by someone who can speak in an authentic way about the content. External experts can help in this regard, if only to provide a peer review function for the training materials.

With regard to the SMRC, one of the most talked-about ERA recommendations was that a reporting line outside of the chain of command was needed. That prompted the creation of the sexual misconduct response centre as an independent body. There is an inherent tension in the SMRC's work because of the nature of its mandate. On the one hand, the SMRC needs to hold the CAF accountable, but it also needs a good working relationship with the CAF, including with the chain of command, which might undermine perceptions of the SMRC's independence. Constant review and oversight of the SMRC through both internal self-assessments and external audits might be needed, as the protection of the SMRC's independence in the face of its growing mandate is paramount.

Finally, the path to dignity and respect strategy is a promising approach, because it puts culture and climate front and centre, thereby making cultural change everyone's business.

While it makes sense for this document to define culture and climate along with a series of indicators, it should dedicate more attention to describing the problem at hand, which is sexual misconduct and how it ties to culture and climate. Basically, the scope of the problem needs to be crystal clear before jumping into the solutions.

A journey of cultural change needs to convey shared responsibility for sexual misconduct. The percentage of CAF members who have witnessed sexual misconduct is pretty astounding, but how many people intervene, speak up or report? If one does not engage in sexual misconduct, it does not mean they perform their duty with honour. The standard of performance is much higher than that if you want to get to zero tolerance. It is the notion of collective responsibility that should be stressed more forcefully throughout the document because everyone can do better on this front.

This is not about the duty to report; it is a standard of daily conduct. The challenge moving forward is not simply about how to eradicate sexual misconduct within the military. It entails identifying positive steps to create a culture of equality for women in the CAF and a culture centred around respect for all.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Karen McCrimmon]

Thank you very much, Doctor.

Dr. Okros, I know you gave a shortened statement the last time you appeared here. Would you like to go through your statement again? It has been distributed, but it might be helpful for people to hear it once again, if you're prepared to do that.

[Dr. Alan Okros, Professor, Canadian Forces College, As an Individual]

Thank you, Madam Chair.

I am speaking to you from Toronto, the traditional territory of the Mississaugas of the Credit, the Chippewa and the Wendat peoples.

I have been engaged on issues of harassment in the CAF for over 40 years, and I see strengths and weaknesses in the current version of the movie. Leaders at all levels are seeking to address issues and to do the right thing. The supporting functions provided by the SMRC are helpful, and “The Path to Dignity and Respect” has some promising ideas, but Operation Honour has not had the results intended. Why?

The reason, which my two colleagues have alluded to as well, has been an incomplete understanding of the issues, which has led to incomplete solutions, underpinned by an unwillingness to critically assess certain aspects of CAF identity and culture.

Six years ago, General Lawson said that CAF culture and behaviours had improved from the 1990s. While he was correct, the CAF had not been attending to evolutions across society. Expectations around the standard of workplace conduct have continued to rise. People are no longer prepared to ignore, endure or accept behaviours that may not have been called out in the past, so while there has been some progress in the last five years, the gap has likely grown yet again.

I’ll note that two years ago, senior leaders said they didn’t know what the root causes were. External experts said they did but weren’t being listened to. The problem is that the issue has been framed as sexual misconduct. The description of the term in Operation Honour puts the emphasis on the first word, describing it as sexual advances, sexual overtures, flirting and so on.

There are CAF members who annoy people with overtures, but the key issue is not about sex. If I hit you with a shovel, you wouldn’t call it inappropriate gardening. It is about power. It is using sexually and racially coded language to create and police social hierarchies about who is important and who is not. Death by a thousand cuts damages an individual’s self worth, identity and sense of belonging. That is what is being broken, not people feeling uncomfortable seeing an explicit picture or hearing an off-colour joke.

“The Path to Dignity and Respect” starts to expand the framing of the problem. It has taken 40 years, but it's a good first step. It acknowledges that there are cultural factors that can increase incidents of sexual misconduct, but the door is only open very slightly. There are a couple of carefully worded statements that gender stereotypes, outdated conceptions of the warrior and a male-dominated workforce can create harmful cultural dynamics, but nothing more and nothing of substance in the rest of the document to address even these factors.

The key omission is the continued reluctance to name power and militarized masculinities. This requires a careful and critical analysis of the military construct of soldier, sailor and aviator, and equally of leader and commander. We need to examine the institutionalized and systemic processes that shape military identity, and to ask the question: how much of one’s identity do they have to give up in order to be successful in the CAF? Most of those leading today have not had to think about this. Left-handed people know they live in a right-handed world; right-handed people don’t. It isn’t apparent to us when the world is constructed to fit us.

The CAF was likely a good fit for most seniors, and we still have some who don’t realize or can’t see why it isn’t a good fit for others. They continue to use terms and narratives they believe resonate with all, but actually serve to accentuate the dominant identity, hence increasing the social hierarchies and leaving some feeling isolated, ignored or not valued for who they are.

“The Path” indicates that work will be done to update professional development and enhance leadership capacities. Both are needed but should be informed by analyses of CAF identity and the practices of militarized masculinities.

As part of the analyses, I would highlight a 2016 U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission report that identified 12 factors that increase the risk of workplace harassment. The CAF has 10 of these and is at the high end on six. These are significant power disparities, encouraging alcohol consumption, a young workforce, use of coarse language, a single-gender-dominated culture, and a homogeneous workforce. Only two are reflected in “The Path”.

Proper considerations of institutionalized and systemic factors that create the conditions in which sexualized language is used to diminish others requires the CAF to shift away from the current focus on the weak individual. Harassment incidents and lack of reporting are not due to people not having read the definition or not knowing how to report. There are strong social factors that are intentionally created by the CAF to set these conditions.

Addressing these factors means challenging some centrally held tenets of the profession, facets that are key to success but also to creating unhealthy conditions. Obedience to authority, normative conformity and group loyalty are essential yet can also create intense social pressure to fit in, to conform and above all, to stay silent. Power and hierarchies are critical to effective command but signal that it is acceptable for individuals to use social power against others.

Members need to know that their buddy will have their back when the brown stuff hits the rotating object, but this means people are constantly judging others to see if they measure up, and outdated stereotypes continue to put women under the microscope to constantly be tested and forced to prove they can do the job.

My comments lead to a key issue. The first objective of Operation Honour is to have leadership-driven culture change. There still is no clarity regarding which aspects of CAF culture are to be changed and which will be allowed to remain the same. The central question for this committee is whether this is a decision CAF leaders will make on their own.

Finally, as would my other colleagues, I would identify that I am speaking on the basis of my academic expertise, but I would note a slight correction, that after 33 years, I retired with the rank of naval captain.

Thank you. I look forward to your questions.

[The Chair, Liberal, Karen McCrimmon]

All right. My apologies, sir.

Thank you very much, Dr. Okros.

We'll open the floor for questions.

Madam Alleslev, go ahead, please.

[Randall Garrison, NDP, Esquimalt—Saanich—Sooke, BC]

On a point of order, Madam Chair, given that this is our last day of scheduled testimony from witnesses, I have a couple of questions that I think will be key to how we spend our time with the witnesses today.

The first is whether we have any advice as to whether the military ombudsman will be appearing before the committee on the question of whether the former chief of the defence staff was allowed to remain in office when these allegations against him were known.

The second is whether we have had any indication that the minister would like to return now that we have had a second chief of the defence staff subject to investigation, according to media reports, for more than a month and, again, the minister did nothing but left it to the chief of the defence staff to voluntarily step aside.

I wonder if we have either of those indications, because those will, I know in my case, determine how we spend time today.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Karen McCrimmon]

All right. Thank you, Mr. Garrison, but that is really not a point of order; it's more debate. I can tell you that the former ombudsman did reply to the summons and affirmed that he will attend next Wednesday. The other question is debate.

We will go on with questions.

Madam Alleslev, go ahead, please.

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB]

On a point of order before we move on, Madam Chair, for whatever reason, when you're speaking, we get just a screen on here that says “House of Commons”. We cannot actually see you through the Zoom in our virtual meeting.

Also, just to add to Mr. Garrison's point, I don't believe that what he is talking about is debate. He's talking about procedure and conduct for this meeting based upon any future meetings that we may have and witnesses that we may want to call, all of which is germane to the study at hand, so I believe that it is admissible to have these discussions.

[The Chair, Liberal, Karen McCrimmon]

Mr. Bezan, I'm sorry, but I disagree. We have published the notice of meeting for this particular meeting. We have very esteemed guests with us today who have a lot to offer on this situation and to the discussion. If you want to have this discussion at the end of the meeting, I'm pleased to do that. If you are asking me to put aside 15 minutes at the end of the meeting, that I can do.

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB]

Please do so.

[The Chair, Liberal, Karen McCrimmon]

All right.

Madam Alleslev.

[Leona Alleslev, Conservative, Aurora—Oak Ridges—Richmond Hill, ON]

Thank you very much, Madam Chair, and thank you to all the witnesses for some fundamental testimony.

In each of your statements, you've made it clear that there remains a problem in the Canadian Armed Forces with respect to this topic; that progress has barely been made, if at all; that the military culture is, by design, strong; and that policy is not successful, necessarily, in changing that culture.

Also, now that we see that it's at the most senior level, that they're not isolated incidents and that more officers are implicated by their actions and/or their silence, we recognize that this problem has actually been 30 years in the making, because military culture starts at military college or as junior officers.

When it comes to the battle between policy and culture, policy is clearly losing. This is not the first time. We had the sexual harassment and racism prevention program in the nineties, and that summarily failed. Now we have attempted to do a similar repeat with Operation Honour without changing the foundational elements.

My question for all of you is, how do we change the fundamental cultural elements? It clearly cannot be done from within. Also, even more importantly, how do we set the tone and hold accountable all of those who may be complicit in perpetuating the culture at these senior officer levels?

[The Chair, Liberal, Karen McCrimmon]

If anyone has an answer, go ahead and jump right in.

Dr. English.

[Dr. Allan English]

I can start. That's a great question and a very complex one. It sounds like one that we go over in some of my seminars.

I think the short answer in all of this is that armed forces are very good—and the Canadian Forces are excellent—in dealing with short-term, well-defined problems. That's what they're set up to do, but because they have very rapid turnover in leadership positions—every two to three years, the leaders change—they have a lot of trouble maintaining focus over long-term problems. That's why they're generally not very effective at long-term problems, in my view.

Really, the only way to be successful—and I think just about everyone has mentioned it—is to have an external body, a truly external body, to hold people to account, even though the senior leadership might change. Just as a small fact that may interest you, over the five years between when Operation Honour was released and “The Path to Dignity and Respect” was released, there were seven vice chiefs of the defence staff. The vice chief of the defence staff was responsible for the oversight of Operation Honour. That is a pretty stark example of one of the reasons why it didn't succeed.

To me, an external body is essential. One example—

[Leona Alleslev, Conservative, Aurora—Oak Ridges—Richmond Hill, ON]

Would you include as well in that external body an external body to hold accountable people who potentially have committed infractions?

[Dr. Allan English]

Personally, I think I'd separate them out. I think there needs to be one to supervise the culture change and then another one, perhaps, to hold individuals to account, because the culture change job is such a big project. It really needs a dedicated group. The most recent example was that after the Somalia scandal and the Somalia reforms, the minister appointed a minister's monitoring committee that reported directly to him, and he was able to hold the CAF to account.

There are a lot of different models. I think I'll stop there and let others talk.

[The Chair, Liberal, Karen McCrimmon]

All right.

Go ahead, Dr. von Hlatky.

[Dr. Stéfanie von Hlatky]

I think we can recognize the opacity of the current culture. I want us to switch the framing from operational effectiveness to organizational effectiveness. Operation Honour framed misconduct as a problem that undermines operational effectiveness; and I think moving forward, it would be prudent to talk about organizational health. Organizational effectiveness is a prerequisite for operational effectiveness, and the way that the forces get ready for operations is through training exercises and certification. You plan and practice until your instincts are right, and even in difficult. complex environments with high stress and sleep deprivation, you will perform in a way that is consistent with your training.

On the other hand, we have Operation Honour training, which consists of passing on information about sexual misconduct. It's ticking the box, and we don't worry so much about how the information is retained or applied beyond monitoring who's up to date on their training and who's not.

While I fully agree with my colleagues that it's important to look at culture, I think it's important to look at culture through different phases of the career and at how military identity is developed throughout these stages. I also really believe in the importance of some more bureaucratic fixes, and training is one of them. We need to give this kind of training as much importance as the other types of training that happen in the military. Here, I think a different approach is needed, and—

[Leona Alleslev, Conservative, Aurora—Oak Ridges—Richmond Hill, ON]

Thank you.

I'd like to hear from Mr. Okros, if I could.

[Dr. Alan Okros]

Thank you.

I'll make two shorter comments. The first one is we tend to talk about CAF culture, and I think it's important to recognize there are multiple facets of culture internally within the Canadian Armed Forces. It's a complex issue. One of the challenges is understanding what culture looks like and how it's lived down at unit levels and small team levels, because there are differences. That's the first part that I would offer.

The second comment, to concur with Dr. English's comment, is that there is a difference between understanding and implementing culture change versus investigations of wrongdoing. They require different mechanisms, they require different frameworks, and they lead to different outcomes and initiatives. I would agree we need to keep these two things separate—

[Leona Alleslev, Conservative, Aurora—Oak Ridges—Richmond Hill, ON]

Outside of the Canadian Forces...or do you believe they can do it from within?

[Dr. Alan Okros]

I do not have the expertise to talk on detail, but I would point out there is a lengthy history of research and review of military discipline and justice systems, including by previous committees. I think care needs to be taken when there are efforts made to make changes to those.

[The Chair, Liberal, Karen McCrimmon]

All right, thank you very much.

We move on to Monsieur Robillard, please.