Thank you, Madam Chair.
I appreciate the opportunity to contribute to the committee' work on this important matter. I have had the privilege to serve this country at home and abroad for more than 35 years. This has provided me the opportunity to work closely with national security organizations like the Canadian Armed Forces both internationally and domestically.
It is obviously a very challenging time for the Canadian Forces, particularly for women. As your work proceeds to identify pathways to address these challenges, I would be remiss if I did not underline how much I have been impressed by the dedication and work of its members. Now as a private but interested citizen, I can only hope that the institution can build on its rich tradition to nurture an environment where female members can express their talent without fear of harassment or inappropriate behaviours.
I served as national security and intelligence officer to the Prime Minister for two years from May 2016 to May 2018 after several deputy minister appointments, the more recent being Global Affairs Canada and Canadian Heritage.
The role and functions of the advisor mirror the role and functions of the Privy Council Office, namely, providing independent advice, supporting the cabinet process and promoting the coherence and co-ordination of policy and programs of the national security organizations within the respect of their respective mandates.
I understand that the interest of the committee is primarily around the responsibilities of the advisor in ensuring that there is an appropriate vetting process for Governor in Council appointees at the time of selection, renewal or should allegations surface in the course of their appointment.
I wish to stress that my remarks and answers today will focus on the norms and practices that were in place during my term as advisor, norms and practices that for the most part have been in place for years.
As committee members have heard from previous witnesses, the responsibility to support the Governor in Council's appointment process resides with the Senior Personnel Secretariat of the Privy Council Office, or PCO. When it comes to the conduct of security background checks, the secretariat relies on the support of the Security Operations Division, SECOPS, that is part of the PCO. The responsibility of SECOPS is to work with the relevant mandated and expert partner agencies to confirm that the person being considered for an appointment does not pose a security risk, has no criminal background or other liabilities that could undermine their reliability to serve.
There are dozens of GIC appointments that take place every year. Given the need to protect the confidentiality of these appointments, the vetting process operates on a strict need-to-know basis. By this I mean that PCO senior personnel refers directly the names and information of potential GIC appointees who require a background check to SECOPS. The NSIA does not see the names and details of any potential appointee unless something comes up in the background check that raises concerns, from a security perspective, with the appointment.
This process respects the principle of need to know, while ensuring that senior level attention is devoted to information that could put in question the reliability of a GIC candidate to serve. The number of cases where such information surfaces is a handful. In any of these situations, the NSIA will engage very closely with the relevant senior officials in PCO senior personnel, given their lead responsibility for the appointment process.
I know that the interest of your deliberations today is to understand what happens if allegations were to surface while someone is already serving under a GIC appointment. This is also a rare occurrence. It may come directly to the NSIA, particularly if the allegations were already being investigated for a possible criminal offence, for example, by the RCMP, or a security dimension, let's say, by CSIS. In such situations, the NSIA would review the information, take the appropriate course of action and eventually engage with senior personnel.
In situations where the source of the allegation is not an established investigative body, it will most often come to the attention of PCO senior personnel. In such situations, if the nature of the allegation raises security concerns and may require the co-operation of an established investigative or screening agency, PCO senior personnel may turn to the NSIA for advice and, if warranted, follow-up actions. If the allegation does not engage security or criminality, there would likely be no reason to inform and engage the NSIA.
With regard to the specific allegations this committee has been examining—and I am referring to allegations made in 2015, prior to the appointment of the previous chief of the defence staff and the subsequent allegations made against him in the spring of 2018—I wish to make the following comments.
As the committee has heard, the 2015 allegations occurred prior to my term as NSIA, and none of these have ever come to my attention either prior to or once I became the national security adviser.
With regard to the subsequent 2018 allegations which, according to testimony, first emerged in a meeting between the former ombudsman and the Minister of National Defence and were subsequently brought to the attention of officials at the PMO and the Privy Council Office, I wish to indicate that these 2018 allegations were never brought to my attention.
I also think it is important to add that this is not necessarily unusual, particularly, as I explained before, if PCO senior personnel were not able to obtain information that would have allowed and warranted the pursuit of an investigation.
Madam Chair, this brings me to the end of my opening remarks. I will be happy to answer your questions to the best of my ability. I would, however, like to conclude by reiterating a few important points.
Like most Canadians, I am someone who cherishes the proud history of the Canadian forces. As a former official who has served Canadians through various roles with a nexus to the national security community, I have enjoyed a fruitful partnership with the Canadian Armed Forces. I can only hope that through collective efforts, including the work of this committee, women serving in this important institution can aspire to lead and contribute to the fullest extent without the fear of harassment in any form.
Thank you.