National Defence Committee on April 29th, 2024

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

I call this meeting to order.

Colleagues, as you know, I don't normally read the chair's notes. This is because I think most people have read these chair's notes about 150 times, and if you haven't figured them out by now, you're never going to. However, there are some changes, and I'm going to take this opportunity to read the chair's notes with respect to avoiding audio feedback.

The first one is that in order to prevent disruptive and potentially harmful audio feedback—incidents that can cause injuries—participants are reminded to keep their earpieces away from the microphones at all times.

Second, as of Monday, April 29, the following measures are being taken to prevent audio feedback. All earpieces have been replaced by a model that greatly reduces audio feedback. New earpieces are here. The former ones were grey. These ones are black. Please use only the black ones. All unused earpieces will be unplugged at the start of the meeting. When not using the earpiece, please place it face-down on the middle of the sticker. There's a sticker on the thing here. I'm sure the clerk is going to have to remind the chair to do that.

Please consult the cards on the table for these guidelines.

The room layout has been adjusted to increase the distance between the microphones. It's more like a football field. I can barely see Brigadier-General Adamson's name there, but I'm sure he's here.

Those are the changes that have been put in place in order to cut down on audio feedback, which has been difficult for our interpreters. Thank you all for your anticipated co-operation.

As a reminder, wait until I, as the chair, recognize you. I'll remind you that comments should be addressed through the chair.

This is the start of our study on the defence of space.

I'd like to welcome our witnesses for the first hour. We have Lieutenant-General Blaise Frawley, deputy commander of the North American Aerospace Defense Command. We also have Brigadier-General Michael Adamson, commander of 3 Canadian Space Division.

Welcome, Generals Frawley and Adamson. I'll invite whoever is going to make the opening five-minute statement. I look forward to hearing what you have to say. We'll then go to our rounds of questions.

It's over to Brigadier-General Adamson for five minutes.

[Brigadier-General Michael Adamson, Commander, 3 Canadian Space Division, Canadian Armed Forces]

Good morning, Mr. Chair and committee members.

I am Brigadier-General Mike Adamson, Commander of Canada's 3rd Space Division and Commander of the Joint Force Space Component.

As the commander of 3 Canadian Space Division, I am responsible for the administrative functions of the division, which include the generation and development of personnel, strategic engagements with international allies and domestic partners, and identifying the operational capability deficiencies and needs. As the joint force space component commander, I am responsible for the delivery and use of space capability to support Canadian Armed Forces operations at home and abroad.

Space in the CAF has been evolving for over 20 years. Its first iteration, director of space development, was formed in 1997. The 3 Canadian Space Division was established on July 22, 2022, representing the operationalization of the space domain within the CAF. This reorganization has streamlined how we meet our mandate, which is supporting CAF operations with space effects, maintaining space domain awareness, and defending and protecting military space capabilities.

The focus of 3 Canadian Space Division is on the administrative business of the division, as well as developing and maintaining partnerships with our national and international space allies. The 7 Wing was also stood up subordinate to 3 Canadian Space Division. It is primarily focused on planning and coordinating the delivery of space effects.

The space domain is, as you can imagine, constantly evolving and changing. The growing accessibility of space means it is no longer limited to state players. Rather, we have seen incredible growth in civil and commercial activity as well as nefarious capability development by disruptive actors.

This creates challenges, as the space environment is becoming more congested, contested and competitive, making it an increasingly difficult environment in which to operate. It also increases the vulnerability of critical capabilities, potentially affecting the long-term sustainability of space-based services.

That is why Canada is working with other like-minded spacefaring nations to advance the development of responsible behaviours and identify how to reduce the risks of misunderstanding and miscalculations in the space domain.

As such, my priorities for the division are clear. The first is to maintain relevance within space alliance frameworks. The second is to maintain assured access to the space domain to support CAF operations at home and abroad. The third is the continued evolution of the space division and the CAF space operations enterprise.

Since our establishment, 3 Canadian Space Division has been focused on increasing what I have dubbed the “space-mindedness” within the CAF. That is the mindset that acknowledges the critical dependency that every CAF operation and activity has on space.

Space is just as vital to the day-to-day activities of Canadians. Space services power the stock market, provide Internet and cell phone services, get emergency services to where they're needed and even deliver meals to our doorsteps.

Part of my role is to ensure that space remains accessible and peaceful for the benefit of all, so that Canadians can continue to enjoy the services we rely on.

I appreciate the invitation to speak to you today and the opportunity to build space-mindedness within the Canadian public, and I welcome your questions about space and defence.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Thank you.

Ms. Gallant, you have six minutes.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

Thank you.

This February—

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

I'm sorry. I apologize.

You have five minutes, please, sir.

[Lieutenant-General Blaise Frawley, Deputy Commander, North American Aerospace Defence Command, Canadian Armed Forces]

Good morning, Mr. Chair and members of the committee, and thank you for the opportunity to testify today.

I am Lieutenant-General Blaise Frawley, Deputy Commander of the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD), headquartered in Colorado Springs.

As Deputy Commander of NORAD, my role is to support General Gregory Guillot, Commander of NORAD, in the execution of our binational command's missions, namely aerospace warning, aerospace control and maritime warning.

Within aerospace warning and aerospace control, NORAD relies on space-based capabilities every day for providing threat warning and attack assessment, communication, navigation, intelligence gathering, reconnaissance, weather tracking and much more. There is nothing we do as a joint binational partner command that is not enabled or enhanced by space power.

While NORAD is not responsible for space defence, General Guillot has expressed that awareness and protection of the space domain is absolutely critical. As modern threats continue to blur the lines between air and space, it is now more important than ever that Canada and the U.S. work collaboratively in both domains, such as we are doing with the Arctic over-the-horizon radar initiative, to defend North America and better integrate space-mindedness into our operational environment.

Thank you, Mr. Chair, for the opportunity to address this committee, and I look forward to your questions.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Thank you.

Ms. Gallant, you have six minutes.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

Thank you.

This February, the U.S. House intelligence committee chairman, Republican Mike Turner, disclosed a new threat by Russia to deploy a new anti-satellite weapon. How imminent is this new threat?

[BGen Michael Adamson]

Mr. Chair, thanks very much. It's a great question and certainly an issue that concerns us significantly. We are working with the American space force and space command in order to understand what that threat might be and what implications that might pose to activities in the domain.

We don't believe, at the moment, that there is any imminent threat, but as we look with the Americans and our allies to understand what might be going on, that's certainly something that in due course would be communicated to those who would be implicated.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

It was indicated that the new weapon developed by Russia may utilize nuclear weapons to destroy satellites. How credible is it, at this point, that it is feasible to do that in the near future?

[BGen Michael Adamson]

I think that, as a feasibility, certainly it is a possibility, but I don't think that we're able to conclusively determine at this point that it is in fact what the nature of the weapon might be.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

If Russia were to use nuclear bombs in space, what are the consequences if they were to detonate a nuclear device in low-earth orbit? Could you...?

[BGen Michael Adamson]

Certainly, it's a great question, and one that we're trying to understand ourselves. We've seen in the past, in the 1950s and 1960s, that there were tests done with these kinds of weapons in space, which provided, I think, a bit of a benchmark in case something like that were to occur again. It's probably worth stating as well that international law prohibits the placement of nuclear weapons in space, so this would be a direct violation of that and certainly counter to accepted norms of behaviour that we would expect from any spacefaring nation.

The impact and implications of something like that, I think, would be considerable in terms of what it might do to pollute the environment, how it might directly affect satellites that were in the near vicinity of such a blast—and certainly it would be a cause for concern that we might, in fact, lose some of the utility of some of those satellites if they're not appropriately hardened.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

And the impact on earth...?

[BGen Michael Adamson]

It really depends on the altitude at which something like that would happen, but I don't think we would expect there would be a direct impact on earth.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

According to a leaked U.S. intelligence report, China is building a sophisticated cyber-weapon—or more than one—to seize control of enemy satellites, rendering them useless for data signals or surveillance during wartime. How prepared is Canada to deal with this, and what is the financial allocation out of this budget to work towards getting our assets hardened?

[BGen Michael Adamson]

That's another great question.

That really speaks to the equities and expertise of my colleague on the Joint Force Cyber Component Command. It's certainly within their wheelhouse to understand that threat and how we might counter it.

Certainly, from our perspective, it is a concern. The space infrastructure we concern ourselves with consists of activities or platforms or vehicles that are on orbit in space. Obviously ground infrastructure would be a concern, and then the link between the two, the communication signal between those two, are all potential avenues for our adversaries to try to affect what we're doing and to degrade our capabilities.

On anything further than that, though, on the cyber front, I would have to defer to my cyber colleagues.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

Within the last several months, a satellite from China came very close to one of our North American defence satellites. It was eclipsing our satellite for a while. Is there any indication that the Chinese satellite obtained any information or changed any of the coordinates or did anything to the North American defence satellite?

[BGen Michael Adamson]

At this point, I would say there's no indication that it caused us to change, or would cause our allies to change, anything they're doing on orbit. Certainly we watch that with great interest. The ability to understand that kind of activity on orbit speaks to the criticality of space domain awareness and how important it is that we, either through our own contributions or by being plugged into wider allied efforts, be able to understand who's doing what on orbit—if a satellite, for instance, is approaching one of our own—and be able to attribute those actions to whoever might be responsible for that activity.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

The intelligence committee in the United States is also saying that nuclear weapons could be launched in space by placing the weapon into orbit. Is that possible right now? Do we know that it's not currently in place?

[BGen Michael Adamson]

We've not seen that at this point, so I don't believe that is something we're concerned with. Is it theoretically possible? It could potentially be, at some point down the road, but it's not something we're dealing with at the moment.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

You still have a minute. Go ahead.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

I'll go back to the Chinese Communist-owned satellites.

What, if anything, do they have to do with these balloons? Have you had any more sightings or experiences with any of these balloons that were such a concern a number of months ago?

[BGen Michael Adamson]

Mr. Chair, I'll defer to my NORAD colleague.

[LGen Blaise Frawley]

As far as a link between the satellites and balloons goes, we at the unclassified level have not seen any link between the two, other than the fact that a balloon flying over North America could be collecting surveillance data.

There are thousands of balloons that fly over North America every year.