National Defence Committee on Oct. 25th, 2022

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Let's call this meeting to order.

This is meeting number 35 of the Standing Committee on National Defence.

We have with us today three professors, who are probably prone to giving long-winded lectures. I apologize in advance for cutting you off at five minutes. I find that the back and forth between professor and students is much more interesting than the presentations.

I'm going to call on Professor Huebert, then Professor Kimball and Professor Massie for five minutes each, and then the balance of the hour and a half we'll devote to questions and answers.

With that, I'll call on Professor Huebert.

Thank you for making yourself available this morning.

[Dr. Robert Huebert, Associate Professor, University of Calgary, As an Individual]

Thank you very much for this privilege of being able to share some thoughts about what is becoming, in my view, one of the critical existential threats that Canada faces to its security. What I want to talk about in my five minutes is the increasing threat of the geopolitics to Canadian security writ large, but also Canadian security in the Arctic.

Let me begin by saying that I am seeing now a developing...what I would call the ordinance syndrome, whereby we are trying to diminish the Russian threat. I would take very strong opposition to it.

The geopolitical threat is based on three elements.

The first one is intent. We have a country, Russia, that is intent on being an expansionary power, and we see this from its treatment of Chechens, Georgians, and Ukrainians in 2014. I don't think we should underestimate what that means for Canadian security.

The second part of the geopolitical threat—and this is the one that is probably not getting the attention it deserves—is the weapon technology. The critical point of why this is a threat to Canada is that the Russians, since Putin took power in 1999, have embarked upon a policy of developing a range of not only offensive, conventionally powered weapon systems, but also nuclear-powered weapon systems. What makes it an Arctic threat is the geography of Russia. Many of these weapon systems, both in terms of their surveillance communications but also the means of delivery, are based in the north. Therefore, we are faced with a growing geopolitical threat that is focused on tactical nuclear weapons, something that Canada has not fully addressed at this point in time.

We also have to be aware that the Americans have become aware of this growing threat, as evidenced both by a series of strategies that they began to develop by 2016-17 and by a redevelopment of some of their key delivery systems. As a result, we are entering into a new and much more dangerous international era. I suspect that we are going to be seeing, not necessarily the breakdown of nuclear deterrence, but an increasing viability of the possibility of nuclear war fighting, because of these new weapon systems and the intent that is now developing between these two states.

Canada is at risk, for two core reasons.

First and foremost, Canada is, of course, a member of the alliance system that is arrayed against the Russian aggression. This includes both NORAD and NATO. Even if somehow we could geographically isolate ourselves from the result of any form of conflict, be it low probability but still there, any type of conflict would automatically involve us.

However, the real danger to the Canadian Arctic is that, from a defensive position, there are several scenarios we might want to explore. Of course, a limited first strike against North American bases may in fact be the route that the Russians decide to go, in essence trying to blind the Americans by a strike on Thule, and possibly Anchorage, as a means of facilitating a limited nuclear intervention in Europe.

Once again, I want to stress that this is a low probability, but we start seeing the variables coming together. That means that the probability, unfortunately, in my estimation, has increased. As a result, the biggest danger is that Canada has to ensure it is doing its part to allow for protection.

The defence against such a Russian intervention—and possibly even in the longer term, China, and we can talk about that in detail—is twofold.

First of all, we have to demonstrate to the Russians that the defence of North America is seamless, in terms of both the surveillance capability and its delivery capability. This is basically enforcing what General VanHerck, the head of NORTHCOM and NORAD, referred to as extended deterrence.

Second of all, we need to convince the Russians that our commitment is as strong as the Americans' in the defence of the North American homeland. This means, of course, getting the type of weapon systems and capabilities that will assume that in fact such a conflict is possible. The best way of avoiding such a conflict is actually defending against it.

Thank you very much. I look forward to the questions.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Thank you. That was very professional, right within five minutes.

Professor Kimball, you have the floor, for five minutes please.

[Prof. Anessa Kimball, Full Professor, Université Laval, As an Individual]

I thank the standing committee for this invitation to discuss issues associated with Arctic security. These comments are drawn from an understanding of the strategic problems associated with securing the Arctic, alongside the intersecting issues and asymmetric capacities creating challenges for Canada and its partners.

Currently, what we have is a set of partially overlapping institutional arrangements that attempt to manage Arctic challenges concerning great power competition. For example, the Arctic Council's mandates are circumscribed, preventing the securitization of the region by focusing on the environmental and human security aspects. The absence of strong security institutions is shaped by distrust and a lack of confidence when it comes to compliance and monitoring of any sort of security guarantees, ergo the security dilemma.

Of course, we are concerned about Russian reactions. It goes without saying that NATO's enlargement to include Finland and Sweden would enhance multilateral security in the region for Canada and its partners. I'd be happy to speak to that in the question and answer period.

If we're looking at the strategic problems in the Arctic, we can characterize them under the following approaches. The ones we are supporting right now represent a minimal cost to mitigating issues, for example, codifying norms of behaviour in the region with respect to the environment, durable development, and the participation of the communities in the region.

Second, there are ongoing efforts to encourage the positive and discourage the negative externalities of state actions in the region, particularly when it comes to the environment.

Of course, rational institutionalists would say these are the easiest behaviours, but observance and compellence through enforcement are a central concern that we have not addressed strategically or institutionally.

One key aspect of competition in the region is concerns over distribution, which is a central strategic problem we are trying to mitigate through institutions and agreements. This involves the protection of exclusive economic zones and the potential for the degradation of these zones with increasing commercial and military traffic in the area. Increasing militarization of the region due to great power competition significantly raises the risk of accidental crises. Moreover, Russia's demonstrated difficulty in complying with commitments, as we've seen in Ukraine around past security guarantees and humanitarian corridors, does not make it much of a credible partner, even if a bargain could be struck.

Finally, uncertainty about future actor behaviour by both Russia and China creates more problems. For example, China has increasing interest in the region, but it is not integrated into any institutions. It is an observer to the Arctic Council, but has identified the Arctic as an increasingly important strategic region for rivalry and resource extraction. It's set to complete its heavy icebreakers by 2025, creating the potential for a polar silk road, part of its larger belt and road initiative. While some seek to tamper this discourse in China, its actions in the Arctic evidence a state seeking to secure influence and access.

Documents produced recently by the Chinese military offer a more militarized perspective, using terms such as “a game of great powers” and “a struggle over and control of global public spaces”, which is how it views the Arctic.

Engaging a public goods analogy over the space signals to those states currently operating in the region that China has rights to invest in the region and create research stations concerning resource extraction. Of course, this would also enable it to gain important experience operating in the climate.

Its polar silk road offers a competing framework for development, and Chinese firms have increasingly been trying to buy territory in areas that would give them strategic access. However, China’s success thus far in the region appears to be more limited than its ambitions.

There is some ambiguity concerning what China's endgame is in the Arctic. On the other hand, Russia remains quite transparent about seeking and maintaining military capabilities in the region to diversify its capacities, as it sees this region as open for competition and rivalry.

Perhaps the most crucial strategic problem pressing stakeholders is uncertainty about the future state of the world. For the last two decades, there have been claims of a slow decline of the U.S. relative to China, economically and politically. The reality is that the U.S. and many other Arctic states have sufficient capacities to jointly secure the region in a crisis. This would not be without retasking assets from other missions or regions. The current configuration of defence assets in the region offers a level of deterrence from ambition but is not sufficiently strong to deter incursions into the aerial and maritime spaces.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Unfortunately, I'm going to have to stop you there.

We'll leave the rest for questions and answers.

Finally, Professor Massie, you have five minutes, please.

[Dr. Justin Massie, Full Professor, Université du Québec à Montréal, As an Individual]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Ladies and gentlemen, I will be speaking in French and will be using my notes to help the interpreters with their work.

According to conventional wisdom, we should consider the security environment in the Arctic as being relatively safe, with no signs of the turbulence that we see in other regions of the world, which are much more threatened by conflicts and where opportunities for cooperation are not as favourable. This has been the case for a long time, but two new trends are calling into question the assumptions that have underpinned Canadian's strategic approach, which has long been guided by the conviction that we are living in a region which is safe and free of threat.

The two trends are as follows.

Firstly, competition between the great powers has intensified, and this is clearly shown by the return of high-intensity war in Europe and competing strategies.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

I'm feeling sympathetic for the interpreter, because she is just ripping along, as are you.

Could we go more slowly, please?

Thank you.

[Dr. Justin Massie]

Of course. It is quite possible that I won't be able to read out my statement in full if I go more slowly. I could always provide more information to the members of the committee during the round of questions.

We are currently seeing two significant trends that weren't there previously. Firstly, competition between the major powers has intensified, as we can see by the new high-intensity war in Europe. Secondly, there have been upheavals brought about by climate change, and we have seen more domestic operations led by the Canadian Armed Forces who have provided support to civilian authorities.

These two trends are not recent. The major powers' military forces have been modernizing their technology for quite a while now, and obviously climate change is nothing new. However, the co‑existence of both trends creates a threat that is forcing Canada to redirect much more of its strategic attention and its resources to its home base, and by that I mean on Canadian soil.

Historically, Canada has always had an advanced vision of security, meaning that it would intervene abroad to prevent conflicts from coming to it. Currently, these interventions are taking place on Canadian soil. This has transformed Canada's strategic thought.

I believe that the Canadian government should consider two main threats.

Firstly, climate change has led to more marine traffic in Canadian inland waters and in its exclusive economic zone, whether it be for fishing, transportation, tourism, research or military operations, and the major revisionist powers will take advantage of that.

The second threat is the strategic ambitions of revisionist states. Not only are they developing their conventional capacity to reach Canada, with tactical nuclear weapons, as mentioned earlier, as well as hypersonic missiles, submarines and drones, but they are also using strategies that fall under the threshold of armed conflict. They are investing in critical infrastructure, such as the mining industry, including rare metals. These sectors play an important role in Canada's economic development but are very vulnerable.

While we welcome recent investments in Canada's defence capabilities as per the 2017 policy, there are still many gaps. One of the main gaps is the absence of planning, whether budgetary or operational, for replacing the fleet of Canadian submarines. These are essential to the security of Canadian waters. Whether we consider that the Northwest Passage is in Canadian or international waters, we still need that capacity. The fact that we are not planning to replace the fleet leads us to believe that we will lose that defence capacity. If we had to invest in a new fleet of nuclear submarines, as Australia is doing, the cost would be so high that we would have to use the money budgeted for other Canadian defence priority items.

I believe we should review the Canadian Armed Forces' approach in matters of defence by looking at Norway and Sweden and what they call total defence. This is a whole-of-society approach based on the resiliency of all society stakeholders, whether they be civilians, industrial and commercial actors or the military, in order to better resist in times of crisis. This approach is also based on a high and low intensity deterrent capacity that mobilizes the entire population in a multidimensional conflict, rather than stand-alone operations based on conventional and non-conventional defence.

In conclusion, you might find it odd that I am talking about threats that are not immediate, whereas there is a considerably significant threat of the war in Ukraine escalating horizontally or vertically. This is what my colleague Mr. Robert Huebert was alluding to earlier. However, the threats that I have been describing are not insignificant, given that we would have to invest right now to protect ourselves. You know as well as I do that developing defence capacity and military procurement in Canada is not something that can be done quickly. In order to gain the capacity to defend Canada and its territory in 10 or 15 years, we have to make those difficult choices today.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Thank you.

I think, colleagues, we can get through three rounds. The first is a six-minute round. I have Madam Kramp-Neuman, Mr. Fisher, Madame Normandin and Madam Mathyssen for six minutes each, please.

[Shelby Kramp-Neuman, Conservative, Hastings—Lennox and Addington, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you to those who spoke to us this morning. All of you have provided some good content.

I'm going to start with Professor Huebert. There are a couple of things that you acknowledged and that I would like to underscore. First, you mentioned that we need to demonstrate that our defence is seamless. I couldn't agree more. Second, you acknowledged that the best way to avoid conflict is to defend against it. Again, I couldn't underscore that more.

What I'm going to be speaking to today is the shortfalls of personnel that require urgency and priority.

My first question is for Professor Huebert. Yesterday, retired General Rick Hillier suggested that the personnel problem in our Canadian Armed Forces might be worse than the one in 10 shortages the current CDS spoke of. He suggests that the numbers he is hearing from within the military are such that we can muster a force of about 45,000 and, within that 45,000, a significant number are not operationally deployable today.

If that's accurate, it's truly staggering and it would mean that we are pushing 50% surge capacity in all areas: NORAD, NATO and other domestic deployment. If he's right, do you believe that critical shortage means the collapse of the Canadian Armed Forces?

[Dr. Robert Huebert]

I don't think we're at the point where we can characterize it as a collapse, but we are facing a disaster. I would agree with those who point out that our inability to meet the numbers we have set ourselves in terms of overall personnel numbers is a critical problem facing Canada, as in fact is our inability to even have that discussion about an expansion of the numbers.

It's everything. When we reflect upon what my two co-speakers are saying about what we need to do now in terms of difficult choices, we need to be preparing. Just the numbers that we officially say we're supposed to be at are problematic. When we hear, of course, these reports that the numbers are nowhere near that, that's where the crisis starts coming.

I would add that the threat we are facing is of the highest technological level. That is the type of threat. We're not talking about the boots on the ground that the Ukrainians have to deal with in terms of the actual fighting they are facing. Ours is a high-level technology threat. That means the numbers in and of themselves are important, but it also points to our inability to properly train, with the length of time that training requires, to meet these threats. I think all of this is coming together when....

Consider the fact that Russia is the major geopolitical threat that we have. They've had a GDP that on average has been less than Canada's, and yet they have created this military capability that is now destabilizing the entire international system. On the other hand, Canada, with a higher GDP, has not been able to ensure that we have adequate numbers. It points to the problem all three of us are illustrating, that we are not taking the threat seriously.

[Shelby Kramp-Neuman, Conservative, Hastings—Lennox and Addington, ON]

Thank you for that.

To complement what you're saying, I'll add a supplementary question. This committee has heard that our tenuous hold on the Arctic is not just due to the lack of material support in terms of equipment. You spoke to the trained personnel in the military and to the different levels of training for different deployments in the military. Has this complicated our ability to project our rights and diplomatic fears? How much more can our military capabilities suffer before even allies begin to challenge our ability to project our own sovereignty in the north?

[Dr. Robert Huebert]

There's always a bit of a tendency for everybody to conflate sovereignty concerns with security. Let me be clear: Sovereignty is about our ability to acknowledge that these waters are internal waters and that we have complete control. That tends to be an issue of international law. The issue you're really pointing to is our ability to ensure the security of the region, both domestically and internationally.

Domestically, we're actually probably not too badly off, thanks to the rangers and our ability to be able to consolidate our understanding of how to operate. It's as soon as you get into the international and to what you point to—this conflation between sovereignty and security. The fear that Canadian policy-makers have always had to face is at what point our inability to provide for the defence of our Arctic region means our allies have to step in and do what they think is responsible. Traditionally, that has focused only on the Americans. There remains the fear—and when we look at the possible political outcomes of the American election, I think these fears are even amplified—that the Americans will simply act in the way they think is necessary.

The other part of the coin that we haven't talked about is that there has been a substantial re-arming of the Nordic countries, including in the form of Finland's and Sweden's entry into NATO, that means our Nordic allies now take northern defence that much more seriously. I think the fact that they may in fact start seeing us as not doing our part to contribute will hurt our relations with them and raise questions about how we then participate in the greater surveillance capabilities that we need to have to deter the Russians and, in the long term, the Chinese.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

You have about 15 seconds.

[Shelby Kramp-Neuman, Conservative, Hastings—Lennox and Addington, ON]

Okay. At this point, I would like to thank all of the witnesses.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Thank you.

Mr. Fisher, you have six minutes.

[Darren Fisher, Liberal, Dartmouth—Cole Harbour, NS]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair, and thank you to our academic experts who are here today. This is absolutely fascinating testimony.

Professor Huebert, you talked about Russia being the biggest geopolitical threat. I think we would all agree with that, but we've also seen that Russia's land forces have been severely diminished as a result of the invasion of Ukraine. Also, just candidly, it seems like maybe a lot of us would be surprised at their lack of success. Many of us would have thought they would end the war fairly quickly. We would see them as being certainly a massive military presence, and although I'm not suggesting that they aren't—their air and naval power is obviously still very significant—what kind of conventional threat do they realistically pose, Professor, in the global Arctic and, maybe more specifically, in the Canadian Arctic?

[Dr. Robert Huebert]

This is one of the favourite red herrings that many individuals who want to diminish the Russian threat to Canada often point out. It used to be a joke among some senior military leaders that the biggest threat they faced from Russia was how they were going to rescue them if they ever tried to invade any of Canada's Arctic islands or lands. The reality is that it has never been about a conventional land force invasion. I want to make it very clear: that is not what we are talking about. We did not talk about that during the Cold War and that is not the threat today. It is about aerospace, and it is about maritime.

I'd like to start off with a response to your initial premise in terms of difficulties the Russians have demonstrated in the land battle against the Ukrainians. One of the things that we have to watch and that we are all guilty of, basically, is ignoring the Russian military interventions when Canada and the western allies were involved with the Afghanistan and Iraq campaigns that were being conducted. Since the time they were occurring, the Russians have maintained a series of wars, starting in 1999 against the Chechens, in 2008 against Georgia, and then again in 2014 with the Ukrainians.

If we look at the Russian way of war, they do it very differently from us. We have what the Americans refer to as “shock and awe”. We like having that big punch; we use the highest tech, and the air force is intrinsically involved in all of this. What we've seen from the Russian way of war is the exact opposite. They like to bleed their enemy. They will use their least-trained troops first, and they will often come very close to what we think is a defeat, mainly to, basically, exhaust the enemy and then overwhelm them. We saw this with the Chechens and with the Georgians, and we saw this in the context of the eastern Ukraine in 2014.... Well, they did use shock and awe in the Crimea. I think the Ukrainians were not expecting the degree of intervention they saw.

We have to be very careful about drawing any conclusions, because we tend to compare it to ourselves. We say, that's not how we engage; that's not how we did it in Afghanistan and Iraq. Once again, remember, in Afghanistan we ultimately pulled out, so there are questions in terms of our utility, of how we conducted that combat. The Russians stopped Georgia from joining NATO; the Russians did succeed in putting down the Chechen revolution, and when the Russians seized Crimea they created very little international reaction. From a Russian perspective, their way of war is actually more effective than the western way of war.

Having said that, we return to the Canadian threat, and it is the aerospace and maritime. We need to be watching what the Russians did in cutting the cable to the Svalbard Islands in February of this year. We need to be looking at the Russian capability of destroying the Nord Stream cable. That all points to an undersea capability that we're not focusing on.

As you point out in your preamble, the Russians have not been using their air force to any degree whereby we can come to any meaningful assessment of its efficiency. The air force and the navy are what we would be facing in a threat, not land forces.

[Darren Fisher, Liberal, Dartmouth—Cole Harbour, NS]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

You have two minutes.

[Darren Fisher, Liberal, Dartmouth—Cole Harbour, NS]

I'll stick with Professor Huebert, but if there are comments from the other two, they can jump in.

I want to switch to remotely piloted systems and how that might change the nature of Arctic security. Also, my main question would be whether we are investing enough in this area.

Professor Huebert, could you respond for just 30 seconds or so, and then maybe give the other two witnesses a chance?

[Dr. Robert Huebert]

The big breakthrough that the Russians have made is in terms of their ability to use long-range underwater vehicles. The Poseidon is the best example. That was always the limiting factor. They seem to have cracked it. Are we doing anything in terms of our ability to respond? There's nothing that I've been able to detect in the open literature.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Professor Kimball.

[Prof. Anessa Kimball]

Yes, I'm very much on the same page: Canada could be doing much more in terms of what Russia is doing. Again, as Dr. Huebert said, with the Nordic duo entering into NATO, this will be good for Canada. I can speak a bit to that, but it should also be quite good in terms of contributions to NATO and monitoring in the north, particularly, so there is a bit of saving us there.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Mr. Massie.