I would add that from Canada's point of view, it is a good follower in NATO. Its strategic objective is to contribute more than it is to have any meaningful impact, I think, politically or strategically.
We've seen this in the desire simply to have a seat at the table instead of having any concrete impact with respect to its own national interest.
We see that in the limited capacity to send weapons to Ukrainians and in how we say we need to keep those in case there's a war against Russia. Russia is actually fighting that war currently in Ukraine, so that doesn't make sense to me.
We see it also with the inclusion of two new partners in NATO, Finland and Sweden, and the limited willingness to engage with these two towards developing greater partnerships. Because the deterrence of the Russian military in the Arctic will be mostly, I think, occurring in the attached region of the European Arctic, rather than in the Canadian Arctic in the short term, I think Canada needs to have that focus in mind as well. We could be much more proactive.
We also see this with its limited willingness to have any NATO involvement in the Canadian Arctic, vetoing the new NATO strategic concept and the fact that it doesn't even want to mention the Arctic in its strategic concept. I think there's a willingness to keep that just as a bilateral relationship with the United States, which I think limits Canada's capacity to engage multilaterally or bilaterally with other countries. I think that's a problem given the increasing unreliability of our southern neighbour with the coming presidential election in 2024.