You have about 30 seconds.
Evidence of meeting #35 for National Defence in the 44th Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was arctic.
A recording is available from Parliament.
Evidence of meeting #35 for National Defence in the 44th Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was arctic.
A recording is available from Parliament.
11:50 a.m.
Liberal
Emmanuella Lambropoulos Liberal Saint-Laurent, QC
At this point, I'll offer Ms. Kimball or Mr. Massie the chance to respond as well, if there's anything they would like to add.
11:50 a.m.
Full Professor, Université Laval, As an Individual
I would just note quickly that there are opportunities for Canada to do more on some of these outside things by joining more NATO centres of excellence. Canada is putting its first one up here in Montreal, but it's NATO's 30th. Canada, for instance, is not in the centre of excellence on energy security. It's not in the centre of excellence on northern operations. There are places where it could be profiting more from multilaterals and from our partners, but it's simply not taking advantage of those. I think there are places it could look to find this expertise and collaborate more.
11:50 a.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal John McKay
We're going to have to leave things there .
Madame Normandin, you have two and a half minutes.
11:50 a.m.
Bloc
Christine Normandin Bloc Saint-Jean, QC
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Professor Huebert, you explained how important it was for Canada to have a seamless defence system, both in terms of surveillance and delivery. However, Professor Massie has told us even if we can see the drones coming, we have absolutely nothing to shoot them down with, should the situation arise.
It was also mentioned that Canada has to prove that its commitment to security is just as strong as that of the United States. I understand that we were talking about potential enemies, but wouldn't it also be important that Canada provide proof of its commitment to the United States, especially in the context of NORAD?
11:50 a.m.
Associate Professor, University of Calgary, As an Individual
A critical point that we will face with America, and I think the elephant in the room that we don't mention in polite society is the prospect of the election of an individual who of course has demonstrated a reluctance to accept anything in terms of the special relationship with Canada. Once again, of course, the political nature of speculation in the United States is anyone's game.
The problem we face, though, is that over time we have had an erosion of the foundation of what we've always identified as a special relationship. This relationship, of course, politically, is important. The various meetings that the presidents and prime ministers have had historically set the tenet of that, but it's the ability to work together at the bureaucratic level that really has been the essence of why the Americans have tended to sort of see us as something different, rather than a foreign entity.
The difficulties we've had in being able to ensure that our military is updated to the standards that the Americans would like mean that becomes more problematic. It doesn't disappear. We still have very good interpersonal relations, but the special relationship gets eroded by this lack of day-to-day engagement, and it goes beyond military. It goes to economics; it goes to social policy, and so forth.
I fear that the development of the political direction that the Americans may be going in, following, of course, the November elections—but even more problematic, the presidential election—may in fact create a situation in which I guess the best phrase would be we'll be swimming upstream the whole time, ensuring that the Americans under that administration know it is in their interest to ensure good relationships. Those are the types of steps we need to be taking today, so should that election outcome occur, we are prepared for it.
I think that's one of the politically most difficult positions for us to be thinking about today.
11:55 a.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal John McKay
Thank you, Ms. Normandin.
We have Madam Mathyssen for two and a half minutes.
October 25th, 2022 / 11:55 a.m.
NDP
Lindsay Mathyssen NDP London—Fanshawe, ON
In terms of where we're going, I have this.... I imagine lots of Canadians do, too, in terms of the difference between where we stand on modernizing NORAD, our operations, our fleets, our vessels and so on, versus that growth of weaponry; and, as Professor Huebert was just talking about, the reliance upon the United States to cover us in lots of ways, the historical relationship, except that historically we've pulled away from engaging in the ballistic missile defence aggressions because of that fear of an arms race.
We don't have the capacity, as I see it continuing forward, so much as we plan to compete to be the next United States—if that's what we're talking about. Ultimately, though, why does that reasoning no longer stand, or why does it still stand? I'll direct my question, because I have very little time, to Professor Massie, just on how we hold our own without falling into that arms race argument.
11:55 a.m.
Full Professor, Université du Québec à Montréal, As an Individual
Looking at what the Finns are doing, I don't think they're trying to be the United States, but they're still investing much more than we are. The Norwegians and Swedes, per capita, are as well. I don't think it's the U.S. and then the rest. Some countries are doing much better, and what they're doing is defining, articulating more clearly what their national interests are instead of waiting for others to tell them what they should be doing. That's a different approach from what we're focusing on.
There's a reluctance to take the lead politically here in this country. Also, there's an aversion in the Canadian military to focusing its resources and attention on our country, because it would prevent us, given that 1.2% budget, from being elsewhere. It's being elsewhere that is ingrained in the strategic culture of, “This is how we can have the Canadian flag abroad,” and, “This is how we can have influence,” by leading a multinational task force in Latvia and things like that, or leading any naval deployment, as well, such as in the Asia-Pacific, where we have two frigates right now. This is what we think is in Canada's best interests, but I'm not sure these are well-spent resources. They are such finite resources, in my mind.
11:55 a.m.
Liberal
11:55 a.m.
Conservative
James Bezan Conservative Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB
Thank you, Mr. Chair. I want to thank our witnesses for attending today and building upon the narrative that Canada's just not doing enough. Is that due to a lack of political leadership? Is it due to a lack of resource capability? Is it due to a lack of prioritization of investment in our Arctic security and in our entire North American defence?
I'll go right around the table. Perhaps you guys can give us a quick yes or no. I'll start with Mr. Massie here, then Mr. Huebert and Professor Kimball.
Perhaps you would start, Professor Huebert.
11:55 a.m.
Full Professor, Université du Québec à Montréal, As an Individual
I agree with your statement. I think we were on the right path with the 2017 defence policy; it's just not enough. It's the right direction, but it's not enough.
Now we're seeing talks about reducing the budget or not having it grow. The fact is that all of these key investments are coming in the mid-2020s and then should be present in the mid-2030s, but we know it's always delayed and always costs more.
We're not talking about reducing from 15 to 12 combat ships. These sorts of talks—I hope they're just rumours—mean that there's a reduction of capacity, not just maintenance.
The 2017 defence policy is not about growing. It's about maintaining Canada's military capacity. What we're talking about today is how we could grow that. We're not even close to that.
Noon
Associate Professor, University of Calgary, As an Individual
There are three factors at work here.
First of all, I agree with you. I think there's an overall process in Canada, at both the political level and the country level, to be retreating to isolationism. This is something I wrote in an article in Policy Options. We see a trend that we are, in fact, as a nation, pulling away from our willingness to engage in the international arena.
There are two factors that are driving this. First of all, there is a mythology that geography protects us. There's a mythology that what happens in terms of Ukraine, Georgia or Chechnya doesn't concern us or that what will happen in Taiwan—you can place me in the category that believes that the Chinese will use military intervention to reclaim what they see as part of “the century of humiliation”, and we will see military conflict there—somehow doesn't touch upon us. We've allowed ourselves to believe that, and I think it's been encouraged by certain political leaders that somehow we're so far away that it won't really affect us.
The second factor—and the one I find the most chilling—gets to the question about an arms race that was raised before. The debate as to whether or not we are entering into an arms race actually ended in 2002 when the Chinese and the Russians made a series of military procurement decisions that are, in my estimation, moving us away from the system of nuclear deterrence into one of nuclear-war fighting. It's not just the Russians who have invested.
This is an issue. Let's face it. Canada does not want to talk about nuclear weapons. It does not want to talk about the prospect that, in fact, we seem to be entering an era in which it's not only about deterring nuclear war but also, in fact, about engaging in that type of conflict. I mean, as Herman Kahn said, how do you think of the unthinkable?
Because it is such an overwhelming issue as we try to address.... The other issue that professors Massie and Kimball raised is, of course, the existential threat that climate change poses to us. How do we, both as a society and as political leadership, say, “Okay, we have to think about climate change and the fact that we're now in an era, on the basis of what we see of intent and capability, of nuclear-war fighting”? I dare say that it's such a challenging issue that the Canadian withdrawal into this pretense that geography protects us is the reason we don't think about it, and because we don't think about it, we don't act.
Noon
Full Professor, Université Laval, As an Individual
I would go the other way. I would say that geography traps us in some senses.
One of the things I do is show my students a ballistic missile intercept that would be fictive between Pyongyang and Washington. One of the things they notice, of course, is that there's a whole bunch of geography in there of where we live. Then we talk about how fast this happens and that as we move towards mid- or early-course intercepts, we're not talking about six minutes. We're talking about three minutes. Most of these people can't go smoke a cigarette or go to the bathroom in three minutes. Could we prevent nuclear war in that time? That's one thing we need to think about.
There's a public allergy in Canada, I think, with regard to defence spending versus foreign affairs spending. This has to do a bit with Canada's self-perceived role in the world as a multilateral country, as a collaborator and as somebody who always goes along with the gang.
As somebody who has studied defence spending now for a long time, I think there's a misconception that it's always about spending on war. A lot of defence spending is about spending on peace. That's a lot of what NATO's defence spending is. I think there's a large misconception around that.
Noon
Liberal
The Chair Liberal John McKay
We're going to have to stop there, unfortunately. I'm not sure why I always end up cutting you off, Professor Kimball, but I apologize.
Noon
Liberal
The Chair Liberal John McKay
You're here to deal with our allergy.
Next is Mr. Robillard, for five minutes, please.
Noon
Liberal
Yves Robillard Liberal Marc-Aurèle-Fortin, QC
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Given that many countries, including the United States, do not recognize Canada's claim that the Northwest Passage is a Canadian inland waterway, what concrete measures can Canada take to protect its sovereignty in the Northwest Passage?
12:05 p.m.
Associate Professor, University of Calgary, As an Individual
If I could jump in, this is something that keeps me up at night in terms of our ability to enforce our sovereignty.
Russia is the only other country that has made similar claims regarding control of a similar waterway, in terms of what they have done for the northern sea route. However, the Russians clearly have gone beyond Canada in their claim. The northern sea route exceeds what Canada has basically claimed as a similar right of control within the Northwest Passage. Once again, the difference between Canada and Russia is that Russia has a very vigorous enforcement capability. The Russians will say no to ships that they think do not meet their standards, or for political reasons.
I'll point out that in 2017, the Chinese asked for consent to send the Chinese ship Xue Long through the Northwest Passage. Given the animosities that were developing between China and Canada at the time and the fact that we say we want these waters to be internal because we want to have control for the protection of Canadian security and interests, I'm left a bit curious as to why we ultimately gave that consent. I say “consent”, because in my understanding that's what we gave, as opposed to permission.
The question is, do we have the political will to actually enforce it? I've been following this for a very long time. We've been saying we're going to build a large icebreaker since September 1985, when it was announced by Joe Clark. We're still waiting to build it.
If we say we're going to build two right now.... Once again, I think it illustrates that in terms of the Russian capability to enforce having countries follow their rules within the northern sea route and the Northeast Passage, we would be well advised to take a page from their book.
I believe that even though the Europeans have not accepted our straight baselines—they say we cannot draw it that way—I would add that each of the European countries has an Arctic strategy that says they want to see freedom of navigation in the newly emerging waterways of the Arctic. They don't name the Northwest Passage, but you can detect that's what they are talking about. The means by which we deter them from any action that would threaten us would be to have enforcement capability.
That is a problem we continue to have. I'd say we can trace it all the way back to the Joe Clark statement about Arctic sovereignty on September 10, 1985.
12:05 p.m.
Liberal
Yves Robillard Liberal Marc-Aurèle-Fortin, QC
What are China's intentions in the Arctic? What are the key factors driving China's interest in the region? How have those factors evolved over the past few decades?