National Defence Committee on Nov. 15th, 2022

[Kevin Hamilton]

Mr. Chair, perhaps I can take that question.

Certainly there's a recognition across government of the need for better and more modernized surveillance capabilities in the Canadian north. I think we are seeing now a commitment from the government for investments in those areas.

Work is ongoing, for instance, to complete the Nanisivik naval facility at Arctic Bay. That's going to support refuelling for our naval vessels in the north to increase the Canadian Armed Forces' presence and the ability to sustain their long-term presence.

The government recently announced that it will move forward with the construction of two polar icebreakers for the Canadian Coast Guard. That will give us a greater year-round presence in the Canadian Arctic. The pace of our military exercises and surveillance operations in the north has increased over the last year or so, and I know it's something that the government is committed to continuing.

[Christine Normandin, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you very much.

I'd like to go back to the Auditor General's report. It mentions the risk that several vessels and satellites currently in service may reach the end of their useful life before being replaced.

Is your department aware of this situation? Is a contingency plan already in place to continue monitoring marine traffic in Arctic waters?

[Kevin Hamilton]

Mr. Chair, certainly we work with the Department of National Defence to ensure that there is a plan in place for the modernization and upgrading of antiquated systems, systems that are fast reaching the end of their useful life. Once again, that is the reason for these reinvestments in our surveillance capabilities. I know there are plans to look at the RADARSAT Constellation mission. The member mentioned satellite surveillance. Certainly there's NORAD modernization, which will move beyond the traditional realm of just aerospace monitoring and look at pan-domain surveillance, including maritime and subsurface and outer space surveillance, as well as cyber.

I think the government, and officials within government, are very much aware of these challenges of aging equipment and aging systems, and that's why there is a plan in place to replace them.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

We will go to Madam Mathyssen for six minutes, please.

[Lindsay Mathyssen, NDP, London—Fanshawe, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

There has actually been a consistent problem for over a decade in terms of the Nanisivik naval facility. As the Auditor General's report mentioned, it's only operational four weeks of the year. When can we expect that to be improved, if it's already been a problem for more than a decade?

[Kevin Hamilton]

Mr. Chair, my apologies; I don't have a specific timetable available to me on that. That is a question we'd like to refer to National Defence.

[Lindsay Mathyssen, NDP, London—Fanshawe, ON]

Okay. In terms of the increase of the threats that you were talking about, Mr. Hamilton, and the fact that there are more people needed, can you talk about how the government is further addressing the key lack of infrastructure to support the people who are already living in the north in terms of clean drinking water, housing and other key infrastructure capabilities? How does the government plan to expand that if they're looking at increasing the number of people in the north to help with the surveillance?

[Kevin Hamilton]

Mr. Chair, on issues of support to northern communities, it falls outside Foreign Affairs directly, although perhaps I can turn to Heidi to discuss some of the work of the Arctic Council in supporting northern communities.

I will say, though, that just from a military and security point of view, I know that National Defence is looking through the lens of dual use. For NORAD modernization and military investments in the north, they will look at every opportunity to create jobs for local populations and make some of the infrastructure useful to civilian populations. There is an integrated plan, as I understand it, to move forward with our military infrastructure investment alongside the civilian infrastructure investment.

Heidi, did you want to add anything?

[Heidi Kutz]

The only point I would add to that is to make reference to the Arctic and northern policy framework, which really does have that base overarching domestic framework, and then on the part of Global Affairs there is the international framework, and on the part of National Defence the defence and security chapters.

That domestic framework, which contains a lot of the reflections and the packaging and the forward proposals with respect to infrastructure in the north that is non-military, falls under that rubric, guided by Indigenous Affairs, so I would defer those types of questions to them.

In the Arctic Council work, we work to engage and use the governance structures that we have set up to engage with northern communities, including the indigenous permanent participants, to work towards and identify the projects that make the most sense to them within the work of the Arctic Council.

[Lindsay Mathyssen, NDP, London—Fanshawe, ON]

With regard to the Arctic Council and the previous conversation about the shift of leadership to Norway in the coming year, Russia certainly considers itself quite attached to its Arctic, as Canada does as well. It's defined by that.

What's your opinion in terms of the Arctic Council moving on to a new leadership role? How will Russia react to that ultimately when they see that they are being left behind? We've often heard in this committee about the further isolation of Russia and the dangers of that. Could you comment on that further?

[Heidi Kutz]

I think I would agree. Russia certainly does identify itself as an Arctic nation, and the Arctic Council's originating declaration identifies the membership as including Arctic nations. Those points are all correct.

Canada's approach in light of the current circumstances has been to keep the council as healthy as possible, with as many projects as possible operating, given the current circumstances and the fact that we simply are not operating under business as usual. In that context, of course, we are not co-operating with the Russian Federation.

We're working towards a smooth transition to the next chair in Norway. We're focusing our considerations into what the Arctic Council will look like going forward in ways that we can take into consideration the current circumstances and also make sure that as much work as possible is being done to the benefit of northern communities.

[Lindsay Mathyssen, NDP, London—Fanshawe, ON]

We also heard that opening up the Arctic obviously leads to a great deal more commercialization. We were talking about the increased need for rescue, often in really dangerous situations. Is there a belief or a move or a conversation at all from our side with regard to banning a lot of that commercial activity—cruise ships, for example—and the environmental impact they could have?

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

You have about 10 seconds.

[Kevin Hamilton]

I can defer to Heidi again on this question. I'm not aware of any conversation around banning particular vessels coming through our waters as a matter of principle.

Certainly through the COVID period, for instance, there was a prohibition that we instituted for our own waters to protect isolated communities from having commercial ships dock at their ports. We do certainly have that capacity. It could be exercised in the future, from a safety and security point of view, for search and rescue types of things, as you mentioned, or environmental concerns. It is a hallmark of the exercise of our sovereignty up in the Canadian north that we—

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

We're going to have to leave that response there.

Before I go to Ms. Gallant for her five minutes, the Auditor General's report about Nanisivik and its four weeks of utility I thought was quite an interesting observation. I note, colleagues, that we have the Coast Guard and search and rescue and some military people coming next week, but I think you've hit on a significant element of the report. Colleagues may want to ask questions about that at that point.

Ms. Gallant, you have five minutes.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

What does the PRC's interest in the Arctic say about President Xi Jinping's foreign policy? Specifically, does the PRC's interest in strengthening its economic, defence and energy capabilities in the Arctic pose a threat to Canada?

[Kevin Hamilton]

Mr. Chair, it's two-part question.

I think you'll see that Chinese interests in the Arctic are mirrored by Chinese stated and manifest interests in a great number of regions around the world. This is an assertive China. This is a China that does want to project. The Arctic is just one piece of that.

On the question about whether that represents a threat to the Canadian Arctic, I would say that certainly in any reasonable foreseeable future we do not perceive a military threat, a sea-based military threat, from China in the Canadian Arctic. That said, there is a potential for challenge to our sovereignty in the Arctic. That's why we must invest, and we are investing, in protecting and patrolling the approaches to our Arctic. That is part and parcel of what we're doing with shipbuilding as well as with NORAD modernization.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

What threat assessments have been done with respect to China's and Russia's increased presence in the Arctic?

[Kevin Hamilton]

A myriad of classified assessments are done on an ongoing basis on both those countries with respect to the Canadian Arctic.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

Is there anything you can share with us with respect to threat assessments on the military buildups of the two states?

[Kevin Hamilton]

I can certainly say that we see the military buildups.

With respect to Russia, their buildup is in their own Arctic on their Arctic territories. Once again, from a purely military point of view, we don't detect that land-based or sea-based buildup as a direct threat inasmuch as we don't perceive the Russians trying to initiate an attack against the Canadian north. That said, the political disposition of Putin's Russia does give us concern, and we've seen that they have very little to no regard for international law, so even though we don't see the material buildup prima facie as a particular threat aimed at Canada, we do see the politics surrounding that kind of military buildup as a matter of concern.

As for China, once again we see the threat as not military—not kinetic, as such—but we have seen nefarious Chinese activity aimed at Canada through hybrid threats, through cyber activities and predatory investment attempts, so we are monitoring those issues very carefully.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

Ms. Kutz, what role do observer states have in the Arctic Council, and has the Arctic become a region of competition?

[Heidi Kutz]

Observers within the Arctic Council have the ability to attend meetings when they're sitting and to support and participate in the project work of the Arctic Council. You will recall that I mentioned upwards of 100 projects that are normally active within the council.

I'm sorry; I didn't write it down. Could you repeat your second question?

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

Has the Arctic become a region of competition?

[Heidi Kutz]

Certainly the Arctic is a region of many geopolitical interests and commercial interests and, by its very definition, of different interests and competition, be they commercial or otherwise. That will only become more pronounced, as we all know that the disproportionate effects of climate change on the Arctic will, over the course of time, render it more accessible and certainly render it of higher geopolitical interest.