National Defence Committee on Feb. 17th, 2023

[LGen Alain Pelletier]

I'll let Major General Prévost talk about the acquisition project.

[MGen Paul Prévost]

The F-18s had been scrambled for the object that was shot down in Yukon. We scrambled on this one. Onboard the F-18s were infrared missiles that we believe would have been able to take the shot. We don't know this because we didn't make it and the decision was made to shoot it down using the F-22.

Similarly, when the object came over Lake Huron, if the F-16s from the U.S. had not shot down that object, the F-18s had been scrambled from Bagotville on their way to take over from the U.S. on this one. They had infrared missiles on board, and we believe we would have been able to take the shot. We'll never know because—

[Pat Kelly, Conservative, Calgary Rocky Ridge, AB]

Are these missiles that had been ordered as an update to the CF-18 armaments, or are these the older missiles?

[MGen Paul Prévost]

The F-18 has the AIM-9M, which is a lesser version than the one that was used in the U.S., but we believe we would have been able to take the shot.

[Pat Kelly, Conservative, Calgary Rocky Ridge, AB]

The object that was shot down over Yukon was tracked, as you've said. The American F-22s were in contact with it before it crossed the border. Why was it not shot down over American airspace?

[LGen Alain Pelletier]

The object was detected in early morning, but early morning in Yukon and Alaska is late morning for folks in the lower 48 just because of a later sunrise. Given the size of the object, it needed to be intercepted during daytime in order to be able to identify and characterize the object itself—

[Pat Kelly, Conservative, Calgary Rocky Ridge, AB]

It was a question of waiting for sunrise.

Is darkness part of a gap in our awareness and ability to detect and identify threats to our airspace?

[LGen Alain Pelletier]

Darkness is maybe a challenge, depending on the speed, size and characteristics of the object. The sensors on board the different aircraft may have an ability to actually characterize, but that ability is dependent on a number of factors, including infrared signatures and electro-optical characteristics as well.

In this case, in order to have a better characterization of the object and its potential package, we scrambled fighters. That scramble led to an intercept just before sunrise. About five minutes after sunrise, that object crossed into Canadian airspace. That's why F-22s were on board and following and tracking the object.

[Pat Kelly, Conservative, Calgary Rocky Ridge, AB]

There is an awful lot of darkness in the winter in these latitudes. It is somewhat troubling that there is such a short window as part of the necessity of assessing whether there is a kinetic threat.

Let me get to that point.

In earlier testimony we heard that General VanHerck was confident that there was no kinetic threat on the first balloon, the PRC-confirmed balloon that was shot down later. If it was determined that there was no kinetic threat, how was he able to make that call so early? Can you walk us through how this happened?

[LGen Alain Pelletier]

Thanks for the question—

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Answer very briefly, please. Mr. Kelly is beyond his time.

[LGen Alain Pelletier]

Okay, good.

An assessment was made using a number of systems that are within NORAD and within the commander's ability to use. Those systems, after a quick analysis of the potential payload that was underneath the structure, led the commander to his conclusion.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Thank you, Mr. Kelly.

Madame Lambropoulos, you have five minutes, please.

[Emmanuella Lambropoulos, Liberal, Saint-Laurent, QC]

Thanks, Mr. Chair.

Thank you to our witnesses for being here to answer some of our questions on something that has been a big question mark for many people. As my colleagues mentioned, I think this is top of mind for Canadians right now.

There are still a lot of questions marks, because we don't necessarily know what we're dealing with or where they're coming from. You mentioned how difficult it has been, and it will be, to recover the wreckage, especially because of the location and the fact that it fell over Yukon and is now buried in snow. It's possible we won't be able to recover some of the parts, if at all.

If that's the case, is there another way of learning about the origin, the capabilities and the purpose of the object? Is there any other way, or do we really need to find this piece in order to answer some of these other questions?

[LGen Alain Pelletier]

Obviously, we're still doing data reduction of the radar contacts. The three different regions of NORAD involved with the intercepts are also doing video analysis. Obviously, those videos are at a higher classification than this forum.

Those assessments are being done, as well as a better characterization of whether it's a commercial, non-commercial or private usage of balloons that is taking place, not only in our airspace but across other airspaces as well, so as to better understand how many of these systems are probably in the airspace at any one time.

General Prévost, is there anything you want to add?

[MGen Paul Prévost]

I think, Mr. Chairman, the member has it right. Until we find it, we won't be exactly sure what this was, where it was manufactured and where it came from, but as General Pelletier mentioned, we're looking back as well at the radar. We know that two of those contacts came into Alaska from the Pacific. We just don't know what they were, where they were manufactured or how they got there.

We would really like to find those things on the ground, and there's a lot of effort to find them on the ground to close some of those questions.

Thank you.

[Emmanuella Lambropoulos, Liberal, Saint-Laurent, QC]

Thank you.

Why, in your opinion, would China use balloon surveillance as opposed to a satellite or something else? Why is it, do you think, they're using this specific object or these types of objects in order to enter our airspace and surveil us?

[LGen Alain Pelletier]

Thanks for the question.

Again, my view is that it is one of multiple sensors that could be used. It is one they may have felt was not going be detected and one that may be a bit more difficult to attribute, as well, in terms of launch locations, capabilities and intent. That may be one of the reasons. We know that the PRC has a number of systems in orbit that have a great capability, but those systems may not have the loiter time that a high-altitude balloon—a surveillance balloon, in this case—may bring about.

General Prévost, is there anything you would like to add?

[MGen Paul Prévost]

What I would add is we have a good sense of what they are. Finding more on the ground will help close some of that gap.

However, I think we all know that China likes to challenge the international order. China is more assertive in its foreign policy. China is also building military capabilities to assert that foreign policy, so we have to be concerned.

As I mentioned before, some of the answers we have are that this object was unauthorized and unwanted. We have to make more sense of this. We have to make sure we're prepared for this. That's what I'll answer for now.

[Emmanuella Lambropoulos, Liberal, Saint-Laurent, QC]

Thank you.

I know you've already touched on this a little bit, and a couple of my colleagues asked similar questions.

Why did detecting this balloon require us to fine-tune or change the tuning of the radars to pick up slower-moving and smaller objects? In the aftermath and going forward, is there a change in how we'll look at this?

I know we mentioned that sometimes there are false contacts because of the way radar is able to see smaller things. Clearly, here it helped us find potential danger.

What is our outlook going forward?

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

That's an intriguing question that I would really like to hear an answer to, but unfortunately Ms. Lambropoulos is out of time.

We are going to go for a third round, colleagues. Maybe someone could raise that question during the third round.

I have questioners, but I need advice from both the Conservative Party and the Liberal Party for the last two questioners in the third round.

With that, I'm going to call on Mrs. Gallant for five minutes, please.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

The general said that NORAD provides a list of needs to the U.S. and the Canadian governments on a yearly basis. I'd like to see that list provided to the committee.

Would that be possible, Mr. Chairman?

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

I don't know. We're going into some pretty sensitive areas, I should think. I would appreciate guidance from General Pelletier as to whether that could be provided within the confines of their secrecy qualifications.

[LGen Alain Pelletier]

Thanks, Mr. Chair.

I missed the description of the list. I apologize.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

It's the list that NORAD provides to the U.S. and Canadian governments of what it needs on a yearly basis.