National Defence Committee on Feb. 17th, 2023

[MGen Paul Prévost]

Maybe I can clarify what I said in the previous session.

On the object that was in Yukon, F-18s had been scrambled from Cold Lake to go and execute the order that both governments had made about this object. This object first transited from Alaska, where the decision had been made to engage that object, and then was transiting from Alaska to Yukon.

At the time, we were in transition between the U.S. fighters and the Canadian fighters that took off from Cold Lake. The F-18s from Cold Lake were minutes from being on site when we were able to take action with the American F-22 fighters, but this was about to be a handover between the U.S. fighters and the Canadian fighters. NORAD, because of the way we work, is very binational in nature. You can see that the deputy commander of NORAD is a Canadian. All assets are always at the disposition of both governments, be it U.S. or Canadian fighters, tankers or surveillance airplanes.

On the one in Yukon, the F-18s had been scrambled. The F-18s had a good chance of taking an engagement there, but we elected to go with the first opportunity, which was the F-22, just as the object crossed the border.

[Shelby Kramp-Neuman, Conservative, Hastings—Lennox and Addington, ON]

Okay.

Are you able to share exactly what the lack of resources was that prevented the RCAF CF-18 fighters from actually shooting down the balloon? Was there a lack of resources?

[MGen Paul Prévost]

General Pelletier talked a bit about that question.

Part of the ongoing assessment is on what the threat is—what it is made of and what does it emit? The missile we're talking about here is an infrared missile, so is the object hot enough? Is there a chance that we're going to have a shot at that? That assessment happens as the object moves across.

We thought the CF-18, on that object, would have been able to attempt it. It was going to be the first attempt from a CF-18. Before taking that shot, there were a few tests that would have let us see if we had a good shot on it, but it did have an armed missile to take that object down.

[Shelby Kramp-Neuman, Conservative, Hastings—Lennox and Addington, ON]

Going back to your initial response, you spoke about “minutes”. Do we know how many minutes? Was it five minutes, two minutes, 10 minutes?

[MGen Paul Prévost]

I would say that it's probably in the five-minute range.

[LGen Alain Pelletier]

If I may, Mr. Chair, I just want to highlight the fact that given the binational nature of the NORAD command, we're going to go for the best toolset that is available at the time but that is also currently available. In these conditions, given the changing environmental conditions and the desire to actually take it down as soon as possible, the asset that was on hand was the F-22.

I must also say that the best tool is not only the fighter; it's also the type of missile. Every condition, based on a radar cross-section infrared signature, may require a different toolset. That's what we've seen in the difference between the high-altitude surveillance balloon and the follow-on three objects that we observed. Those were changing conditions that could probably have required different toolsets.

[Shelby Kramp-Neuman, Conservative, Hastings—Lennox and Addington, ON]

That's perfect. Thank you.

Was there enough time to move our fighter jets to our forward operating locations to better position the RCAF to intercept the object?

[LGen Alain Pelletier]

Time is always an element, a factor, and the nice thing is that Canada and NORAD don't have only the fighters; they also have the strategic tankers provided by both Canada and the U.S. to actually carry out the missions.

In this case, at the Canadian air defence sectors and the Canadian NORAD region, which look at the disposition of fighter assets in the Canadian airspace, made the decision to actually keep the fighters in Cold Lake and to scramble from Cold Lake, which is the main operating base. This enabled easier sustainment and leveraged the strategic tankers to provide the reach required to achieve the intercept itself.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Thank you, Ms. Kramp-Neuman.

Mr. Fisher, you have five minutes.

[Darren Fisher, Liberal, Dartmouth—Cole Harbour, NS]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here today.

I think of the phrase we used to hear all the time: “Inquiring minds want to know.” Since these incidents, so many people are asking questions, and we don't really have answers.

I know that NORAD, CAF, the Canadian government and the U.S. government keep holding briefings, but it just seems that there are so many unanswered questions. I've listened to all the conversations going on here today, and it still seems that there are so many unanswered questions.

My apologies if what I'm asking touches on some of the things that were already asked.

I think General Pelletier talked about the first balloon. We kind of know what they can do and what they can't do, but can you fill us in on what we don't know? What kinds of challenges are facing us in finding out and getting the answers to some of these questions?

I picture an update on finding what's left of that first Chinese surveillance balloon, and I think you might even have touched on an update on the rubble. Maybe you could touch on an update of what's left to accomplish and what questions you folks have and NORAD has that we're still trying to find out about.

[LGen Alain Pelletier]

Okay. I'll start, and then I'll pass it over to General Prévost.

The first unknown for us during the actual intercept phase of the objects was, again, characterization. Where is the object coming from? For the objects, we could not discern or didn't have a visual on any form of registration on the objects. Normally, even an air balloon or a commercial or civilian aircraft would have a registration to actually demonstrate the country of origin.

Obviously, as I pointed out, the rate of closure of the fighters made identification of those registration marks very difficult. This was combined with low light conditions for two out of the three object intercepts. Also, the capability of the payloads that may have been carried by the objects is an element of high interest, in order to actually assess not only surveillance capability and collection capability but potential threat capability as well.

General Prévost, do you want to add something?

[MGen Paul Prévost]

Yes.

Maybe what I'll add is that there are many unanswered questions, as the member mentioned. The one thing we know is that those four objects were unauthorized and unwanted. That we know. We had to take action on them. It is true that we don't know exactly what the last three objects were, but they were unauthorized and unwanted. We're still searching for those objects on which we have more questions, the ones in Yukon and Alaska. Hopefully, we'll find them so that we can link or corroborate what these were.

With regard to the one that was shot down over the coast of South Carolina, we had a very good idea of what that was, because this had been observed in the Pacific before, but these things evolve. It's scaffolding that China can put a lot of arrays on. Many of those have been recovered, but they're still searching the water. Two naval ships and I think a U.S. Coast Guard ship are still trying to find the rest of it at the bottom of the ocean. They've recovered parts of it already. Some of it we already knew and some of it will be under analysis. We'll let the U.S. disclose what that is when they're ready.

[Darren Fisher, Liberal, Dartmouth—Cole Harbour, NS]

I don't want to put words in Ms. Mathyssen's mouth, but she said something along the lines of how all of a sudden we have all these objects in the sky. In your opinion, is it maybe just a heightened awareness after that first balloon came from China that now has us out there looking? You talked about them being small and slow. It kind of reminds me of my hockey career.

Is it that we have a heightened awareness now and we're looking for more of these things in the air?

[LGen Alain Pelletier]

Obviously, we always try to optimize sensors for the potential threats that may be coming, especially on the approaches to North America. In our case, sensors have been cued to detect long-range aviation. We've worked on sensors to detect potential cruise missiles, which are one of the predominant threats out there, as seen in other regions.

With the detection of the PRC high-altitude surveillance balloon around the end of January and early February, at NORAD we went back and did data interpretation and data analysis. We tweaked the filter—it normally is called a gate, but I'll use the word “filter”—that we use to discriminate from just radar anomalies to be able to detect objects with a lower speed and a lower radar cross-section. Obviously, by lowering the gate or the filter, we end up with the risk of having more false contacts. That happens. Radar can detect dust particles in the wind, potentially, or birds that are travelling. That may lead to false contact.

That's an element that we're cognizant of and that we're going to be monitoring. That tweaking of the radar is probably what enabled the detection of the follow-on objects in the last couple of weeks.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Thank you, Mr. Fisher.

Mrs. Desbiens, you have the floor for two and a half minutes.

[Caroline Desbiens, Bloc, Beauport—Côte-de-Beaupré—Île d’Orléans—Charlevoix, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

My question is for Lieutenant-General Pelletier or Major General Prévost.

In your opinion, is NORAD adequately equipped to monitor the airspace?

You will surely tell me that there's always room for improvement. However, are you comfortable with the current equipment?

[LGen Alain Pelletier]

Mr. Chair, I thank the member for the question.

The possibilities are endless. In terms of sensors and effectors, fighter aircraft or tankers and so forth, we have needs everywhere.

We do the work with the tools we've been given, and we send a list of our requirements to the Canadian and U.S. governments every year. As I mentioned earlier, those needs change as the threat changes.

After 9/11, we had to adapt to a new internal threat, that of terrorist groups using commercial aircraft. We're currently transitioning to be able to detect cruise missiles and respond to the threat, as I mentioned earlier.

As part of the modernization of NORAD, the Canadian government is going to give us additional tools that will improve our ability to respond to the mission.

I mentioned the Canadian government, but the U.S. government also announced support in its most recent budget for the purchase of four over-the-horizon radars, similar to the ones Canada will procure after NORAD modernization.

We continue to communicate our needs to both governments to ensure we're able to respond to a current or future threat.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Ms. Mathyssen, you have two and a half minutes.

[Lindsay Mathyssen, NDP, London—Fanshawe, ON]

Lieutenant-General Pelletier, you mentioned the addition of Canada's F-35s and increasing the capabilities of what we could detect.

Correct me if I'm wrong, because I'm not technically knowledgeable about these things, but it was my understanding that because of the high altitude of the first balloon that was detected, only the F-22s could reach that high up.

Could you explain what you meant by increasing abilities through the F-35s? If they actually weren't useful in this instance, how could they continue to be useful going forward in these sorts of instances, especially since it was such a high altitude and they weren't...?

[LGen Alain Pelletier]

I appreciate the interest in the F-35s. Having worked on the project for a number of years, I can speak a little bit to that. I will see if Major-General Prévost wants to add.

Again, it's the usage of the right tool for the right unknown or object that may be in both our airspaces. At the end of the day, it's not only about the aircraft; it's also about the aircraft, its sensors and its weapon package, so that we're able to actually tackle different threats being presented.

For high altitude, with the sensors on board the F-22, F-35, F-16 or CF-18, we're probably in a position to detect the high-altitude surveillance balloon or the objects that we've seen. The small radar cross-section makes it challenging, but the multitude of sensors onboard the aircraft now allow for cross-queuing on the specific threat or on the specific object that we're trying to intercept.

[Lindsay Mathyssen, NDP, London—Fanshawe, ON]

Just to clarify, it was said that the F-35 wouldn't have been able to do what was needed in terms of that first Chinese balloon.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Comment very briefly, please.

[LGen Alain Pelletier]

I believe that the sensors of the F-35 would have been able to. I'm not going to talk about the maximum altitude of the F-35 here because at the end of the day, the F-35—or any fighter aircraft—doesn't need to be at co-altitude with the object, because it can employ weapons that will make up that altitude difference if we decide to take out the object.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

We're going to have to leave it there. Thank you, Ms. Mathyssen.

Mr. Kelly, you have five minutes.

[Pat Kelly, Conservative, Calgary Rocky Ridge, AB]

Thank you.

I'd like a little more clarity, again, on the armaments of the CF-18, the CF-18s that were scrambled and the ones that we have the ability to scramble.

Media reports have said that the AIM-9s have not arrived but were ordered two years ago. On the armaments of the aircraft that were scrambled, in an earlier comment you said they were armed with missiles that you believed were capable of striking and taking down a balloon, although there would have been tests if they were going to make the shot.

Can you clarify the status of the CF-18's armaments?