Well, Mrs. Gallant, I don't know what car you drive. I drive a minivan. It's about a dozen years old. Think about much of what's happening in terms of our networks within the Government of Canada as driving an old car. We're driving on old infrastructure where the government has not sufficiently invested in the actual infrastructure itself.
This is the cybersecurity part of the challenge we face. The other is the cyber-domain part, which is the risky behaviour that is created by individuals who click on links—as was likely the case in this Defence Construction Canada contract—and then inadvertently end up spilling information or making networks vulnerable.
In the previous session, you had a conversation about classification. One of the things we do in Canada is constantly and vastly overclassify material: 90% of the material we classify we probably don't need to classify. The 10% of material that remains we absolutely need to protect at all costs. What we're currently doing is classifying way too broadly instead of targeting our protection, our resources, to make sure that those elements that must never reach the outside are actually protected. Recent discussions over leaks show that, indeed, we have a lot of work to do.