Thank you for your question.
Yes, I still share that view, because I think it's been a year since that document. I believe I wrote that the basic problem is that the threat environment was specified solely to where the Canadian Armed Forces are stationed at home in Canada and abroad. That is a failure in understanding the cybersecurity environment in general. There is no defence perimeter anymore. Not just Canadian Armed Forces and their members but also their family members are targets for a moderate attacker, a black hat hacker or especially some sort of group such as the Russian group Sandworm. They will attack not specifically hard and secure targets but rather so-called low-hanging fruit first. That means even attacking family members, for example, compromising their home networks and expanding from that point onwards. We had a similar case in Slovenia, in which our emergency response was taken down in the very same manner. It was a failure in strategic thinking.
I'm not familiar with whether that agenda has changed in the past year. If it hasn't, it should be updated and improved.
I hope that answers your question.