National Defence Committee on April 21st, 2023

[Jennifer O'Connell, Liberal, Pickering—Uxbridge, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, Dr. Watling, for being here.

To start with, in your opening remarks you spoke about the importance of Ukraine winning this war, but the sustained winning of this war. The implications that you mentioned for the future of European communities in demonstrating NATO strength is something that all members understand, certainly in our House, as well as in this committee particularly, which has been looking at it.

I want to ask whether you can elaborate on this further. There will start to be political pressures. I sometimes hear even in my own constituency, “You're spending all that money in Ukraine. What about this country? What about that conflict?”

In the U.K., they have gone back into double-digit inflation rates. There are going to start to be pressures. The eurozone is at 6.9% inflation. There are going to be some financial pressures on other countries.

Can you elaborate on that argument about the importance, and even the economic importance, in the long term of not continuing to support Ukraine?

[Dr. Jack Watling]

I think there are plenty of examples of how the war in Ukraine is disrupting industry and doing economic harm to us. Ending it more quickly is important for producing economic stability. A good example would be what the outpouring of grain into Romania is doing in Europe at the moment.

There's another side to this, which is that we keep framing this as money being sent to Ukraine. It's not, right? If we're sensible about it, this is money we are spending to create jobs and to rejuvenate complex industry in our own countries in order to achieve our security goals.

I will give you an example. In the U.K., we don't produce artillery barrels anymore. We should, because there aren't enough barrel machines across Europe. There is an opportunity there to level up, in the British government's terminology, by spending money on establishing complex manufacturing and metal forging in the U.K. The outcome of that is to make Ukrainian artillery more sustainable, but where that money is being invested is into deprived communities in the U.K.

If we were more joined up about this, then I think we could shift the narrative.

[Jennifer O'Connell, Liberal, Pickering—Uxbridge, ON]

Thank you. I appreciate that answer.

I think that is something we have to speak more about here at home, and in a coordinated approach with NATO and our allies. It's important, from a political perspective, to make sure that our communities and our country as a whole understand the full picture and the importance of continuing to be a strong ally for Ukraine.

My next question is in regard to NATO's response and coordination.

Do you have opinions on some of the strengths that maybe surprised Russia? We've heard a lot of testimony to that fact. However, moving forward, where can Canada be involved in making sure that any weaknesses or gaps are filled within the NATO system and in that coordination?

[Dr. Jack Watling]

In terms of weaknesses, I think a major one is the distinction I made between a military strategy, which NATO has the muscle memory and the mechanisms to develop, versus a political strategy. NATO can be a coordination body for that strategy, and the military strategy has to align with the political strategy, but ultimately NATO doesn't have the same authorities in that space. My observation would be that a number of different countries in the alliance have a different vision of what the outcome that we would like looks like.

There are good reasons that this debate shouldn't be had in public. However, I think constructive convening, whether that be by Canada or others who in some ways don't antagonize the different opinions in the alliance on that particular topic, could be very constructive in hosting and building a common understanding of where the alliance is trying to get to, not just what the alliance is trying to prevent in the short term.

[Jennifer O'Connell, Liberal, Pickering—Uxbridge, ON]

Thank you.

To follow up on your comments about the political strategy, is this part of the conversation about Ukraine's future in NATO, or is this more just coordination, in your view, in terms of NATO's strength moving forward and ensuring readiness? Frankly, NATO needs to always be ready and coordinated in case something like this occurs, but are your political strategy comments also in relation to the future of Ukraine in NATO or the future of NATO in general, where perhaps more work or more coordination needs to be done?

[Dr. Jack Watling]

I think it's more in relation to Russia. If we think about Russia's position, Russia has burned all of its soft power. It is in a conflict, and in Russia's terms, it is fighting NATO—not militarily, but that's how the Kremlin talks about this conflict.

Now, irrespective of where the line of control is in Ukraine, that leaves a live, very dangerous relationship between NATO and Russia. We need Russia, ultimately, to come to the negotiating table, not thinking that it's going to get everything that it wants but being prepared to make concessions, which also means the Russians need to fear the alternative, right? They need to think that the alternative to not negotiating and not making concessions is less positive for their vision of where the world is going—

[Jennifer O'Connell, Liberal, Pickering—Uxbridge, ON]

Thank you.

[Dr. Jack Watling]

—which may mean we need to make it more uncomfortable.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Unfortunately, we're going to have to leave it there.

Thank you.

[Dr. Jack Watling]

Sorry.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

That's all right.

Ms. Michaud, you have the floor for six minutes.

[Kristina Michaud, Bloc, Avignon—La Mitis—Matane—Matapédia, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Watling, thank you for agreeing to testify and answer our questions.

Earlier, I asked other speakers how things are going for the Russian troops. As we know, there has been a leak of secret U.S. documents containing several pieces of information related to the U.S. view on the conflict.

In your opinion, did this have a negative impact on the morale of Ukrainian troops or on military strategy? Did it have a positive impact on Russia or did they choose to ignore these documents since it could have been an allied tactic or strategy? What can you tell us about this document leak?

[Dr. Jack Watling]

I'm afraid, for legal reasons, I can't comment on the content of the leak specifically, but I can comment on the consequences of it.

I think there's been a long process of building up trust with Ukraine, which has been very important in making sure that we provide the right support, because there are a lot of things that aren't necessarily as helpful as others. There can be no doubt that this will have restricted access to some of the information-sharing arrangements and potentially damaged that trust. That can be rebuilt, but it does add friction to things. There is very much goodwill on both sides to make sure that it doesn't cause problems, so I think it's not insurmountable. It just will add friction.

On the Russian side, what was exposed would certainly provide very useful information to the Russian military that it could use to try to counter what Ukraine is trying to do in its operations over the next few months.

Now, obviously, those slides relate to information that is earlier in the year. Some of those problems may have been resolved or, because of the dates outlined in them, the slides may no longer reflect the position, but certainly the shortage of air defence munitions, which has been widely discussed, is a very critical problem that has to be overcome. If the Russian air force can bomb from medium altitude, then that will inflict a very serious level of damage on Ukrainian forces, so making sure that this problem is overcome is now a critical priority.

[Kristina Michaud, Bloc, Avignon—La Mitis—Matane—Matapédia, QC]

Thank you.

Earlier, I asked the witnesses about Russia's supply problems. Essentially, I was told that there may indeed be some problems, but that Russia is such a large and populous country that it is not likely, in the long run, to be such a big problem for Russian troops.

As we know, Putin finds himself in an increasingly difficult situation: he must maintain public support while increasing the war effort. Recently, Russia passed a law allowing mobilization orders to be sent electronically.

Do you agree with the witnesses we heard earlier? Do you think the supply issues are not that serious in the long run? Do you think there are some things that are beneficial to the Ukrainian troops?

[Dr. Jack Watling]

Russia does face some severe supply challenges, in particular for some of its complex weapons. Their weapons are dependent on components that are manufactured in Europe, the U.S. and South Korea, etc., the access to which we can potentially disrupt, so we have some agency there in making it harder for them.

However, the Russians, up until towards the end of last year, had primarily stepped up the tempo of their defence production. They had not started cannibalizing or militarizing their civilian industry. From the beginning of this year, we've observed them starting to shift civilian industries into military production, and that opens up a very significant amount of industrial capacity for their military.

There is also the potential that they will receive more support in terms of workers and technician support from China, and matériel support through Iran and other countries that will allow them to expand access to things like explosive energetics, which is a bottleneck for the Russians too.

At the moment, Russian industry is lagging behind their requirements quite significantly, but depending on how competently they stitch together the aspects of their industry that they are mobilizing, they could start getting on a much more favourable trajectory in terms of production later in this year. There will be a lag, but the trajectory is increasing.

[Kristina Michaud, Bloc, Avignon—La Mitis—Matane—Matapédia, QC]

Thank you.

We've heard that since the war began or thereabouts, Ukrainian children have been adopted by Russian families. According to what the Institute for the Study of War said recently, the Wagner group is training Ukrainian children for combat. Do you have any information on this? If so, do you know what we can do to protect Ukrainian children from this phenomenon?

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Please answer very briefly.

[Dr. Jack Watling]

The critical protection is to prevent the Russians occupying any more territory and to try to negotiate for the return of children who have already been seized. I've been in areas that were occupied and have been through the records in some of those areas. It's clear that many children were taken into Russia by the Russian armed forces. This is something that has happened across the areas that they've occupied, and it's obviously a great concern for the Ukrainians, because the process of filtration that was set up separated those children from their families.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Thank you, Madame Michaud.

Madam Mathyssen, you have six minutes, please.

[Lindsay Mathyssen, NDP, London—Fanshawe, ON]

Thank you, Dr. Watling, for appearing with us today.

Many members of this committee visited Taiwan last week. We spoke to some really incredible representatives about how they battle misinformation and disinformation campaigns from China and about that intense relationship they have. We learned that they were very proactive about it in their education systems. We heard in the last panel as well that other countries are better at it.

Could you talk to us about the impact of Russian misinformation campaigns on the U.K. and what they're doing to defend against them?

[Dr. Jack Watling]

Sure. I think that for the last few years there has been an obsession with misinformation on social media and that kind of thing as though that were the primary issue. While the Russians do exacerbate those problems, and it's useful to them, what they are actually doing is manufacturing constituencies that elites can then use.

The target for Russian information operations is actually elites in certain countries, people like yourselves. What we are observing is that the Russians have set up a series of “centres of special influence”, as they call them, for command and control, and are targeting a number of countries, including the U.K., Germany, France and the U.S., where they are conducting active measures and ultimately trying to shift policy through pushing targeted narratives at elites.

In the U.S., for example, those narratives include the argument that every dollar spent defending Ukraine is a dollar making you weaker in the Indo-Pacific, essentially exacerbating policy debates there about prioritization. Pushing the argument that money should be spent to support domestic needs and fight inflation rather than support Ukraine is another one, even though Russia is the cause of a lot of that inflation through its energy campaign and economic warfare.

The really critical thing, to my mind, is being much more proactive in identifying the individuals who engage with elite communities and try to seed these ideas in our policy debates. It's about combing through and identifying individuals who are not participating politically in good faith.

[Lindsay Mathyssen, NDP, London—Fanshawe, ON]

In terms of the weeding out of those individuals, are there countries that are doing that well? Does the U.K. have a specific strategy? Could you give us examples?

[Dr. Jack Watling]

I think Estonia has done a very good job of going through that process. It's taken them a period of time to acknowledge that it was a problem and to build the domestic political support for doing that.

In other countries, it is happening. You will see a steady trickle of arrests. In the U.S., there are certainly individuals. We are seeing indictments come out on a semi-regular basis.

One of the challenges with this process is that it's almost always politically contentious, because the way the Russians work is that they target organizations that give the people they recruit political legitimacy, protection. It looks like enforcement is going after the legitimate political debates that are surrounding the organization the person is attached to rather than going after the individual.

[Lindsay Mathyssen, NDP, London—Fanshawe, ON]

I want to expand on one of the conversations we had in the other panel with Ms. Buck, the former Canadian ambassador to NATO. She spoke about targeting lesser allies and making them stronger allies by talking about things like food security and the impacts that have been seen around the world as a result of what has happened with Ukraine's production of food.

Could you expand a bit on that in terms of how Canada participates and how NATO countries and the U.K. could participate to strengthen those lesser allies to make them stronger so that they have a greater impact on Russia in those diplomatic formats?

[Dr. Jack Watling]

I'm going to interpret your question as partners rather than allies. I presume you mean countries outside of the alliance that we have relationships with.