Evidence of meeting #57 for National Defence in the 44th Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was ukraine.
A recording is available from Parliament.
3:40 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal John McKay
I call this meeting to order.
Before I call on our witnesses—Mr. Jenkins and Mr. Rasiulis—you'll notice that we are going to stretch the one hour into a bit more, so we should be able to get three rounds of questions in at a very minimum.
You'll notice that we are not dealing with the health study we had agreed to. That is in part because we were not able to get the witnesses lined up, and it's all Bryan May's fault.
3:40 p.m.
Some hon members
Oh, oh!
3:40 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal John McKay
On Friday, we will have the health study. The following Tuesday, the minister will appear with officials for two hours. On May 5, Parliament is suspended for a day. We will then resume our health study.
We also have some invitations. I think I'll go through those later, after we release our witnesses. It is a fairly packed agenda until the end of Parliament in June.
With that, I want to welcome an old friend, Mr. Rasiulis, to the committee. He is quite familiar with the way we operate here. We look forward to his five-minute statement.
Before we call on him, we'll call on Mr. Jenkins, who is the senior adviser to the president of RAND Corporation, for an opening five-minute statement.
Welcome, sir. We appreciate you making yourself available over the course of the next hour or so. We look forward to what you have to say in the next five minutes.
3:40 p.m.
Brian Jenkins Senior Adviser to the President, RAND Corporation, As an Individual
Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you very much for inviting me to comment on the war in Ukraine.
As you may know, I am responding on short notice, so instead of a polished briefing, let me offer some brief informal remarks. These are based upon a series of essays I wrote for the RAND Corporation. Mr. Wilson, your clerk, has the links.
I want to emphasize that I am not an authority on Ukraine or Russia. My field of research for many years has been political violence, irregular warfare and psychological operations. I also want to make clear that these are my personal views and not those of the RAND Corporation or, of course, of the U.S. government.
My essays attempted to go beyond the battlefield and explore the potential strategic geopolitical and economic consequences of the war. Of course, we don't know how the war will turn out. In my essays I outlined seven theoretical scenarios ranging from a Russian takeover of Ukraine to a Russian military collapse. I think the more likely scenarios fall in the murky middle and include engrenage, which is a good French term for which there isn't an English translation that has the same impact. It is simply a continuing carnage. We could see a stalemate or a frozen conflict, or we could see a range of favourable to unfavourable negotiated settlements. We could also potentially see a continuing gradual escalation, which has been the pattern thus far.
Whatever the scenario, however, the status quo ante bellum will not be restored. The post-Ukraine war landscape will be different.
Russia's reputation as a military power has been badly tarnished. Its problems include strategic miscalculations, incoherent execution and the poor quality of Russian soldiering. Even if it prevails on the battlefield, Russia has been weakened.
The war has also exacerbated Russia's demographic crisis. It was fascinating to see the results of a recent poll of global strategists and practitioners, conducted by the Atlantic Council. It showed that a surprising 46% of the 167 respondents expected Russia to become a failed state in the next 10 years.
On the other side, Russia's invasion of Ukraine has, for the time being, strengthened NATO. However, continued western support for Ukraine may depend on its continued military success.
NATO's southeastern flank is soft. Hungary is pursuing its own course. Romania is very cautious. Bulgaria remains politically divided. Turkey's response has been supportive, but at the same time ambivalent and transactional. Such stresses are not new to NATO. The alliance has survived these kinds of things in the past, but it is always difficult.
Looking at the postwar global economy, the war has slowed the economic recovery from the pandemic. The effect in Europe will be more significant. The reconstruction of Ukraine will require a massive investment, which is estimated at $350 billion. The willingness to invest in that reconstruction, especially by the private sector, will depend of course on the situation that prevails.
I believe that Europe's reliance on Russian energy is over. Russia will find and is finding new markets for its gas and oil, but reduced gas sales to Europe will affect Russia's political influence and state capture, especially in eastern Europe. We are seeing somewhat of a recreation of a divided Cold War economy in the world, albeit much more complicated than it was 40 or 50 years ago. I also believe that deep globalization pressures will continue, and global defence spending seems likely to surge.
The world is again a more perilous place. Naked military aggression is not ancient history. More than 30 years after the end of the Cold War, we may find these dangers hard to grasp.
Let me stop there. I'm happy to respond to your questions later on.
Thank you.
3:45 p.m.
Liberal
3:45 p.m.
Andrew Rasiulis Fellow, Canadian Global Affairs Institute, As an Individual
Mr. Chair and members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to provide an update on the current situation in the Russo-Ukraine war.
As of today, the war may be described as being in a strategic stalemate. The last Ukrainian offensive action was last fall when Ukrainian forces pushed back Russian forces in the areas of Kharkiv in the northern sector of the front and Kherson, specifically Kherson city, in the southern sector of the front.
Thereafter, the Russians stabilized their defensive lines, and Ukrainian forces went over to the defensive. In January, the Russians began a slow, grinding offensive drive across various sectors of the entire front line. The main focus of the Russian offensive has been to capture the city of Bakhmut.
The battle for Bakhmut in the central sector of the front, within the oblast of Donetsk, has been the centrepiece of the Russian offensive drive. While there have been debates within the Ukrainian leadership, as well as among the U.S. military advisers to Ukraine, as to whether it would have been more effective militarily for the Ukrainian forces to retreat from Bakhmut and establish stronger defensive positions in two towns further west, the final decision taken by the Ukrainian government was to hold on to a tenacious defence of the town.
To date, the Russians have managed to push into Bakhmut with pincer movements, surrounding the town from three sides, with the Ukrainians holding on to one road to the west, which they use for resupply and the evacuation of casualties and refugees. That road remains under Russian artillery fire. The Russians have also managed to push into the centre of the town and appear to occupy much of the town, with the Ukrainians doggedly defending the western sections. The battle continues to rage, with the latest reports saying that Russian forces are continuing to advance westward in small, incremental steps by seizing building by building and street block by street block. Casualties on both sides have been very high. It's very much a battle of attrition.
Beyond the front lines, the Russians have waged a war of aerial bombardment, largely targeting Ukraine's energy grid throughout the country. The Russians have used a variety of weapons, from cruise missiles to drones of various types. Ukrainian air defence systems have been quite successful in shooting down large proportions of the incoming Russian ordnance.
The Ukrainian political military objectives and aims in the war have been clearly stated as the expulsion of all Russian forces from occupied Ukraine, including Crimea—essentially the Ukrainian borders of 1991. On the matter of Crimea, commentary appears from time to time about the potential of a diplomatic settlement on Crimea rather than through the force of arms. However, in the main, the Ukrainian position is to use military force to expel Russian forces from Crimea.
The Russian political military objectives may be broken down into maximalist and minimalist. The Russian maximalist objective has been to force a regime change in Ukraine through military action. The intent has been to install a pro-Russian government in Kyiv that would align itself as a close partner of Russia and reject the objectives of moving closer to the west through accession to the European Union and NATO. The minimalist Russian objective is to fully occupy, by military force, the four oblasts in eastern Ukraine that were annexed by the Russian Federation's Duma, while continuing to hold on to Crimea, which Russia annexed in 2014. The four oblasts are Kharkiv, Luhansk, Donetsk and Kherson. The current front runs through these four oblasts, and they are controlled by Ukraine and Russia to varying degrees.
Where may the war go from here? The expectation is for an imminent Ukrainian spring and summer counteroffensive. In fact, some are arguing that the offensive has actually started. The centrepiece for this offensive is the latest reinforcement of western arms, such as main battle tanks, infantry armoured fighting vehicles, air defence and artillery systems, and large stocks of ammunition.
Most assessments are that this Ukrainian offensive has the potential to punch a hole somewhere in the Russian defensive line and secure an operational level success. It is expected that the Russian defence will be strong enough to prevent a strategic level victory, meaning the expulsion of Russian forces from all of occupied Ukraine. It should be expected that the Russians will, in turn, conduct their own counteroffensive to offset the Ukrainian effort.
The resulting effect of the upcoming spring and summer fighting may continue to be a strategic stalemate into the fall. Whether there will be a change in Ukrainian and Russian political positions to move toward a ceasefire and eventual peace talks is impossible to assess at present. It remains very probable that the war will continue throughout 2023 without a ceasefire or political settlement.
Thank you for your attention. I look forward to your questions.
3:55 p.m.
Liberal
3:55 p.m.
Conservative
Shelby Kramp-Neuman Conservative Hastings—Lennox and Addington, ON
Thank you.
I'd like to start with Mr. Jenkins.
There's no question that the world has changed dramatically over the last eight years. You noted in your comments that you expect global defence spending to surge.
There's been limited political will to change this sad state of affairs, so I wonder if you could comment on the military deficiencies, be they personnel or procurement, that are becoming a liability for our security partners.
3:55 p.m.
Senior Adviser to the President, RAND Corporation, As an Individual
That's a good question.
The reason I expect to see an increase in defence spending—and I think we're already seeing it—is that, first of all, the overt Russian invasion has, to a degree, galvanized NATO and pushed a number of the countries closer to meeting their pledges to increase defence spending to address some of these deficiencies. That's number one.
Number two, it is clear from the nature of the war that the consumption rates of artillery, drones and other forms of weapons and ammunition have been intense and indeed beyond what was, I think, anticipated by many. We're going back to World War II levels of consumption. Stocks have been drawn down to meet that. We don't have the production capabilities to maintain it. Therefore, we are seeing some new production facilities come online. Depending on the war in Ukraine...that will use more weapons and ammunition, and stocks will be replenished.
Number three, I would point to the general perception now that the world is, again, a much more dangerous place. I think many nations are looking to perhaps bolster their defences.
Overall, I think this will combine to see an increase in weapons acquisitions. The nature of those acquisitions, in addition to replacement, will be learning from the battles about what types of weapons, drones, air defence systems and so on are valuable and essential to war in the 21st century.
3:55 p.m.
Conservative
Shelby Kramp-Neuman Conservative Hastings—Lennox and Addington, ON
Do you mind responding to whether you have seen the Pentagon Discord leaks?
3:55 p.m.
Senior Adviser to the President, RAND Corporation, As an Individual
I beg your pardon.
3:55 p.m.
Conservative
Shelby Kramp-Neuman Conservative Hastings—Lennox and Addington, ON
Can you comment with regard to the leaks from the Pentagon?
3:55 p.m.
Senior Adviser to the President, RAND Corporation, As an Individual
No. I've been fascinated reading about some of that in the press. The investigation into how this took place is ongoing. I have no detailed knowledge of that investigation.
I think there is a personal view on this. We have a lot of classified material, and perhaps a lot of connectivity, that may not be necessary. I'm still trying to figure out how, in fact, the particular individual who has been named in the press came to have access to such a broad array of material, but all of that will have to wait for the investigation.
I have no other comment.
3:55 p.m.
Conservative
Shelby Kramp-Neuman Conservative Hastings—Lennox and Addington, ON
Thank you.
Mr. Rasiulis, there's no question that the war is much more complicated than anybody would have anticipated. However, over a year ago, you outlined that the war in Ukraine was the most “immediate threat” facing Canada and the CAF, and you shared that Canada should be front and centre on both the defence side and the deterrence side.
Over a year later, how do you feel Canada has responded to this call to action?
3:55 p.m.
Fellow, Canadian Global Affairs Institute, As an Individual
I think Canada has done everything it is in a position to do. Everything is relative. The strength of the Canadian Forces is a relative balance with Canadian government budgets, so it doesn't get everything it needs or wants.
As we have traditionally done, we have put our forces in what I call the front window. We have used everything we have. I think we have been very good at that throughout our history.
Today we have the lead in Latvia. We have promised to plus up from a battalion group to a brigade group. We're still waiting for the results of that. I'm sure there's a lot of work going on. Whether or not Leopard tanks will join our troops in Latvia is another good question. I'm looking forward to the Canadian government announcing what it's going to do.
I think everything is relative, but I think the Canadian Forces do everything they can. We're in the front window.
4 p.m.
Conservative
Shelby Kramp-Neuman Conservative Hastings—Lennox and Addington, ON
Can you possibly comment with regard to your foreshadowing of the danger of burnout in our armed forces? Do you feel that Canada has invested in the necessary resources to avoid this burnout? As it appears that the war is going to be long term, has Canada created the capabilities to maintain its stamina?
4 p.m.
Fellow, Canadian Global Affairs Institute, As an Individual
Burnout is an extremely serious matter. As you well know, we're 10,000 personnel short. There's a rule of thumb for deployments. In Latvia, for example, it's one-third deployed, one-third training and one-third resting.
We are not in a combat situation in Latvia, unlike in Afghanistan, where we were in a combat situation. There, the burnout was extremely serious. Latvia is not the same case. Our troops do not have the stress of combat; they have the stress of training, so it's one step removed from that.
Again, given the shortages of personnel, I believe the Canadian Forces and General Eyre have been very conservative about deploying our forces in addition to what we are already doing because he's concerned, I'm sure, about maintaining the credible standing of the forces we have in place.
4 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal John McKay
Thank you, Mrs. Shelby Kramp-Neuman.
Mr. Fisher, go ahead for six minutes.
4 p.m.
Liberal
Darren Fisher Liberal Dartmouth—Cole Harbour, NS
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair, and thanks to both of our witnesses for being here.
Mr. Rasiulis, it's nice to see you again. A lot has happened since the last time you were at our committee over a year ago.
I'm going to quote what you said at the time: “The neutrality option for Ukraine is on the table.” Again, a lot has happened. A very violent year has passed. From this perspective, it's difficult to have imagined that Ukraine was ever truly neutral as it pertains to NATO versus Russia.
You talked about “diplomatically”.... You talked about Ukrainians using military force to expel Russian forces. I'm interested in your thoughts on what a post-conflict Ukraine would look like diplomatically. I'm also interested in what challenges you think this poses.
4 p.m.
Fellow, Canadian Global Affairs Institute, As an Individual
[Inaudible—Editor] huge. Let me just—
4 p.m.
Fellow, Canadian Global Affairs Institute, As an Individual
Yes, a light one.
Just for historical accuracy, let me say that Ukraine had a position of non-alignment—not exactly neutrality—from 1991 to 2014. It was balancing off between the Russians and the west, but as of 2014 it really shifted, joining NATO and the EU firmly into its constitution.
The question is—and this is why there's war, from the Russian point of view—how the war will end. We don't know. Let's take the general speculation that there will be some kind of stalemate or some kind of deal. That deal, whatever it is, will no doubt have to have some measure of security guarantees for Ukraine.
One option is they are brought into NATO. Another option is they receive equivalent security guarantees, not just like the Budapest thing, which is a political guarantee, but a hard-core security guarantee that's legal, and not by NATO but by certain NATO members individually. You would have a group of NATO countries that sign up as individual states to provide security guarantees to Ukraine. It takes away the bogeyman of NATO as a whole, but you have the strength of certain key partners like the United States and so on. That's another option in there.
A complete neutrality and a demilitarized Ukraine, which is the Russian objective, I think is not really a strong card right now for the Russians to play.
4 p.m.
Liberal
Darren Fisher Liberal Dartmouth—Cole Harbour, NS
I want to switch gears a bit and then maybe give both of our witnesses a chance.
I asked this question last week. When we think about China and we think about Russia, we think about the strange relationship they may or may not have. I'm interested your thoughts about what China's interests and objectives are and what Beijing hopes to achieve in the near and the long term by what looks like and appears to be deepening ties with Russia, notwithstanding the fact that they claim they want an end to this.
Mr. Jenkins, you can start.
