National Defence Committee on April 25th, 2023

[Lindsay Mathyssen, NDP, London—Fanshawe, ON]

I want to talk about what could come out of the Vilnius conference and what you hope will come out of that moving forward.

[Andrew Rasiulis]

Well, from what I'm aware of, for the Lithuanians, who are hosting it, the big thing is to get everybody to plus up to 2% GDP. That is the Lithuanian position.

I know they are pounding on the doors here in Ottawa to try to get Canada to plus up to 2%. They would even say that 2% is a floor not a ceiling. That's the Lithuanian agenda. They want to go hard on strengthening that. They also want to make sure that for the eastern flank, the plus-ups to go from a battalion group to a brigade group are actually in place.

As the Lithuanians drive it, that's where they're going. They really want to push the hard defensive positions.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Thank you, Ms. Mathyssen.

Mr. Kelly, you are next for five minutes in the second round.

[Pat Kelly, Conservative, Calgary Rocky Ridge, AB]

Thanks.

Mr. Rasiulis, you talked about the strength of Canada's contribution. You praised the effort to date and characterized it as applying the maximum capability possible. However, the recent American leaks indicated that our allies, including the United States, are skeptical or concerned about Canada's ability to maintain NATO battle groups while aiding Ukraine.

How sustainable is the present deployment? How have failures to increase personnel numbers jeopardized our ability to maintain even the current commitments we have made or enable Canada to up its contribution to ensure that Ukraine ultimately prevails?

[Andrew Rasiulis]

My understanding of the leaks you referred to is that they're saying Canada.... The concern of some allies is that we cannot take on another operational assignment other than what we have now. That's the issue, and yes, we can't. That's why we didn't go to Haiti, I assume.

The question is really about the battalion going to a brigade-level group in Latvia. That is the real question. We have not yet seen the Canadian government come forth with its plans. I understand that there is planning under way for that and discussions are under way for that, but that's the litmus test to come. I suspect or I'm guessing that maybe the Canadian government will announce it at Vilnius.

[Pat Kelly, Conservative, Calgary Rocky Ridge, AB]

Then you think there is capacity there. It's not a—

[Andrew Rasiulis]

My understanding is that we, the Canadian military, will work toward establishing, as a lead nation, a brigade group, but again, we are not the sole providers of forces for that brigade group. I'm sure that we are going around the NATO circles thinking there is another group of countries with us in Latvia and that they are plussing up as well. We're negotiating on how we all, together, get to the brigade.

[Pat Kelly, Conservative, Calgary Rocky Ridge, AB]

I'll go back to something you said about China. You said that you thought China's goal is to ensure that Russia doesn't lose. What does Russia not losing even look like? The minimalist positions of both sides don't leave room for a compromise solution, or at least I don't see one.

Go ahead. I'll let you take that on.

[Andrew Rasiulis]

Losing is going back to the 1991 borders of Ukraine, including the Russians losing Crimea and losing the Black Sea fleet in Sevastopol. That's something they've always had. Even in 1991, when Ukraine became independent, the Russians had a lease arrangement with Ukraine to keep the Black Sea fleet in Sevastopol. From the Russian point of view, that would be an existential defeat.

The Chinese, I believe, do not want that to happen, so it would be something short of that. Then you have other scenarios—a return to the February 24, 2022, line, for example, and the Minsk II lines and so on. Those are options that are being discussed.

[Pat Kelly, Conservative, Calgary Rocky Ridge, AB]

Those would mean Ukraine losing, to the Ukrainian side.

[Andrew Rasiulis]

Everyone loses. There are no winners and no losers, you can say.

[Pat Kelly, Conservative, Calgary Rocky Ridge, AB]

Okay.

I have about a minute left, so maybe I'll go to Mr. Jenkins for productivity capability and the expenditure of basic artillery shells and ammunition. I'm not talking about smart or sophisticated guided ordnance but just plain artillery shells.

How can western countries, in particular Canada...? Perhaps you can comment on Canada's productive capability. What needs to be done to ensure that Ukraine just flat out doesn't run out of shells?

[Brian Jenkins]

If we're talking about artillery shells and not smart weapons...because smart weapons are more complicated. The pieces to them involve more than a single country, and manufacturing is very, very complicated. If we're talking about old-fashioned artillery shells, then this is a matter of manufacturing capability.

Years ago, decades ago, we had this capacity. It has understandably atrophied over the years without a Cold War push behind it. I think military services have been understandably.... I don't want to say they've been mesmerized, but certainly they've been attracted to the more high-tech weapons. The idea of artillery tubes and old-fashioned 155 shells was not the most exciting thing. As it turns out, in this particular type of war they have proved to be critical.

I don't think it's a matter of any country's individual capacity. I think it is a matter of NATO planning and in a sense parsing out who can do what to bring up the overall level of production. Defence budgets for the production of weapons tend to be geared a great deal toward the national industry, and—

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Unfortunately, we'll have to leave Mr. Kelly's inquiries there. He's very cleverly turned five minutes into six and a half.

We have Ms. Lambropoulos for five minutes, please.

[Emmanuella Lambropoulos, Liberal, Saint-Laurent, QC]

Thanks, Mr. Chair.

I'd like to begin by thanking both of our witnesses for being here to answer our questions today.

I don't mind who answers me first. They're general questions that I'd like answers from both of you on, if possible.

I'd like to know what your take is on the consequences of Ukraine losing this war. I know that in the beginning—and from the beginning—NATO stated that it would not go to war for Ukraine, as mentioned previously. Of course, NATO is trying to support in whatever way that it can with military equipment. What are the consequences, in your view, of Ukraine losing this war?

We've also heard a bit about the different opinions or the divergence that could occur between NATO allies. What are some of the ways that you believe we can stop that from happening? What are some ways that Canada, for example, could play a role in keeping countries together and on that right path?

[Brian Jenkins]

Let me start off with that.

First of all, if by “losing” you mean that Russia succeeds in regime change in Ukraine, I think that would have a major impact. Even though NATO leaders have said they're not going to go to war with Russia in Ukraine, a great deal of western credibility is on the line in how this turns out.

A true loss—a dramatic loss—would question the credibility of the alliance. The strength of the alliance has always been, of course, that it was intended initially to deter a massive Soviet invasion of western Europe. Alliances deter. When they actually get to war, it becomes a lot more complicated.

If there was a loss, we would see two things happening at the same time. We would see some fragmenting and some fracturing of the alliance. Some of the countries that I've already indicated are in the less enthusiastic, wavering category. They might find ways to, if not remove themselves from the alliance, in a sense slide into a kind of soft “self-Finlandization”, if I can say that, where they attempt to avoid provoking the wrath of Russia.

At the same time, I think for some countries—for example Poland or the Baltic republics—we would see a desperate redoubling of effort so that Russia would not be lured by perceptions of victory in Ukraine and a weak, supine NATO into pushing further and attempting to advance, whether it's into Moldova, the Baltic republics or somewhere else. That certainly has been the long-term objective that has been outlined by President Putin himself.

[Emmanuella Lambropoulos, Liberal, Saint-Laurent, QC]

Before we get an answer from our other witness, could you comment on the next question and then we'll go back?

A lot of public opinion in some western countries is that there may be too much spending on this particular war. I guess the general public may not see a need to continue spending. Maybe they don't necessarily know what the implications or the consequences could be if it goes in one way and not another.

Do you believe that public opinion has any way of swaying the government, in the United States or on our side in Canada, to make a different decision or to change the way we're doing things?

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

You have 20 seconds or less, please.

[Brian Jenkins]

I think the public opinion on the street initially has been pushing the government. The valiant defence put up by the Ukrainians has been inspiring to many and has perhaps persuaded some governments to go further than they had imagined they would at the outset. At the same time, if we look at elections coming up in this country and if we look at political developments in the European countries, 2024 will be very interesting in terms of how the divided sentiments you point to will play out in elections.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Thank you, Ms. Lambropoulos.

Colleagues, if we're going to get to a third round, which I think everyone wants because it will include all members, I'll have to run a harder clock.

Ms. Normandin, over to you for two and a half minutes.

[Christine Normandin, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

My question is for Mr. Jenkins, but Mr. Rasiulis can also respond afterwards.

We keep discussing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or NATO, and Russia and Ukraine, but we sometimes seem to forget about certain other countries, like BRICS, including Brazil and India. In addition, we seem to skip over the countries that decided not to take sides, the “wait-and-see” countries. In fact, a good article was recently published entitled “In Defense of the Fence Sitters”.

Can you tell us about the countries watching from a distance that do not necessarily take a stand?

Should we be more concerned about them? Should we be keeping a closer eye on them? Should we make sure that we support Ukraine better so those countries do not pull their support or cross over to the wrong side?

We also keep talking about Africa, among other places where Russia has already sunk in its claws, so to speak.

I would like you to comment on the other countries—the ones that don't come up as often.

[Brian Jenkins]

The idea of fence-sitters, especially in a developing world—in Africa, in Asia and in Latin America—is not a new one. Remember, going back to the years of the Cold War, we referred to these countries as third world countries, meaning “third world”, as opposed to being clearly in the Soviet camp or in the western camp. Those attitudes have not always fundamentally changed.

I think there has been an erosion of diplomatic efforts in many of these countries, that is, efforts by the United States and by the European countries. I don't want to include Canada, because I don't comment on Canada. There has been a neglect of diplomacy in these areas that both China and Russia have, in some circumstances, taken advantage of.

There still is a long hangover from the colonial era from the behaviour of some of the European countries, and especially from the behaviour of my own country, that is off-putting, if I can use that mild term, to many of the countries in these continents that you have identified. There, it is really about more serious diplomacy, and we're going to have to battle diplomatically, as well as support military efforts, to deter Russia from further aggression.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Thank you, Madame Normandin.

Ms. Mathyssen, you have two and a half minutes.

[Lindsay Mathyssen, NDP, London—Fanshawe, ON]

Mr. Jenkins, I want to build on some of the lines of questioning that Ms. Lambropoulos was discussing.

You've done a lot of writing about Russian disinformation campaigns in the United States. I would like to hear about whether you see any impact of that in the United States. How can it impact support for Ukraine? What have you seen? Just expand upon what I think you were trying to talk about before.

[Brian Jenkins]

Look, Russia can win in Ukraine in one of two ways. Either it can win on the ground militarily or it can win by cracking the resolve of the western nations that are supporting Ukraine.

It has devoted a great deal of effort and attention, especially given the lack of progress on the ground militarily, to its continuing information warfare and influence operations. These include both overt efforts at propaganda and taking advantage of pre-existing divisions, especially in the United States, where Russian information operations take both sides of any kind of debate and attempt to drive them further apart and intensify that debate.

That's not traditional propaganda, but it's enabled by the kinds of communications technologies we have. We see that going on, and, again, as a consequence of our existing partisan divide in this country, exacerbated by Russian exploitation of that, we really have major divisions on this issue. As I said, we will see in the coming elections how this plays out.