Go ahead, Mr. Jenkins.
Evidence of meeting #57 for National Defence in the 44th Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was ukraine.
A recording is available from Parliament.
Evidence of meeting #57 for National Defence in the 44th Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was ukraine.
A recording is available from Parliament.
4:05 p.m.
Senior Adviser to the President, RAND Corporation, As an Individual
Look, China is watching this, and certainly what happens in Ukraine will have some effect on Chinese decision-making. Right now, China is a beneficiary of the developments in Ukraine. It completely...not completely, but it distracts, and it's a drag on the ability of the United States to confront China directly, although the United States is doing so.
I don't see that China really wants to start a war over Taiwan. I know the Ukraine war and the Taiwan issue have been connected in the sense that if Russia takes over Ukraine, it is a green light for China to invade Taiwan. I think that's probably simplistic.
China is also benefiting from expanding its influence through soft power in Asia, in Africa and in Latin America. I think the war in Ukraine—again, having distracted the Europeans, the United States, Canada and everyone else—facilitates that process. I think China is a beneficiary of the now perhaps discounted energy supplies from Russia seeking a market.
In the relationship between China and Russia, I would say that clearly Russia right now is the needier junior partner in the relationship.
4:05 p.m.
Fellow, Canadian Global Affairs Institute, As an Individual
I have no disagreement. China is seeing this as a.... It can position itself geopolitically vis-à-vis the United States. The United States and China are the primary antagonists. As our guest has said, Russia is the junior partner here.
The Chinese will not, in my opinion, allow the Russians to lose. They're not particularly interested in them winning, but they won't let the Russians lose. That's the key thing here.
The Chinese actually want the war to end. I think that overall it's disruptive for them economically speaking, so they would like to have a situation where Russia doesn't lose: no winners, no losers, a ceasefire, a demilitarized zone and economics return. Their economic interests will then be served by good, peaceful transactions economically with Europe.
4:05 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal John McKay
Thank you, Mr. Fisher.
Ms. Normandin, the floor is yours for six minutes.
4:05 p.m.
Bloc
Christine Normandin Bloc Saint-Jean, QC
Thank you to the two witnesses for being with us today.
First I have a general question for both witnesses. I will give you some context with the following quote, from Mr. Justin Massie: The pressure is on Ukraine for the next counteroffensive. The west's support is falling short of Ukraine's demands. In spite of this, behind closed doors, the west is warning that Ukrainian failures could be followed by a ceasefire consolidating the territories conquered by Russia.
I would like to get your comments on the possibility of a ceasefire.
Given the current situation, is it valid to think that a ceasefire would be to Russia's advantage rather than Ukraine's?
Perhaps Mr. Rasiulis could answer first.
4:05 p.m.
Fellow, Canadian Global Affairs Institute, As an Individual
On the question of a ceasefire after the offensive that's coming in the summer, the question is, how successful will the Ukrainians be? The Ukrainians have been very skeptical about ceasefires. They see a ceasefire as a temporary recess for the Russians so the Russians can then get their act together and continue the war.
On the other hand, there may come a point in time—it may not be this fall, and it may be next year—where both sides, Ukrainians and Russians, are militarily unable to push each other any further. If you come to the point where further military action does not advance your political objectives, then the question is, why are you continuing to fight?
An example is 1953 in Korea and the Korean War. It ended finally when neither side could push the other and it was felt that a war of attrition had reached a level of exhaustion and therefore peace or a ceasefire. In Korea there's no peace. It's still a war, but it's a ceasefire.
On the question of the ceasefire role in the Russia-Ukraine war—it's not exactly the same situation—a ceasefire would come when it serves the interests of both the Russians and the Ukrainians. They both have to want it more than the war, and there are no guarantees that it would be a continual ceasefire.
4:10 p.m.
Bloc
4:10 p.m.
Senior Adviser to the President, RAND Corporation, As an Individual
I agree with Mr. Rasiulis's remark that it depends on the outcome of these projected offensives and how they occur. Right now, I don't believe that either side would see a ceasefire as being in its interest.
I believe Russia is strongly committed. The propaganda it is projecting at home and abroad is that it has the resolve to continue this at whatever cost, for as long as necessary. Albeit at a huge cost in casualties, the Russians have made very modest gains. Right now, I don't see them being interested in backing off. I think the Russian government may be confident that it can crack the western alliance and ultimately, through fear and fatigue, persuade NATO members to begin to trim their support of Ukraine.
I don't think a ceasefire right now is in Ukraine's interest. I agree with my fellow panellist here that much will depend on this forthcoming offensive. A ceasefire, a stalemate or a frozen war that allows Russia to renew the conflict at any time is a disadvantage to Ukraine.
I go back to my previous comment that rebuilding Ukraine and getting the investments to make that happen are not likely to take place under the guns of the Russians and under the shadow of potential renewed wars. Therefore, absent some kind of firm security guarantee, there is no advantage to Ukraine in a ceasefire, at least at this time.
4:10 p.m.
Bloc
Christine Normandin Bloc Saint-Jean, QC
In the same vein, since a ceasefire is currently not in Ukraine's interest and since it's likely that the next offensive will be crucial, to what extent would you say that Ukraine is waiting on increased support from the west before launching a counterattack?
Are there other factors, like weather—snow was mentioned earlier—that would get in the way of a counteroffensive?
How crucial would increased support from the west be for Ukraine to mount a counterattack?
4:10 p.m.
Fellow, Canadian Global Affairs Institute, As an Individual
Western support has already been factored into this offensive in the sense that the Ukrainians have been waiting and receiving, and are now integrating, the tanks, the artillery and the ammunition.
The calculus is that this offensive has a reasonably good prospect, at least at the operational level, because of the western weaponry and the training that has gone into it. However, this will be expended. Then this question comes: After both forces have used up their energy at this level, what happens in the fall and what happens, as you said, as winter comes?
These are the calculuses. That's four or five months from now, after a major battle. It's very difficult to guess what will happen, except that the calculus is always this: “What's my advantage to continuing the military action?” versus “What's my advantage in a ceasefire?” Both sides will do that.
4:10 p.m.
Liberal
4:10 p.m.
NDP
Lindsay Mathyssen NDP London—Fanshawe, ON
Thank you both for appearing today.
Mr. Rasiulis, I think you said that Canada has done pretty much what it can, and it's done it well on the defensive side.
Can you talk about deterrence? Have we done everything we can on the deterrence side? Where do you see that we could do more?
4:10 p.m.
Fellow, Canadian Global Affairs Institute, As an Individual
NATO has the deterrence. The deterrence has come from article 5 applied to NATO territory. There was no NATO or Canadian deterrent put in to defend Ukraine. In fact, before the war started, President Biden said very clearly that NATO would not go to war and the United States would not go to war against Russia over Ukraine. Ukraine never had a deterrent. It always had to defend itself, with western support.
Deterrence is really linked to nuclear weapons. You have conventional defence and nuclear deterrence. NATO functions like that. It has the two.
All NATO territory has the benefit—like the Baltic states, so Poland and that area—that should Russia attack, the initial defence would be the conventional forces. However, NATO has the right at any point in time to use nuclear weapons to defend itself should the conventional defence fail. That's where the nuclear deterrent comes in.
4:15 p.m.
Fellow, Canadian Global Affairs Institute, As an Individual
Well, there's nothing in the NATO doctrine that is in violation of the UN treaties.
4:15 p.m.
NDP
Lindsay Mathyssen NDP London—Fanshawe, ON
That's true, but ultimately they've signed on to UN treaties on non-use.
4:15 p.m.
Fellow, Canadian Global Affairs Institute, As an Individual
The first use or no first use of nuclear weapons does not in and of itself violate, as far as I'm aware, anything in the UN charter. I mean, the Cold War.... That policy has been in place since the early fifties.
4:15 p.m.
NDP
Lindsay Mathyssen NDP London—Fanshawe, ON
In terms of the international arms trade treaties we have signed, certainly the United States and Russia have backed away from those agreements.
Maybe you could talk about that. There have been long-term impacts of that, of course, but how do we find a way back to planning for more progress?
4:15 p.m.
Fellow, Canadian Global Affairs Institute, As an Individual
It's about arms control, and with arms control, yes, there is very little left of all of the agreements. I myself was part of the conventional arms control discussions in Vienna back in the 1990 period. That's all gone.
START has been suspended. START is for the strategic level nuclear forces. The Russians have not abrogated it, but they have suspended it, which means no inspections—none of that stuff. It's just barely hanging on. With the arms control comes confidence building. You go visit the other side, inspect and so on, and that builds confidence. That's all gone.
As our guest Mr. Jenkins said, we are in a perilous situation. This is one of the most difficult times since the bad days of the Cold War. I would argue that yes, we need to rebuild arms control and need to rebuild confidence and security-building measures, but we need to establish a peace first, or at least a ceasefire, and that's a way—
4:15 p.m.
Fellow, Canadian Global Affairs Institute, As an Individual
It's chicken and egg, but on the other hand, when you're physically at war, it's very difficult to construct confidence-building measures.
4:15 p.m.
NDP
Lindsay Mathyssen NDP London—Fanshawe, ON
Some of the conversations we've had at this committee have been along the lines of taking everything away from Russia in terms of having conversations, ensuring they're no longer continuing on with conversations as part of the Arctic Council and that we're pushing them out.
Can you talk about that and the problems that may cause? Is there any way around that? What would you suggest?
4:15 p.m.
Fellow, Canadian Global Affairs Institute, As an Individual
Well, I'm one of those who believe in diplomacy and diplomatic linkages, because all wars end in some kind of negotiated settlement, or at least even a ceasefire.
There was no negotiated end to the Korean War, but there was a negotiated ceasefire to the Korean War. That all happens ultimately through diplomacy, and at the end of the day, the diplomatic lifeline needs to be maintained.
In the Cold War, there were times when we basically had one lifeline, through the mutual and balanced force reductions talks that were going on. That was the only time when diplomats were actually meeting and talking, but at least we kept that going.
It's very important to keep the dialogue going. In the 1973 October War, Kissinger, the Americans and the Soviets worked very hard to keep the Israelis, Syrians and Egyptians from setting off a nuclear weapon that Israel had. They always kept the dialogue going.
Anyway, I'm giving you a long answer to say that diplomacy and dialogue are critical, regardless of the fighting that goes on. Yitzhak Rabin once said that you don't make peace with your friends; you make peace with your unsavoury enemies. However, you need to talk to them to do that.