National Defence Committee on April 25th, 2023

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Mrs. Gallant, you have five minutes.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, Mr. Rasiulis, does the west have a clear strategy or even a plan to end the war in Ukraine?

[Andrew Rasiulis]

The answer is no. The west's position is that Ukraine will drive it.

Does Ukraine have a plan? Yes. The Ukrainian plan is to expel all Russian forces from all of occupied Ukraine, including Crimea. That is the Ukrainian plan, and the west backs it.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

Mr. Jenkins, how far do you think Putin is willing to go to maintain his foothold in Ukraine?

[Brian Jenkins]

An old intelligence hand once told me that when your analysis is reduced to the remote psychoanalysis of what someone will do, you're in trouble. I can't claim to know what's inside of Putin's head on this issue, but certainly he is attempting to signal resolve.

I think his brandishing of the nuclear issue is a useful way for him to create fear and alarm—essentially, a strategy of terror in the west. He's suggesting that if faced with a loss he'll use nuclear weapons. It distracts from Russia's military shortcomings in the field. It gives humanitarian cover to those who say the war must be halted. It may discourage the west from providing certain kinds of weapons that would allow Ukraine to escalate the war. It allows Russian hawks to indulge in all sorts of bellicose fantasies.

I'm not sure the actual use of nuclear weapons would bring a significant military advantage, although Russia could destroy Ukrainian cities. It's not just propaganda, though. Putin does not have to convince his adversaries that he will use nuclear weapons. He simply has to create enough uncertainty that they don't want to run the test to find out.

I think that's what we're seeing here. We're seeing a shaping of perceptions, which are as important as battlefield progress in contemporary warfare.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

You don't think, then, that Putin sees this conflict as an existential threat to the existence of Russia.

Do you see any changes in the way that Putin is adapting? Also, is he adapting quickly enough to the way Ukraine is conducting its defence?

[Brian Jenkins]

Certainly, the units in the field, even if they were thrown in as poorly trained soldiers and disorganized.... There's a very cruel learning process in war. Even inexperienced soldiers become savvy veterans after a certain amount of fighting if they survive. Otherwise, they don't survive.

Yes, I think we are seeing some operational improvements from what we saw in the initial days of the war. Russia has organized itself to provide more weapons and more personnel, and throw them into the war.

I think again back to information warfare. There has been an interesting change in the nature of internal Russian propaganda, which is basically informing the Russian people that this is an existential struggle for which they have to be prepared to make long-term sacrifices. That's the message.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

Mr. Rasiulis, what do you make of the PRC's envoy to France and his comments over the weekend claiming that former Soviet states aren't sovereign nations? Was he just speaking out of line, or are they giving us mixed messages from Beijing?

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Answer in 20 seconds, please.

[Andrew Rasiulis]

I think he was speaking out of line, because the Chinese government has basically said it was a personal view. He was postulating things, saying there was no international treaty that validated the independence of the post-Soviet states. I don't think that really has any credibility.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Thank you, Mrs. Gallant.

He said a lot of dumb things when he was here too.

Mr. May, you have five minutes.

[Bryan May, Liberal, Cambridge, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I've talked about this a bit in previous meetings, but I want to take us back to before the conflict began and to some of the theories of what was going to happen—whether or not it was going to happen at all and whether it was going to be a very quick redrawing of the map or a complete takeover of Ukraine all the way up to the Polish border. Obviously, none of that has happened.

We also were told in those early days that it had to be that way, because the Russians could not sustain a longer offensive. They couldn't afford it. They didn't have the finances to do it.

A lot has been said about this and how wrong the establishment got this conflict.

I'll start with you, Mr. Rasiulis. What lessons can we draw from this conflict so far? In terms of the future of warfare, what types of capabilities should Canada and its allies be looking to develop and acquire?

[Andrew Rasiulis]

Those are two fundamental questions.

On the point of the war not going the way people on either side thought it was going to go, wars generally tend to do that. World War I started in 1914 with one concept and ended in 1918 with a completely different concept.

Yes, this war was going to be a short, snappy one. The Ukrainians and the Russians were still meeting in March 2022 to discuss the Minsk II variation of a settlement—well into the war, a few months in. We don't know where this is going to end up now, but it's certainly nowhere near what anyone thought. Intelligence had it wrong on both sides, as it often does.

On the lessons learned, we're learning that modern warfare is, in some ways, taking lessons from the last year of World War I, when there was a strategic stalemate and what are called storm troopers. I don't mean the Nazi thing. I mean the small units. Canadians were very innovative, as were the Germans, in having small units that would try to break through the stalemate and advance on each other. What the war is showing us is that with modern technology, if you move, you're seen and you're killed. Therefore, you have to figure out ways to advance your position without being seen and killed, and that means small unit attacks.

That's why when people say Ukrainians may be starting this offensive, they may be but we don't know about it, because there's not going to be a big wave over the top, like there was in the early part of World War I.

[Bryan May, Liberal, Cambridge, ON]

Mr. Jenkins, do you have any thoughts on the preconceived notions that we had prior versus where we are now?

[Brian Jenkins]

I think we regularly get things wrong in net assessments of the strength of the two sides. We can count troops, look at weapons systems, look at economies and come to conclusions. Those are things that we can count. We tend to miss what we can't count.

The will to fight has made the difference. The Ukrainians put up an extraordinary and, to be sure, unexpected defence on both sides. That defence in turn inspired international support, which it would not have done had Ukrainians been quickly defeated. Despite all of the modern technology weapons, it does come down to the will to fight and perceptions.

[Bryan May, Liberal, Cambridge, ON]

Thank you.

I'm not sure I have enough time for a proper question. I'll just say thank you to both of you for being here today.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Thank you, Mr. May.

The next speaker has the floor for two and a half minutes.

I'm sorry; that completed that round.

Mr. Bezan, you have five minutes.

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB]

Thank you.

I want to thank both of our witnesses for being here.

We're having this conversation about all wars ending at the negotiating table. I know from my conversations with Ukrainian officials that they fully appreciate that fact.

As Mr. Jenkins just said, the will to fight, the valour and the dogged determination of the people of Ukraine have to be brought into the equation here, as does their right to self-determination. Essentially, President Zelenskyy has turned into a modern-day Winston Churchill in how he's conducted himself and inspired not just Ukrainians but the free world.

Ukrainians, rightly so, are mistrusting of the peace process. Minsk I and Minsk II were disasters and ultimately ended up in the war we have today, so there's no trust. Maybe we're still not at a place, at the negotiation tables, of trying to find a peaceful resolution.

We know that Ukrainians are going to keep on fighting. We know that the weapons systems they have are, surprisingly, matching what Russia has brought to bear. Maybe what's more surprising is what Russia hasn't been able to accomplish with what's supposed to be one of the greatest militaries in the world.

My question is about the resiliency of the alliance and the support of our citizens, as alluded to earlier. We are seeing an erosion of the willingness of Canadians, Americans and some of our European allies to continue standing with Ukraine. A lot of that has to do with the success of Russian information operations and their dissemination of disinformation, misinformation and outright lies.

How do we counter that to ensure that Canadians—taxpayers—and our military, as well as our allies, like the the United States, aren't being distracted by fake news?

[Andrew Rasiulis]

I'll go first.

The challenge is that it's essentially a war of attrition, but there are various dynamics. We have to see where the Ukrainian offensive will go now and how dynamic it will be. That dynamism will, in fact, affect public opinion in and of itself.

Political leaderships in the west are fully on board with Ukraine. The issue, as you correctly pointed out, is the population. There are various polls in various countries that suggest it's not a uniform thing. Certainly political leadership is uniform, but the people are not necessarily so. I don't want to make specific points on countries, but generally, as you move further west away from the Russian and Ukrainian borders, support among the populations tends to soften a bit in certain areas.

I think the United States—I put the finger on Mr. Jenkins on this one, and he can pick it up—is the biggest backer of Ukraine, but the willingness politically of the American people and Congress to support the president, whether it's this president or the next president, to sustain this effort in what will still be some kind of attritional warfare is right now uncertain. I think we're in a very interesting situation. The support is there now, but we know that elements of the Republican Party are not supportive.

We can leave it at that for now. I don't know where it's going to go.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

You have a little more than a minute.

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB]

I want to ask this question, especially with Mr. Rasiulis's experience dealing with arms control and nuclear weapons: With Russia now moving warheads into Belarus, how do you see that playing out, especially with Putin continually rattling the nuclear sabre as a deterrence measure?

[Andrew Rasiulis]

I'll be very quick.

This is a key component, and Mr. Jenkins has mentioned that. It is part of Russia's other side. There is the conventional war going on, but there's the nuclear deterrent aspect and the nuclear threat aspect.

Putting nuclear forces in Belarus is very consistent with the escalatory rhetoric that Russia is now doing. They are actually putting forces into Belarus to back up their rhetoric. There is tactical and then there is strategic nuclear—the thermonuclear stuff—and I'll just leave you with these comments. Medvedev, the chief of the Russian Security Council, has stated very clearly in the last month that Crimea is existential and Russia will use “all...weapons”—that's not just the tactical stuff; that means thermonuclear—to defend Russia. He doesn't want to use this stuff, but he wants to threaten so as to dissuade and deter Ukrainians, with the American pressure on the Ukrainians, from attacking Crimea.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Thank you, Mr. Bezan.

Mr. Sousa, you have five minutes, please.

[Charles Sousa, Liberal, Mississauga—Lakeshore, ON]

Thank you, Chair.

Thank you both for your presentations. You really paint a bleak picture. There's a prolonged war, and there are going to be constant tensions regardless of peace or ceasefire. There will be constant tensions as we go forward.

There is a geopolitical alliance that Russia has, possibly, with China and other regions. Of course, NATO has its risks. We've just heard from a number of others about the concern we have with public opinion in the United States, especially if it starts to soften. What will that do?

Is there any chance of a carnation revolution in Russia? I can't fathom how they can continue, or how the military can conceive of using nuclear weapons against their neighbours in a situation where, regardless of the propaganda, they have to know there is something unfathomable about doing this continuously.

[Andrew Rasiulis]

You have asked two questions. One is about the Russian internal situation, and then there's the nuclear thing.

Let me put the nuclear thing in one way. I don't believe they would be considering limited nuclear war. I think most deterrence strategists believe that there is no such thing as limited nuclear war. If you're going to threaten, you're going to threaten thermonuclear.

The best historical example I can give you of that is John Kennedy in the1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. He didn't expect to use the things, but he went to Defcon 3, which is a level of alert next to nuclear war, to make the point to the Soviets and to Khrushchev that he was serious. Basically, he got what he wanted with that threat. The internal situation in Russia, though, is that Putin continues to maintain control. He maintains a very stable situation.

He has issues. He has the ultra-nationalists. They are giving him more problems than the so-called liberal democrats—guys like Navalny, who's in prison, or Kara-Murza, who's just been sentenced to 25 years in prison. In the Russian system, these people are political outliers. The mainstream people are the technocrats who help Putin run the government. Basically, they don't have an alternative other than to keep going.

The ultra-nationalists are pushing Putin to do more, not less. Putin's problem is that he's actually fending off people who say that he should be fully mobilizing, that he should be trying to take out the government in Kyiv and that he has to go west. That's what Putin is trying to manage all the time.