Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you very much for inviting me to comment on the war in Ukraine.
As you may know, I am responding on short notice, so instead of a polished briefing, let me offer some brief informal remarks. These are based upon a series of essays I wrote for the RAND Corporation. Mr. Wilson, your clerk, has the links.
I want to emphasize that I am not an authority on Ukraine or Russia. My field of research for many years has been political violence, irregular warfare and psychological operations. I also want to make clear that these are my personal views and not those of the RAND Corporation or, of course, of the U.S. government.
My essays attempted to go beyond the battlefield and explore the potential strategic geopolitical and economic consequences of the war. Of course, we don't know how the war will turn out. In my essays I outlined seven theoretical scenarios ranging from a Russian takeover of Ukraine to a Russian military collapse. I think the more likely scenarios fall in the murky middle and include engrenage, which is a good French term for which there isn't an English translation that has the same impact. It is simply a continuing carnage. We could see a stalemate or a frozen conflict, or we could see a range of favourable to unfavourable negotiated settlements. We could also potentially see a continuing gradual escalation, which has been the pattern thus far.
Whatever the scenario, however, the status quo ante bellum will not be restored. The post-Ukraine war landscape will be different.
Russia's reputation as a military power has been badly tarnished. Its problems include strategic miscalculations, incoherent execution and the poor quality of Russian soldiering. Even if it prevails on the battlefield, Russia has been weakened.
The war has also exacerbated Russia's demographic crisis. It was fascinating to see the results of a recent poll of global strategists and practitioners, conducted by the Atlantic Council. It showed that a surprising 46% of the 167 respondents expected Russia to become a failed state in the next 10 years.
On the other side, Russia's invasion of Ukraine has, for the time being, strengthened NATO. However, continued western support for Ukraine may depend on its continued military success.
NATO's southeastern flank is soft. Hungary is pursuing its own course. Romania is very cautious. Bulgaria remains politically divided. Turkey's response has been supportive, but at the same time ambivalent and transactional. Such stresses are not new to NATO. The alliance has survived these kinds of things in the past, but it is always difficult.
Looking at the postwar global economy, the war has slowed the economic recovery from the pandemic. The effect in Europe will be more significant. The reconstruction of Ukraine will require a massive investment, which is estimated at $350 billion. The willingness to invest in that reconstruction, especially by the private sector, will depend of course on the situation that prevails.
I believe that Europe's reliance on Russian energy is over. Russia will find and is finding new markets for its gas and oil, but reduced gas sales to Europe will affect Russia's political influence and state capture, especially in eastern Europe. We are seeing somewhat of a recreation of a divided Cold War economy in the world, albeit much more complicated than it was 40 or 50 years ago. I also believe that deep globalization pressures will continue, and global defence spending seems likely to surge.
The world is again a more perilous place. Naked military aggression is not ancient history. More than 30 years after the end of the Cold War, we may find these dangers hard to grasp.
Let me stop there. I'm happy to respond to your questions later on.
Thank you.