National Defence Committee on Feb. 14th, 2022

[Bryan May, Liberal, Cambridge, ON]

To that, we know that NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said, “Canada is one of the lead countries in NATO when it comes to providing support for Ukraine and you have been that for a very long time.” He went on to say, “There are not many other countries at the equal level of efforts, doing as much as Canada.”

You've kind of touched on this already, but can you discuss a bit more—in the minute I'm going to give you here—the role that Canada has played to support Ukraine over the past several years? Can you perhaps elaborate on the support that NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg was referring to? In addition, what type of support could Canada offer?

[Andrew Rasiulis]

We've been very active on Ukrainian reform since 1993. In fact, when I was director of military training and co-operation, we were doing that well into the 1990s and into the 2000s. There is a long history there. It was always at the top of our priority list back in those days.

Since 2014 or 2015, when the conflicts broke out, Canada went in with Operation Unifier. We had 200 people on the ground as trainers. That was the highest level of any NATO contingent training Ukrainian forces. We were punching well above our weight there.

What more could we do? Well, I think we should continue to do exactly what we have been doing. Of course, currently the troops are not in Ukraine. They were pulled out on the weekend to a place in Poland because of the potential war. However, if we can get this thing settled down, the Unifier troops will go back in. The Canadian government has authorized a doubling of the amount, to go to 400 from 200, and before this problem started, 60 personnel were authorized to deploy to Ukraine immediately, so I think—

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Unfortunately, we're going to have to leave it there, Mr. May and Mr. Rasiulis.

Ms. Normandin, you have six minutes.

[Christine Normandin, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

I thank the two witnesses for being here. We are grateful to them.

I would like to take advantage of the fact that one of the witnesses is talking about the situation with Russia and the other about the situation with China. Up to now, we've tended to deal with these countries in isolation. Yet they both pose threats to Canada.

I would like both witnesses to talk about the possibility of a cascade of events. I imagine that China is watching closely what is happening in Ukraine at the moment and will be watching equally closely the international reaction that will follow.

What impact do you think one of these situations might have on the other?

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Mr. Colby, please go ahead.

[Elbridge Colby]

We have seen that Russia and China are more aligned today than they have been probably since the period of Mao Zedong and Joseph Stalin. It is, frankly, a catastrophe of American and western statecraft that we have reached this point, but this is where we are right now.

My view, and I've expressed it in The Wall Street Journal today, in case you're interested, is that we must prioritize Taiwan. Instead of adding more forces to Europe, the United States needs to be moving towards reductions. The main factor that Xi Jinping is going to assess in whether or not to attack Taiwan is whether he will succeed, and that will be a matter of whether the United States has enough forces, along with those of Taiwan and potentially Japan and Australia, to defeat an invasion.

There's often an argument right now that if we don't act sufficiently strongly over Ukraine, Beijing will be involved in that. I don't think that's correct, actually. They're differentiated in that way. We have to reckon with what I think of as the scarcity of our military power. We would like to resolve this issue by more allied effort. This is the point I'm trying to make to you, and I'm going to make it in the German press this week. I've made it in Britain and France and so forth, and I will make it to the Japanese tomorrow.

Together we can do so much more. The problem is that the alliance network that we're in is less than the sum of its parts right now. We don't spend a lot. We don't integrate very well, so the Chinese and the Russians are able to move much more effectively. That's the problem we face.

[Andrew Rasiulis]

I will pick up on that, if I may.

The Canadian effort, as I've said in my remarks, is fundamentally.... We're very Eurocentric in terms of our current deployment. This is very much part of our history. We've always defined Europe, and the current situation in Ukraine is one of the strongest importance from our national perspective.

As Mr. Colby said, the China factor is extremely important. Again, however, as he has suggested, there's a question of prioritization of resources. Canada right now does not have the sufficient force levels to maintain a presence in Europe and also address issues in the Pacific. That would largely mean a naval deployment for Canada, and currently we simply lack the resources to do both.

[Christine Normandin, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

In your opinion, should we prioritize the situation in Ukraine or the situation in Asia?

[Andrew Rasiulis]

Mr. Colby has outlined an American perspective on China. There is a long American history there, and I fully respect that.

From the Canadian point of view, the European connection, for the time being, certainly in the short to middle term, should remain our priority. I believe we are where we should be. Europe is a major trading partner of Canada's. We have a long association with Europe, culturally, ethnically, and business-wise. I'm very comfortable with the current position. It's a good division of labour, where the United States takes on the Pacific theatre and Canada takes on the Euro-Atlantic theatre.

[Christine Normandin, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

One possibility that has been raised in the wake of Russia's threats to Ukraine is that the latter may decide to abandon its application to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, NATO.

I'd like you to talk about the likelihood of that happening. I would also like you to tell us about the possible repercussions if a rogue state succeeds in getting what it wants by acting in this way towards the West.

[Andrew Rasiulis]

On the Russian position, they are extremely serious now. The NATO enlargement has been something they have been arguing against since almost the very beginning. In the 1990s—in 1997 and so on—they were extremely weak at doing that, and therefore they simply had to accept it or “suck it up”, as they say.

In 2007, Putin went to the Munich defence conference in February—which is happening now, I think—and basically said, “We're not taking it anymore.” He put the marker down. Russia was seeing NATO as encroaching on areas of its national security sphere of influence. They addressed the Georgian issue with a small war that next summer, in August 2008. When the Ukrainians did a major shift toward the European Union, with the association agreement in 2014, the Russians felt that it was getting too close to their perception of national security, and they reacted.

Would they use violence, right now, to address the situation if, in fact, NATO were to invite Ukraine to join? They are not doing that right now, actually. The question is.... They mobilized their forces of 130,000, approximately. They're showing their seriousness. I believe that if push comes to shove—though we're not there yet—they would be prepared to use military force.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Unfortunately, we're going to have to leave that answer there.

Ms. Mathyssen, you have six minutes, please.

[Lindsay Mathyssen, NDP, London—Fanshawe, ON]

Thank you. This is certainly an unsettling conversation.

In terms of both Russia and China.... Maybe both gentlemen can respond to this from their own perspectives. The Canadian Arctic seems to be, from some perspectives, open and a bit weak because of climate change, because of our own inability to send in the fighter jets that we need but don't have, and so on.

Should this be a major preoccupation, potentially, of Canada's? What are your perspectives on that?

[Andrew Rasiulis]

Yes, it should be, particularly with climate change and the greater utility of the Northwest Passage. Canada was sensitized to this in the 1970s with the passage of the American ship, the Manhattan. At that point, Canada recognized that in order to enforce its sovereignty and the Canadian jurisdiction over the Northwest Passage—which is a dispute Canada has with the United States in terms of whether these are international or Canadian waters—it must show it has a capability in the Arctic. It has been doing so since the 1970s. Is it sufficient? Probably not.

The other powers are starting to.... Russia, particularly, is ramping up a significant military footprint in its part of the Arctic. The Arctic is becoming an open gateway now, with climate change and the mineral resources there. Yes, one can only argue that Canada, in doing its reviews—which this committee is doing—would also need to assess the importance of how many Canadian Forces resources it would wish to deploy in the Arctic. We're really talking, in particular, naval and air, with some ground forces, of course. They'd have to be able to get in and out. The icebreaker capability is the first thing that challenges Canada. My understanding is that it has some way to go.

[Elbridge Colby]

Ms. Mathyssen, I'd like to respond briefly. I think this is a good example of where Canada has a natural specialization and interest in the Arctic. Along with the Scandinavian countries, for instance, it's a natural area. The Chinese are becoming increasingly active in the Arctic, as well as the Russians.

If I could just briefly relate it, I would suggest that the best thing for our collective interest would be if countries like Canada invested in areas where they can have a high bang for their buck, whether it's in Europe or Asia. The worst thing is to spread it around and have little to show for it. Maybe Canada doesn't need to do it totally by itself but, say, with the U.K., Norway, Denmark, the United States, etc. That's much better than if Canada puts a little over in Asia, a little in Europe, a little in the Arctic, a little in South America, and then we end up with very little.

Historically, Canada has been capable, yes, with diplomacy, but also, as I always like to point out, it had the fourth-largest navy in the world in 1945. There's an immense ability. Because it's so secure, along with us, next to us, there's a real ability to turn the military investments into effective power projection capability that can add a lot of bang for the buck in distant theatres.

[Lindsay Mathyssen, NDP, London—Fanshawe, ON]

At this moment right now, we're talking about the fact that.... We all know that we have retention and recruitment issues for a variety of reasons. COVID hasn't helped the situation and that ability to retain our armed forces. We're talking about who we send them to, when we send them....

Both of you have argued for focusing on one or the other. Would Canada be wise to re-evaluate this current situation right now and say with respect to the Arctic, how are we going to redeploy and move back on the other obligations that we have? How would we do that?

[Elbridge Colby]

If I could say this briefly, the big dynamic that is going to happen.... Only the Americans, the Taiwanese and maybe the Japanese and the Australians will be able to meaningfully contribute to the most pressing scenario in the Pacific, which is Taiwan. I don't think there's a realistic prospect of Canada making a material contribution. That's not disrespect; it's just a practical reality.

There is going to be more of a vacuum in Europe. Canada has a long-established position there and worked with NATO during the Cold War. It seems that there is both need and capacity. Maybe that is the most efficient allocation, along with the Arctic, which is natural in the sense that it's probably better to work with the grain of past practice on the whole, especially as we swing increasingly towards the Pacific.

[Andrew Rasiulis]

I would agree with Mr. Colby on that one. Europe and the Arctic would be very good Canadian areas of focus. That's where we've been historically, and I believe that it remains logical. The question is going to be, as is always the case, how much money we can put up. You, the politicians, have to deal with that, in terms of competing demands for the Canadian budget and the Canadian tax dollar.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Thank you, Ms. Mathyssen.

We'll now go to our five-minute round. We have 15 minutes and we have 25 minutes' worth of questions.

Mr. Motz, you have five minutes.

[Glen Motz, Conservative, Medicine Hat—Cardston—Warner, AB]

Thank you to our witnesses for being here.

Mr. Colby, this is a two-part question. You can answer the first part in the second question.

I noticed that when Mr. Rasiulis was responding to Mr. May's question and said that Canada is punching above its weight with respect to Ukraine, it evoked a facial expression from you. Would you like to verbalize what your face said?

[Elbridge Colby]

I'm not very subtle. I'm sorry.

[Glen Motz, Conservative, Medicine Hat—Cardston—Warner, AB]

That's okay. It goes with the second question.

You released an article yesterday, entitled “Ukraine is a distraction from Taiwan”. You're here, though, to discuss Canadian threats and our readiness to defend against them. You're clear in your article on what the U.S. should be doing to defend itself. What role do you think the Americans are looking for Canada to play?

This is tied to my first statement about Canada's punching above its weight, and your article.

[Elbridge Colby]

Thank you, Mr. Motz.

With all due respect, I don't think Canada is punching above its weight. Its defence spending is between 1.3% and 1.4% and there is a Wales commitment to do 2%.

I go around and I hear that people in Ottawa, Düsseldorf or Lyon don't feel that threatened. People in Ohio don't feel threatened either, and there is an increasing trend in the United States towards skepticism about our international commitments. There's a real test going forward about whether this alliance architecture can be sustained.

Moreover, to the point I made earlier and relating to the second point, we don't have the military capacity to deal with all the potential threats in the world. There's obviously China, but there's Russia, North Korea, Iran, terrorism, etc. We don't live in the unipolar moment anymore and we have to focus on Asia, which, by the way, is also a Canadian interest.

All the arguments I make for America's interest are essentially one to one with Canada, because if China has a dominant economic position, you'd better bet it's going to apply it against Canada. In fact, it already has, and it's applying it against Australia.

We're much more powerful. We have a plausible route to autarky, but forget it for a smaller country, so everybody should want us to be playing that role in the Pacific. It's a collective good, but it's going to leave a vacuum in Europe, and Europe is very important. I'm not saying we should ignore Europe.

I served in the Pentagon. I was the lead official for America's defence strategy in 2018. I know the situation. We have essentially what's called a one-war military. What that means is we are not building a military to fight two simultaneous wars, because we are going to lose the primary war if we don't focus on that, and it's going to create vacuums. We're going to need the French and, above all, the Germans—the Germans are the primary problem—but Canada, the United Kingdom and others can really help.

I hear Canada talking a lot about the commitment to a peaceful world and stuff. The most concrete commitment I can see is spending more to help, to be frank.

[Glen Motz, Conservative, Medicine Hat—Cardston—Warner, AB]

Thank you very much for that.

To both gentlemen, Canada, as of late specifically, has been a country that supports allies through training and provides a more tokenistic deployment rather than any combat support.

Are our international partners—Mr. Colby mentioned Australia, for example—looking for Canada to provide a greater level of support, in your opinion? Both of you can respond to that, please.

[Elbridge Colby]

Absolutely. A hundred percent. The Australians have been with us in our good wars and our bad wars. I mean, they're all bad wars. I should say our ill-advised wars and our well-advised wars. Of course, Canada was in the world wars throughout.

There's no situation in which Americans would not welcome more. Forget about Americans. There are the Taiwanese. That's not even saying that Canada should be directly involved. There are the Poles, the Balts and the Scandinavians.

We're beyond the point at which countries can kind of have these caveats. Again, the Germans are the primary problem. We're all going to need to put our shoulder in as societies to.... You know, the Russians, the Chinese and others are really moving at this point.