National Defence Committee on Sept. 19th, 2023

[Emmanuella Lambropoulos, Liberal, Saint-Laurent, QC]

Thank you to all of our witnesses for being here to answer our questions today.

My first question brings us back a few months. At our last meetings before we rose, we heard a lot about the Ukrainian offensive that was going to take place in the spring and summer. I'm wondering if you can tell us in which ways, if any, Ukraine gained anything from that offensive. Could you just give us a bit of a resumé before I move on to my next question?

[MGen Paul Prévost]

Mr. Chair, thanks for the question.

We did discuss how we were expecting that counteroffensive to occur. It started this summer. There have been, I would say, tactical gains. There hasn't been a huge shift in gains. It's the nature of that conflict. This is a conflict that is very much based on old tactics of trench lines and artillery being shelled one way or the other.

Russia had made quite some gains in southern Ukraine, and it's heavily defended. Ukrainians are making tactical moves, but there has been no sweeping breakthrough at this time. This work has to continue.

[Emmanuella Lambropoulos, Liberal, Saint-Laurent, QC]

We had also heard a lot about how Russia had immense potential, because of its resources, vast land and population, to maintain the potential weapon production a lot more than did, obviously, Ukraine. Ukraine relies a lot on the west in order to make sure it is able to fight back. Today you've told us a lot about what weapons we've sent over and generally what is needed.

I'm wondering if you can give us a bit more information on how we're working with our allies and what specifically our allies can be doing to better support this in the long run, considering there might be more than one more offensive by Russia. Obviously, we seem to think that the war will continue for a long time. What strategies have been put in place and what kinds of discussions are happening with NATO allies? What role does Canada play in all of that?

[MGen Paul Prévost]

Maybe I'll start, Mr. Chair, and then allow Ty or my colleagues here to reinforce if possible.

It's important to note that throughout the conflict, the nature of the donations—if you have not noticed—has changed because of the nature of the conflict. We talked a lot about artillery initially, artillery rounds, because it was the nature of the conflict at the time. This continues, so there are going to be those needs that persist until there's a breakthrough on the Ukrainian side.

There was also a change in the nature of the conflict when Russia started attacking by air. There were indiscriminate attacks against the population, nodes and everything else, and then air defence became important. You saw afterwards that the tank discussion came because of the counteroffensive. We basically mounted, as a coalition, brigades of Ukrainians to be able to push that counteroffensive.

That strategy is always being updated, mainly in Wiesbaden, but in consultation...actually, it's a Ukrainian plan that we helped them with. Those things will change, which is also complicating matters with industry in guaranteeing long-term what's going to be the next bound.

What's also complicating this piece is that a lot of what they'll need in the future requires high technology. When we talk about air defence systems, we're talking about things that need long-term, elite items that are complicated to build and don't get delivered quickly. That is why we have those tables that are weekly and monthly to discuss a strategy long-term in order to do what we can with industry to match or even exceed what Russia can produce on the other side.

I think there's clearly a technical advantage in the west, so we can win that fight, compared to Russia.

Go ahead, Ty.

[Ty Curran]

Mr. Chair, I'll add that the question of coordination is something we're quite focused on. I mentioned already that the Minister of Defence was at the Ukraine Defense Contact Group in Ramstein, Germany, today. That's with a number of NATO and like-minded partners all working together to try to figure out how we can support Ukraine's priorities. We've seen some of the coalitions that have been stood up. We talked a bit about the F-16 coalition earlier, but there is the air defence one we recently joined, tanks and that kind of thing.

Trying to figure out how we as partners can best bring the resources we have to bear to meet the Ukrainian demands is something we're always working on with our partners. The enthusiasm across the board is still very high. It's something we're concerned about, in the sense that if it were to waver, it could be a challenge, but I think as collective supporters of Ukraine, that enthusiasm continues to be high.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Thank you.

[Alison Grant]

Mr. Chair, if I have a minute to answer, more on the political side, I would say there's been a lot of energy put into this question of how we demonstrate the political commitment to support Ukraine over the long term.

You will have seen at the Vilnius summit of NATO in July that G7 leaders signed a joint declaration of support for Ukraine. We now have over 20 countries that have signed on to this declaration. Canada played a central role in producing that declaration and getting support for it. At its heart is a commitment to provide multi-year, long-term security assurances and commitments to Ukraine, primarily in the military and security sphere, but also for reconstruction and recovery in the event of ongoing Russian aggression, and in the future for repeated attempts of Russian aggression.

The point of that is to ensure that allies and partners are able to reassure Ukraine over the long term at we are there for as long as it takes, and to signal to Putin that he will have to face a coordinated campaign of western support for Ukraine over the long term.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Two and a half minutes go to Madame Normandin.

[Christine Normandin, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

I have a question about drones. We know that Canada provides software, such as camera systems, but apparently some problems surfaced recently. For example, Elon Musk prevented Starlink-enabled drone attacks. We also know that China has developed technology that can prevent Ukrainian drones from operating. Can you comment on that?

Drone technology, which was very useful during the war, may become useless in the future given these vulnerabilities. Is anyone looking into that at this time?

[MGen Paul Prévost]

Thank you for your question.

Yes, we are on top of that. Not just Canada, but the entire coalition. We are talking about these things with intelligence agencies and with planners. That is kind of the nature of war, which begins one way and evolves.

The Ukrainians have done the same thing. They adapt to the technologies that each country sends them. They adapt their tactics and operations to new technologies that they weren't even trained to use before the conflict began.

It's happening on both sides. We are monitoring the issues you mentioned, and we are looking at ways to counter that and get ahead of those changes.

[Christine Normandin, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you.

You probably won't be able to answer my next question now, but I'll ask it and, if there isn't enough time left, you can answer it in the second round.

We know that six deputy ministers were fired following the arrival of the new Ukrainian defence minister. Could you comment on that? What message does that send? We also know that there are still corruption issues in Ukraine. What is Global Affairs Canada's take on that?

There are only 30 seconds left, so why don't you continue your answer in the next round?

[Kati Csaba]

Mr. Chair, it is true that six deputy ministers and the secretary of state of defence were recently asked to resign. This is apparently a standard practice when the minister has resigned from a post. This should not be considered a sign that any of those deputy ministers were involved in corrupt activities.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Thank you, Ms. Normandin.

Ms. Mathyssen, you have two and a half minutes, plus one.

[Lindsay Mathyssen, NDP, London—Fanshawe, ON]

To continue on, I'll say that this lack of consistency in terms of personnel on the other side does prove problematic.

Can you talk about how our officials and communications on our side...? How are we handling that? Are there additional changes that we need to consider in order to maintain the relationships?

[Kati Csaba]

Mr. Chair, it's still very early days. I think it will be a question of rebuilding relationships with the deputy ministers through our ambassador and defence attaché at the Canadian embassy in Kyiv. It will take a bit of time.

[Ty Curran]

I'll add that we're fortunate that we have a very strong relationship with the Ukrainian government. Our previous minister and the previous minister of defence in Ukraine had a very strong relationship. We look forward to getting the opportunity to create that relationship with Minister Blair and the new minister.

Similarly, it goes beyond that to the bureaucratic level, as well. We're very fortunate that Canada is seen as a reliable partner in that space. The Ukrainians have been very engaging with us from that point of view.

You're right. Any time there is a change like that, there are some relationships that need to be rebuilt. I think that's something we need to work on in coordination with our colleagues at the embassy in Kyiv.

[Lindsay Mathyssen, NDP, London—Fanshawe, ON]

One of the things that happened during our trip this summer was the massive meeting of the BRICS nations and the expansion. This is more of a GAC question, but can you talk about how we are responding to that differently? How does that potentially change things, or is it still along the same points? Can you expand on what that meeting has meant in terms of discussions internally?

[Kati Csaba]

The addition of new countries to BRICS will have long-term implications that we will be following closely. At this point, it's still a little early to be saying what those implications might be. I think it is fair to say that BRICS may be seeking to align itself as an opposing force to western countries. If that is, indeed, the case, then it's something we will have to watch closely and respond to appropriately.

[Lindsay Mathyssen, NDP, London—Fanshawe, ON]

Earlier in the year, the CDS made that huge announcement about the reconstitution order and the impact. My colleague, Ms. Normandin, has spoken about budget cuts in terms of limiting capability.

Can you talk about the increasing stresses on the Canadian Armed Forces in terms of the lack of numbers for men and women who are active and about what we're doing to ensure continued support of our own people but in relation to Ukraine and what we're doing for it?

[MGen Paul Prévost]

Reconstitution is still our priority in the Canadian Armed Forces. It's the top priority, along with culture. We need to refill the ranks. We're still missing the troops. Since the last time we talked, there's been no change in terms of the number of recruits we have.

The ones who are implicated in the fight to train Ukrainians are, I'll say, very motivated. It is great work that we're doing in all the countries. We're involved in training—I mentioned the 4,600 Ukrainian troops we've trained. One thing our soldiers noticed over there—and you saw it on the trip—is that we have very young soldiers contributing over there in training. They appreciate training soldiers who are focused because they know those soldiers are leaving for the battle. It's very motivating, and we hope that we will be able to continue to do the same, because it's a great recruiting tool for us. It's the same with the brigade that we look forward to mounting in Latvia.

These are good-news stories for us, but recruiting Canadian soldiers to the CAF continues to be a challenge that we're focused on.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Thank you.

I think I can speak for the ones who were on the trip. The people we spoke to were very motivated. The corporals were doing sergeants' work, sergeants were doing lieutenants' work, and lieutenants were doing majors' work. They were quite excited about the work they were doing. I hope that works in favour of recruitment for you.

Mrs. Kramp-Neuman is next.

[Shelby Kramp-Neuman, Conservative, Hastings—Lennox and Addington, ON]

Thank you.

Thank you for being here.

Retired Brigadier-General Gaston Côté said:

Extremely important lessons are emerging from all this and from everything happening in Ukraine. However, these lessons are being ignored in some of the defence policy programs.

In your opinion, what lessons learned from Ukraine do we need to be implementing now? It's a question from 30,000 feet, but could you give me a snapshot in 30 seconds or so?

[MGen Paul Prévost]

I would say one that's top of mind, which came up a few times today, is that you go to war with what you have. That is one lesson here. Ukraine had to look to allies to help out from the get-go, and we were right there responding to this. That's one.

We're looking at more operational-level lessons as well. I think one good one is that in Ukraine, through the training we've done over the years before the second invasion in 2022, we had built a way of command and control and training that was more western-like than Soviet-like, and that seems to have worked in favour of Ukraine so far.

We're looking at those lessons from a tactical perspective, an operational perspective and a strategic perspective as well. This is ongoing right now.

[Shelby Kramp-Neuman, Conservative, Hastings—Lennox and Addington, ON]

Thank you.

To follow up, Andrew Leslie told our committee in June:

With NATO, we were supposed to send a battle group on short notice should there be cause to do so, which there is, by the way—let's not forget what Russia is doing, those atrocities in Ukraine. It took us months to send a couple of hundred. We're supposed to send a brigade...and command it. It still hasn't left.

Responding rapidly seems to be the intent, but it doesn't seem to be the case. How has the CAF recruitment and retention crisis limited our ability to assist Ukraine?

[MGen Paul Prévost]

Thank you, Mr. Chair, for the question.

To be frank, I think our recruiting challenges and the reconstitution have not affected the way we responded to Ukraine. We've responded to the requests of Ukraine in terms of training and in terms of sappers, howitzers and all the others I listed before. We're able to respond there.

Your question also had to do with how we're going to plan to mount a brigade in Latvia. In this one, we came up with a plan fairly quickly. This was a quickly developing story between the Baltic nations first, and then there was an announcement by NATO that there were going to be more battle groups along the border, notably in Bulgaria and Slovakia, and in Romania as well. We responded quickly with our plan. We made a plan quickly.

In this case, we're implementing that plan. We're working with Latvia very hard to get the infrastructure ready. Latvia is not ready right now to receive a multinational brigade of that size in terms of infrastructure, so we're working with them to be ready. Our plan matches the NATO regional plans and the plans we have with the sister countries there, with Lithuania and Estonia, but also with the other brigades.

I think we're on par with the plan we've put forward. We're discussing with our allies how to man that brigade, and it's going well. One of the pieces, as I mentioned, is infrastructure, not only to house our troops in Latvia—because we're talking 2,200 Canadians now being deployed in Latvia over the next couple of years and we need to house them—but there are also training ranges and a whole bunch of infrastructure that needs to be worked on with Latvia in order make this happen, and we're on track.