National Defence Committee on Sept. 21st, 2023

[Peter Lundy]

Perhaps I can jump in and note that it's not entirely a DND effort on the cyber side. The funded initiative under the Indo-Pacific strategy on cyber included funding for Global Affairs, Public Safety, RCMP, CSE and DND as well, reflecting that whole-of-government approach on these issues.

There's a demand in the region, for sure. Some of the work we're doing is technical and highly classified, obviously. Some of it is from the Global Affairs side in that realm of cyber diplomacy. We're working with our partners in the region on establishing the international norms that will govern the cyber space. As I'm sure you understand, others may have a different approach in terms of how the cyber space will be governed. There's a lot of diplomatic legwork to do on that.

[Jennifer O'Connell, Liberal, Pickering—Uxbridge, ON]

Thank you. I appreciate that. That is helpful.

In terms of other on-the-ground capabilities, you mentioned two to three warships and air force capabilities. We know the strategy and the policies, but are there additional examples in terms of how our partnership is playing out in reality and how our allies are in particular counting on the Canadian Forces to fill some of these capacity gaps? Is there anything additional that we should know about? I think that leads to some of the threat assessment where Canada is helping.

[MGen Greg Smith]

I'll start. Maybe we can get to some specifics, but I think this is a tremendously good-news story. As you know, the Indo-Pacific strategy came out in November 2022. The Canadian Armed Forces and the Department of National Defence tried to move very quickly. We had that third frigate in the region within weeks.

Equally, I know it doesn't sound particularly interesting, but I will have analysts—people physically posted into the region, to be on the ground constantly—there within weeks. That isn't bad for the purposes of going into foreign countries, getting accreditation and being allowed in. That might not be so interesting in terms of what they do, but we have army forces looking for different exercises to do in the region to do capacity building—or partnership, as I like to call it. These are very capable countries, so we're partnering with them.

Special operations forces are quickly moving out. We've named one exercise and there are others that they're doing. There are a lot of activities. The fact that we have two frigates in the region now, going from exercise to port visit, delivers a tremendous Canadian presence in the region.

[Jennifer O'Connell, Liberal, Pickering—Uxbridge, ON]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Thank you.

Ms. Normandin, you have the floor.

[Christine Normandin, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

To our witnesses, thank you once again for being here, gentlemen. My questions are along the same lines as what the chair was asking about less conventional elements.

We heard yesterday that a Chinese buoy was found in Japan’s exclusive economic zone. I would like to hear your thoughts on these buoys. There were also balloons that flew over North America.

I have a lot of questions. What does this represent? Is it a threat? Is it a message? Is it to gather information? Do we have any more information about what this represents and how many such objects there might be? Similarly, are we able to effectively detect and destroy them? Is Canada playing a role in this, in this region?

[MGen Paul Prévost]

Mr. Chair, I thank the member for her questions.

Yes, it is worrisome. We are aware of buoys in various places around the world. China leaves buoys in various places for marine sciences research, but we are afraid that the information gathered may be used for other purposes, specifically military purposes. We and the intelligence community are monitoring the situation, especially when there are new discoveries based on intelligence shared among our allies, in order to better understand what is going on. Those buoys have been found not just in Japan, but in various places in the Pacific, Atlantic and Arctic. Everyone is trying to understand the type of data being collected.

[Christine Normandin, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

So you are saying it is something we can and should be worried about. Should we also increase our analysis and research abilities? Does Canada have anything to offer relating to research and analysis of these buoys?

[MGen Paul Prévost]

Thank you.

Yes, we do have analytical capabilities. We have DRDC, Defence Research and Development Canada, and various resources, both military and civilian, to mine the data.

This raises another question. The chair asked what kind of threat China represents since its navy is now among the largest in the world. It has the conventional abilities that we are familiar with in the naval, air and armed forces, with all the related combat abilities in terms of artillery and infantry.

What is worrisome and requires our attention are the newer and less conventional abilities. For example, we should really pay attention to what is going on in space, and in cyberspace. These areas are more insidious. We tend to look at the size of an armada or fleet, but we overlook things that can be harmful. China does a lot of research to exploit weaknesses in these areas. It is indeed worrisome.

[Christine Normandin, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you very much.

I would like to move on to another topic, the AUKUS cooperation agreement, a trilateral agreement intended to isolate China in the Indo-Pacific region. Canada is not part of it, particularly as regard nuclear submarines, but we have heard that there might be other ways for Canada to participate. We know it is a two-way street. If we want to be part of it, we have to be able to bring something to the table.

Have there been any developments in this regard in recent months?

[MGen Greg Smith]

I want to thank the member for her question.

As you said, the first pillar of AUKUS is nuclear submarines. Canada is not involved in that aspect.

The second pillar is high technology. Canada has a lot to offer in this regard. We are working with our appropriate allies to see what we could contribute in the future. We are talking and negotiating with them to see what is possible. There are various technologies that are very strong in Canada. Canada is world-class in certain fields. We have a lot to bring to the table, and that is what we are offering our allies.

[Christine Normandin, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you very much.

High technology is very broad. Could you be more specific please?

[MGen Greg Smith]

Yes. I am referring to submarine technology, or technology for hypersonic weapons or to counter them. There is also artificial intelligence. Those are some examples of high technology.

[Christine Normandin, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you very much.

Now I have a question that I might also ask the Taiwanese representatives later on. I understand that Taiwan is somewhat alone in militarizing and acquiring materiel. I know this issue was raised when my colleagues visited Taiwan.

Can you explain why Taiwan is isolated in this regard? Could Canada provide military assistance to Taiwan in the future?

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Go ahead.

[Peter Lundy]

To start with the diplomatic answer, Canada, of course, pursues a one China policy. That dictates our interactions with Taiwan in all respects. We do have regular unofficial contacts with key members from Taiwan.

On the question of future military.... I can't answer the question about their military capacity or procurement. I can only say that it's hypothetical to consider whether Canada would assist in the future. I could not answer that.

[MGen Greg Smith]

Mr. Chair, I do not understand the question about Taiwan's future capabilities. Could someone explain so I understand what we are talking about?

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Perhaps you could give some clarification.

[Christine Normandin, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

We have heard from our colleagues who returned from a trip there that Taiwan is responsible for creating its own military arsenal, without any assistance from other countries. Is that expected to change in the future?

[MGen Greg Smith]

That is an interesting question, Mr. Chair.

Canada does of course have a some military capabilities, but other countries have much more. It is up to them to negotiate for military equipment or arms sales for Taiwan.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

They built a warplane in 500 days from ground zero—by themselves.

Thank you, Madame Normandin.

Go ahead, Ms. Mathyssen.

[Lindsay Mathyssen, NDP, London—Fanshawe, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

To continue with the conversation in terms of better maximizing our forces after reconstitution within the Indo-Pacific region, I can understand exactly why we would want to do that and why it's so key. I would be concerned, however, thinking about what happened this week, about how we're doing that. I would really love to hear if that includes specific partnerships with India and how the news from Monday is currently going to impact that.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Let me just.... This is a hypersensitive area. You are all experienced witnesses. I'll anticipate that you will steer around what might be sensitive information on this issue, but at this point, I'll allow the question to stand.

[MGen Greg Smith]

Thanks, Chair.

I'm here with my GAC colleague. He's the Indo-Pacific guy, so maybe he can help me out a little.

We're working with Global Affairs Canada. Obviously, defence is a part of foreign affairs. Foreign affairs is an active file, as you've said. It's a sensitive one. They're looking at it. We're following the lead and working with Global Affairs Canada for any type of military interaction with India.

We have a lot of presence there. We're increasing our presence because of this Indo-Pacific strategy. It would be natural that we would have more ability to do things with India. We're obviously reflecting on all that right now as we better understand the problem, but again, with a lead from Global Affairs Canada. That really is the foreign affairs lead for this.

[Peter Lundy]

Thank you for the question, Chair. Maybe I'll start with the strategy itself.

One of its strategic objectives is for Canada to be a reliable, engaged and active partner in the region. That requires us to have that 10-year time horizon for the strategy. It really is intended to be the foundation to guide our strategic approach. We do expect, over the course of the life of the strategy, that bilateral issues will come up. That's certainly the case in the past few days.

I can say in this committee, and it might be recent news, that the Prime Minister in New York today did remark that there's no question that India is a country of growing importance and a country that we need to continue to work with, not just in the region but around the world. We're not looking to provoke or cause problems, but Canada is unequivocal around the importance of the rule of law and unequivocal about the importance of protecting Canadians and standing up for our values. That's why we have called upon the Government of India to work with us to establish processes, to discover and uncover the truth of the matter, and to allow justice and accountability to be served.

That's the current posture on India in the context of that broader, long-term horizon for the strategy.