National Defence Committee on Sept. 21st, 2023

[MGen Paul Prévost]

Mr. Chair, I'll add to the Neon piece, but before that I will respond to the previous question, if you'll allow me.

We've often talked about how we're going from two ships to three ships. It might not seem like a lot, but the difference is that with two ships we are there episodically, for six months in a year; with three ships we're there all the time. That means there's always a Canadian ship in the region, which is always in a different port, working with partners from different nations—with a new partner pretty much every week—in multilateral exercises. That's a concrete example of how this presence increases. It's now a persistent presence.

In terms of Operation Neon, we're there right now with Vancouver, and for the next few weeks we will be doing work in enforcing the UN Security Council resolution. The Operation Neon piece is the second-biggest aspect of what we do. We've so far talked about the strategy, which is what we call Operation Horizon, which is capacity building and partnerships. Operation Neon is really about a mission, a mandate to monitor the sanctions against North Korea's illicit transfers.

[Darren Fisher, Liberal, Dartmouth—Cole Harbour, NS]

How has the threat environment in that region changed or evolved since Operation Neon came into play in 2019?

[MGen Paul Prévost]

I wouldn't say the threat environment has changed; the threat in that region slowly changes. We've talked about the capacity China has gained over there. Our interactions with China have changed around that mission, both at sea and in the air, but mainly in the air. I would say it's not a military escalation threat, but rather about safety and what we call “unprofessional conduct” while we perform the mission. We are on a legitimate mission from the UN. We are enforcing a UN resolution. We're in international waters. We're legitimately in that place to do that mission. For some reason, China doesn't like it, and we see some unprofessional intercepts from time to time.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Thank you, Mr. Fisher.

Ms. Normandin, you have the floor for two and a half minutes.

[Christine Normandin, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Lundy, we are talking about the West's perception of the Indo-Pacific, but I would like to know how the Indo-Pacific sees the West, in your opinion, particularly as regards the war in Ukraine.

At the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue summit in June, Indonesia's minister of defence, Prabowo Subianto, was very complacent toward Russian and put forward peace proposals that were quite strange. Further, we know that China did not attend the G20 summit, but does meet with Putin.

Is something happening in the Indo-Pacific region, some change or shift as regards the situation in Ukraine?

[Peter Lundy]

You are correct in the observation that the views and actions of the region are complex and certainly diverse. I can't comment on their particular policy choices. However, from the Canadian perspective, I can say that we have been unrelenting in making our case on what's happened in Ukraine, on the importance of the rule of law and on the important role the international community plays in helping others make their decisions on Ukraine. That's been a key element of Canadian diplomacy since the situation in Ukraine started. It hasn't stopped and it won't stop.

[Christine Normandin, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Based on the answers you have received, was there more openness initially and less now, or is it the opposite? Has the tone in the Indo-Pacific region changed with respect to Ukraine?

[Peter Lundy]

It's hard to assess what impact advocacy has on others, but I can say that persistence is important in the advocacy game. We keep making our point. We keep trying to make sure, to important multilateral bodies like the G20 and to the UN General Assembly this week in New York, that others will clearly understand our perspective on Ukraine. It is our hope they will make different policy decisions.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Thank you, Madame Normandin.

Ms. Mathyssen, you have two and a half minutes.

[Lindsay Mathyssen, NDP, London—Fanshawe, ON]

Thank you.

We've spoken about cybersecurity. Certainly, when we were in Taiwan—I was so glad to be part of that trip—we heard a great deal about the incredible amounts of education that go on just to ensure that people on the ground understand about misinformation and disinformation and the harm that they do. They've put a lot into that because of the huge scale of cyber-attacks they receive. I think the quote was that it's a million per day.

However, we've seen some scary things happen here in Canada in terms of our own social media impacts, the power of social media giants, and how that can impact Canadians and their own personal safety. This week there was a news report about Meta adopting an internal policy to remove on Canadian Facebook some posts that mentioned what had happened to Mr. Nijjar.

What is the military doing on that front, as it relates to the Indo-Pacific and our advancement of how we are protecting our own people, and taking that into account when we're dealing with these giants?

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

This is kind of wandering a little bit far, but you have sophisticated witnesses, so—

[Lindsay Mathyssen, NDP, London—Fanshawe, ON]

It's my time and it's my question, Mr. Chair.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Yes.

Go ahead.

[MGen Paul Prévost]

Mr. Chair, if you'll allow, I have a quick answer to this one.

This is a place where we're concerned. Like all Canadians, our soldiers, sailors, airwomen and airmen are prone to everything that's on social media. Our chief of defence has asked us to look into this. How do we inoculate our people against misinformation? It's out there. We're working with DRDC and many others on how to do that. It starts with education at all levels and developing critical judgment by people of what to believe and not.

[Lindsay Mathyssen, NDP, London—Fanshawe, ON]

Those are the broad questions for a study, but within the armed forces itself, are there programs specifically in terms of that education?

[MGen Paul Prévost]

There are no programs for now. This is something we're looking at in terms of how we're going to educate people. We have a good education program in which we develop critical thinking with our members. How do we now develop programs to talk specifically about how you inoculate your population about misinformation specifically? That's what we're starting to look into.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

We'll have to leave it there.

We have Mr. Kelly for five minutes, and then I need to know who the next Liberal is.

[Pat Kelly, Conservative, Calgary Rocky Ridge, AB]

Thank you.

I'll put this to you, General Smith. Can you comment on the importance of subsurface domain awareness in the Indo-Pacific region, which includes the approaches to the Canadian Arctic?

[MGen Greg Smith]

Mr. Chair, as I understand it, the question is about the awareness of subsurface domain. I'll take that from an Indo-Pacific strategy perspective. Having the presence there is obviously tremendously important. With three frigates, we're going to know more what's going on. That being said, the Pacific is a massive area.

[Pat Kelly, Conservative, Calgary Rocky Ridge, AB]

We're talking about threat analysis in this study, so in terms of the absence of domain awareness, or maintaining and ensuring domain awareness, how important is that? Are there threats within our capability? Are there subsurface threats that make domain awareness important?

[MGen Paul Prévost]

It's a great question.

It's a problem everywhere. We need to understand it in the Indo-Pacific, we need to understand it in the Arctic and we need to understand it in the approaches to North America. Part of the NORAD modernization, because the NORAD mission also has maritime domain awareness, is to look at how we increase subsurface and maritime domain awareness.

We're making investments in there. I don't have the specific data, because I wasn't expecting that question, but a portion of the $40 billion that was announced for NORAD modernization is for subsurface domain awareness around North America.

[Pat Kelly, Conservative, Calgary Rocky Ridge, AB]

To what extent does Canada's exclusion from AUKUS impact our ability to maintain domain awareness?

[MGen Greg Smith]

Chair, let me start on that.

I'll just reiterate, of course, that AUKUS is about nuclear submarines. We're not into nuclear submarines—

[Pat Kelly, Conservative, Calgary Rocky Ridge, AB]

No, no. You said, I believe in the opening statement—and we've heard testimony today—that it's about more than just a particular model of submarine. It's about cyber and it's about undersea capabilities in general. The AUKUS is about more than just a particular submarine. Is that correct?

[MGen Greg Smith]

Yes, Chair, absolutely.

Nuclear submarines are pillar one. Pillar two is the high technology. I can probably say it better in English about AI, machine learning, hypersonic defence. Those are the types of technologies that are being looked at in there. Canada has things to contribute, and we're working with allies about that.