National Defence Committee on Feb. 16th, 2022

[Richard Fadden]

I think part of it in the recent past was that they were very concerned about the two Michaels. I think that was a reasonable reason for delaying. I think eventually they decided they were going to develop an Indo-China policy. Given that, and I don't know where that is, they probably decided they were going to hold off on Huawei until they got the policy out.

I would argue that the two issues are severable, particularly because I believe we significantly lessened our credibility with our Five Eyes and NATO allies by refusing to do this. We could develop an Indo-China or an Indo-Pacific policy while right now saying no to Huawei.

That's my guess, but it is only a guess.

[Todd Doherty, Conservative, Cariboo—Prince George, BC]

How do we launch a two-front war, or really a multi-front war, but two-front for the sake of this, domestic and international—maybe not a war but an offence—to ensure that we can protect Canadians at home and abroad?

[Richard Fadden]

I believe the starting point in this, again, is to recognize the nature of the threat, but I think also it's to be realistic. We're not going to be able to do a great deal as a country alone. I think Canada has relatively less influence now as a middle power than it had during the Cold War.

I think we have to be realistic. Our diplomats and our military personnel should be out there trying, every day, different alliances and different groupings of people to push back on the things you talked about. To begin with, we need to recognize that there's a threat.

It also involves, I think, a whole-of-government undertaking. The CRTC and ISED have a role in dealing with some of these activities that we're talking about on the cyber front. It's not just the military. It's not just CSE. I'm not sure we're using every asset that exists, let alone the additional assets that we may want to bring to bear to the problem.

[Todd Doherty, Conservative, Cariboo—Prince George, BC]

I couldn't agree with you more. As I mentioned, in the inter-agency work I did before, it was a whole-of-government approach that we participated in previously.

In your view, do you believe Canada's lack of action on this file has negatively impacted our standing within the Five Eyes alliance or has the potential to, for example, Canada being cut off from vital intelligence sharing or being seen as more of a threat to our Five Eyes?

[Richard Fadden]

That's a tough question to answer. I think none of the Five Eyes will ever cut us off from operational intelligence that constitutes a threat to Canada, but if we continue along this path, broader cutbacks are a real possibility.

[Todd Doherty, Conservative, Cariboo—Prince George, BC]

Thank you to both of our witnesses for being here.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Thank you, Mr. Doherty.

Madam Lambropoulos, you have six minutes, please.

[Emmanuella Lambropoulos, Liberal, Saint-Laurent, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I'd like to thank both of our witnesses for being with us today to answer our questions.

Mr. Fadden, my question goes to you. We've recently seen a closer bond between China and Russia. I wonder if you could let us know what you believe a military relationship between two of our biggest threats could mean for us. Basing it on what you said a little bit earlier in your testimony, what type of warfare should Canada and its allies be prepared for from these two threats?

[Richard Fadden]

I think we need to recognize that the PRC-Russian Federation get-together, if I can use that expression, is a tactical one. I think the differences in the power and influence on the planet today between Russia and China are such that they do not have and they will not have a strategic relationship of the sort we might have had between two countries that were more evenly based. I do think, on the other hand, that in the short term, their capacity to create mischief in the Indo-Pacific and in Europe are increased because of this. In particular, if they start supporting each other on the cyber front, I think it will be quite significant.

I, for one, don't think—I may be in a minority—that Russia is going to invade Ukraine in the same way the Nazis invaded Poland during World War II. I think they're going to continue using a whole variety of devices. That's probably going to be the case with respect to China as well. They don't want to take over other countries. They want to increase their indirect control and their influence far beyond what it is now.

The difficulty with the west, I think, is that we haven't quite come to grips with this. I mean, what constitutes war, and what is not war, when you can use cyber-attacks to destroy the infrastructure of a country, which, if done kinetically, would immediately result in a declaration of war?

I think in the short term, Russia and China together—fine. They'll collaborate with one another. I don't think it's going to stay that way in the long term.

[Emmanuella Lambropoulos, Liberal, Saint-Laurent, QC]

Thank you very much.

Another thing you touched on a bit was that the best strategy going forward would really be to be a bit more dependent on our allies.

I am wondering what you think Canada should do in order to better our relationship with our allies. Where do you think we currently stand in the way our relationship is with our allies? How quickly would our allies come to our aid, and how can we improve the situation?

[Richard Fadden]

I didn't mean to say that we should be more dependent. I think we should be more mutually dependent with one another. I don't think any country today, even the United States, can function alone successfully against China, Russia and a number of other states that are causing a great deal of difficulties.

The first thing that Canada can do is recognize that we need to do this, and secondly, we need to pay the piper. We have not been a country that has spent a great deal of money on military things over the course of.... This is not a partisan comment. We have never done this; we just don't do it. Since World War II we have not done that, I think in part because we don't see a threat.

I think we should start contributing more than we have to NATO. I think we need to develop a view of what we're going to do in the Indo-Pacific, and I think Australia and Japan are two countries we could start dealing with a great deal more than we have in the past.

One of the things that struck me when I was still working and visited those parts of the world is that everybody was delighted to see me, but after our formal meetings, we'd have a cup of coffee or a beer, and they'd say, “You know, we're happy that you're here, but the last time we saw a federal minister was eight years ago, and the last time we saw a warship was in 1953.” It requires consistency over time and dedicated efforts from everybody, from the head of government down to junior desk officers in the military, in DND and in Global Affairs.

Until we do that, it's hard for other countries to take us seriously. I don't mean to suggest that we flit around, because I don't think we do that, but we're not very consistent when we decide that we're going to do something.

I think a very good example is Japan, which is a significant middle power very interested in working more with Canada. We could do a great deal more.

[Emmanuella Lambropoulos, Liberal, Saint-Laurent, QC]

Our previous witnesses spoke a lot about cyber-threats and the way in which Russia has used cyberspace in order to influence things within our own country here in Canada, which has created a lot of division among different people in our country.

Given the fact that our next warfare is ideological, as you mentioned in your previous answer, what can we do to protect ourselves from this in the cyberspace, in your opinion? I know we heard a lot about it in our previous testimony, but I'd like to hear what you have to say about this as well.

[Richard Fadden]

The first thing, again—and I'm going to be repetitious, and I apologize—is that we have to convince the Canadian population, not just you and your colleagues and not just ministers but Canadians generally, that this is a risk. We're not going to do this unless reports like the one I hope you will produce, like ministerial statements, start talking about this. Once that's done, I think it becomes much easier to point out where there are problems.

There are countries that I believe consciously decided to set up a separate stand-alone agency to deal with misinformation or disinformation. Maybe it's something we should think about and give them a real mandate to educate the public, but I don't think there's a silver bullet here. There is not a switch that we can pull to, all of a sudden, make it go away.

Again, I think we have to work with the allies.

[Emmanuella Lambropoulos, Liberal, Saint-Laurent, QC]

Thank you very much.

That's okay for me.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Ms. Normandin, you have six minutes.

[Christine Normandin, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

I want to take several questions already asked by my colleagues further, but first I would like to come back to some points that Ms. Lambropoulos has just raised, including the perception of the general public.

Both witnesses have talked about, among other things, industrial espionage and intellectual property, which may seem to be more of a civilian than a national defence issue.

I would like to hear your comments on the relevance of making sure that the public understands that this can pose threats to national security.

I would also like to hear from you about who should actually take on the role in terms of protection. There is a perception that in some cases it is the Canadian Security Intelligence Service and in some cases it is more the Department of National Defence.

Is it possible that both are passing the buck? In other words, when it's everybody's job, ultimately it's nobody's job.

I would like to hear from both of you on this aspect.

[Richard Fadden]

Could I give my colleagues a chance?

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Yes.

Go ahead, Mr. Taillon.

[Dr. J. Paul de B. Taillon]

I didn't get the interpretation. I'm sorry.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Okay. Monsieur Fadden can then respond.

[Richard Fadden]

Yes, I'll try to answer your question.

You ask an excellent question.

I think national security has to be defined relatively broadly today. It's not the same context as in the 1950s, when the only real risk was a Russian invasion. You can undermine a country's sovereignty through military interference, but also by making it lose control of its economy. I think that's what's happening right now. The theft of intellectual property in Canada is abominable. It's happening not only in Canada, but throughout the west.

The key element lies in a relatively broader definition of national security. I'm not talking about a definition that is so broad that it is meaningless, as you suggest. Nevertheless, it is not the same situation as in the 1950s and 1960s.

Who should do the protecting? That is an excellent question. That is a matter for the machinery of government, which is the primary responsibility of the Prime Minister.

I don't think the Canadian Forces should be given the responsibility to protect the private sector. Rather, the Communications Security Establishment should be given that responsibility, with the assistance of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service. Indeed, there must be collaboration between the agencies. As I suggested to one of your colleagues, I think a whole-of-government approach is crucial here. We don't have enough resources for either of us to start mucking around; I'm exaggerating, but it's an image to back up my point.

Essentially, the military should be concerned about what is going on outside the country, while remaining very well informed about what is going on here, and it should be up to the CSE to protect the private sector, with the help of a department or other agency. In this regard, we should give the CSE a much more public and much clearer mandate.

In addition, it should be emphasized that when the private sector is subject to cyber-attack, we should always make sure that we talk about it. One of the difficulties we have at the moment is that the target organization never wants to talk about it because of the potential financial consequences. It's true that there is an obligation to report it from time to time, but in very specific circumstances. In the United States, on the other hand, every time there is a cyber-attack, it has to be reported to the federal government. I would suggest that you follow the same rule; I think it would be helpful.

[Christine Normandin, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Aside from the intellectual property and espionage aspects, I am keen to hear your comments specifically on information warfare.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Excuse me, Madame Normandin, for a second. I just want to check with Mr. Taillon.

You didn't get the interpretation. Is that because you weren't on the English channel, or was there some other issue?

[Dr. J. Paul de B. Taillon]

I'm on the English channel.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Are you getting the interpretation?