National Defence Committee on Jan. 29th, 2024

[MGen Gregory Smith]

Mr. Chair, again, I'll see if any of my colleagues want to jump in here.

We have non-combatant evacuation operation contingency plans for all kinds of regions throughout the world. We did it recently in the Sudan, and we did it recently and prepared for it in Lebanon and Israel. We're prepared and can do those types of things.

That being said, how can we set the conditions so that the situation will never occur? That's through the kind of presence we're creating right now—and I'm talking militarily. Clearly, we have other trade, people-to-people connections and a lot of other activities that will try to lower the temperature there to prevent that from happening.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

Okay.

I'll ask Major-General Prévost a question.

At what point do Canadians know it's time to start making plans to get their families out of South Korea?

[Major-General Paul Prévost, Director of Staff, Strategic Joint Staff, Department of National Defence]

Mr. Chair, the answer to this question lies with Global Affairs, as they are responsible for consular cases, so I'll refer to them.

[Amanda Strohan]

Sure.

First of all, let me say that we have condemned the missile launches consistently. Again, I agree with my colleagues that sanctions are an extremely important part of the deterrents to ensure that we don't arrive at a situation of conflict in the region, and that we would appeal for calm, stability and security.

With respect to Canadian citizens in the region, as we have in many parts of the world, Global Affairs Canada has a branch that is responsible for planning for contingencies. We do that around the world in coordination with our National Defence colleagues and partners across government. We have plans in place for the region, much as we do in the rest of the world.

We have travel advisories, which are reviewed on a regular basis for countries across the region, and Canadians are encouraged to follow those travel advisories. Canadians living in the region are encouraged to register with us and to follow our travel advisories for the most up-to-date information on security threats in the region.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Thank you, Ms. Gallant.

Mr. Fisher, you have six minutes, please.

[Darren Fisher, Liberal, Dartmouth—Cole Harbour, NS]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, folks, for being here. I hope you had a great new year and got a bit of a break and time to spend with family members.

I'm interested in what has happened in the global landscape and the global environment since we launched our Indo-Pacific strategy. We have the war in Ukraine and the conflict in the Middle East. There's obviously going to be—justifiably so—a shift in the international community's focus.

How has the recent launch of the strategy impacted the important work you're doing? Also, how has that impacted relationships with our partners in the Indo-Pacific?

[Amanda Strohan]

Indeed, the Indo-Pacific strategy recognizes the importance of the region in an increasingly complex world. It is fair to say that the geopolitical situation around the world has become increasingly complex since the strategy was launched just over a year ago.

What that tells us is that we were timely in launching a strategy and the framework of the strategy remains sound. The strategy is built around five strategic pillars or objectives that we consider to be Canada's priorities in the region. These are peace, security and stability, trade and economic prosperity, protecting the planet, investing in and connecting people, and engaging in the region and being a reliable partner. Partners in the region are increasingly important to us as the world becomes more unstable, and that framework continues to be valid.

Of course, over time, we will continue to tactically recalibrate as we look at a strategy that will extend over five to 10 years, but the framework of the strategy and the principles on which it is based are still valid a year in, and they will continue to be valid as the strategy moves forward.

[Darren Fisher, Liberal, Dartmouth—Cole Harbour, NS]

You talked about one of the pillars being economic and about trade. I see that particular pillar as being something that must have been heavily impacted by the things I just outlined.

[Amanda Strohan]

Indeed. Again I think it speaks to why the strategy is increasingly important. In fact, trade and the economic pillar of the strategy were very active in the first year of implementation. If you look at some of the activities we conducted over the last year, we have our team Canada trade missions that started in the first year of the strategy, with the first full-scale mission taking place in October. There are another four team Canada trade missions coming up in the next months.

We're opening an Agriculture and Agri-Food office in Manila, and Export Development Canada is also expanding its presence in the region with two additional locations. We've named and posted a senior trade representative in Jakarta, and we've put more money out the door in the CanExport facilities for Canadian exporters in the region.

There's a lot of activity happening on the trade and economic front to uphold this strategic objective of the strategy.

[Darren Fisher, Liberal, Dartmouth—Cole Harbour, NS]

Thank you for that.

Sticking with recent tensions that have cropped up since we launched the strategy, what about the tensions between the governments of Canada and India? How have they impacted our ties and relationships in the Indo-Pacific region?

[Amanda Strohan]

I'll take that question as well.

In the context of the Indo-Pacific strategy, what I would say is that this strategy, as I said, is over five years and renewable for another five years. It is a 10-year strategy. We are focused in the IPS on our long-term relationships in the region. We know that India will continue to be an important partner in that. We recognize that there will be ebbs and flows with respect to bilateral relations with many countries in the region over the course of the 10-year time horizon of the strategy. We're prepared for that. Again, the principles of the strategy remain valid.

With respect to specific bilateral relations with any country, I would refer those to my colleagues potentially before the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs. With respect to the Indo-Pacific strategy, we think the strategy framework continues to hold. In fact, it was designed specifically to help us navigate complications in the region over the course of 10 years.

[Darren Fisher, Liberal, Dartmouth—Cole Harbour, NS]

Thank you.

Major-General Smith, during your opening remarks you talked about a defence delegation that was working with partners on how we can become a better defence partner. Obviously, you had only five minutes, so can you just fill us in a little bit on what kind of conversation that was? I assume that we're seen as being a good partner in defence around the world. I'm interested in your thoughts on who might have said that we could do better and what we could do better.

[MGen Gregory Smith]

Mr. Chair, I was fortunate to go to the region—I got back late last week with my boss—and participate in what's known as the Shangri-La Dialogue Sherpa Meeting, which is a regional security forum. It's named after the hotel; it's nothing exciting.

All of that is to say that we had multiple bilaterals with partners throughout the region who said, yup, you're present, and you've been doing good things. However, it's a year in, so I don't want to be too self-celebratory up here and say that we've resolved this. We're now a year in, and from a defence perspective, we're starting to build on relationships. I talked about the visit with the Philippines and Vietnam, and I went to Cambodia, as a means of starting relationships with the countries that are important particularly for ASEAN.

I think we're building upon these relationships and also looking for opportunities across the five pillars of defence. Yes, we want to have ships and visit as much as possible. Where can we do exercises? How about capacity building, including women, peace and security, and maybe some cyber? We're looking for those opportunities. I would say we're doing well after the first year, but we'll continue to build on those.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Thank you, Mr. Fisher.

Ms. Normandin, you have six minutes.

[Christine Normandin, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

I also thank the witnesses. It is always a pleasure to see them again.

I want to start with a few questions about AUKUS, the tripartite agreement between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States. We know that the Canadian government is not going to participate in the nuclear submarine component of the agreement, but that it wants to contribute to the component on artificial intelligence and cybersecurity, among other things. I would like you to give me an overview of the situation.

In addition, when you want to join such a group, the important thing is not so much what you can find there, but rather what you can bring to it. However, in a previous study, we saw that procurement delays are very long. As a result, what we manage to acquire in cybersecurity is often a bit obsolete as soon as we acquire it.

Is there a specific strategy that would make it possible to bring something worthwhile to the table, even if it means reviewing cybersecurity and artificial intelligence procurement in a more targeted way?

[MGen Gregory Smith]

I'll start the answer, but cybersecurity is a broader issue than national defence.

That's a good question. The AUKUS agreement has two pillars. The first concerns nuclear submarines, in which Canada is not a participant, obviously. However, we are ready to contribute to the second pillar, and we are waiting for an invitation.

I would also say that cybersecurity as it relates to national defence is one of the five pillars of the Indo-Pacific strategy. We're already starting to do some work on that. So we are taking significant steps. At the same time, we are working with other groups. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN, is a very important group. We try to do as much as we can with that association. There is also the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting Plus, with which we are doing more. I can talk more about it if you want, but it is moving forward. That is where we are focusing our efforts at the moment.

[Amanda Strohan]

I could add to that. It's not just National Defence that is involved in cybersecurity. There are other departments and other government agencies involved in this.

In the Indo-Pacific strategy, there is indeed an initiative for cybersecurity and cyber-diplomacy. That initiative is well under way with partners. Some activities have already taken place in the course of the first year of the strategy. We convened like-minded partners, including some from the region, in June in Vancouver to talk about threats emanating from the region. In the strategy, we participated in the Singapore International Cyber Week in October and the ASEAN Ministerial Conference on Cybersecurity with partners in October. We've been very active on the front of cyber-diplomacy and cybersecurity.

The Indo-Pacific strategy aims, on the one hand, to reinforce our own capacity to anticipate and cope with threats emanating from the region, but it's also to help partners in the region improve their capacity to predict and cope with cybersecurity threats.

[Christine Normandin, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you.

To clarify my question a little, I understand that you are waiting to be invited to participate in AUKUS, but for that to happen, you have to be attractive.

Is there a specific strategy being deployed in terms of resources to be able to present something worthwhile and to ensure that an invitation becomes inevitable? Diplomacy and cybersecurity are one thing, but in terms of equipment, is a strategy being developed to make Canada more effective and more attractive?

[MGen Gregory Smith]

We are already in discussions with the three countries that form the AUKUS partnership. We already have a very good relationship with these countries, including the United Kingdom and the United States. Things are going very well and we will continue to move this file forward.

To answer your question, we have a lot of resources. We work with those allies to present our strengths in some of the high-tech areas that we are very familiar with.

We are waiting to be invited to be part of that alliance. Few invitations go out, and that applies not only to Canada but to more allies, as well.

[Christine Normandin, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you.

I have a question for Global Affairs Canada.

Canada is in the process of implementing a defence co-operation agreement with the Philippines. On the other hand, we see that the Philippines may have just helped China by providing troop support.

In this context, where a number of Indo-Pacific countries sometimes find themselves on both sides of the fence and have a lot of personal interests to protect, how can we find a balance between bilateralism and multilateralism? Is there an evolution toward one or the other, based on the situation we are currently seeing?

[Amanda Strohan]

We're doing both. I think it's fair to say that the Indo-Pacific strategy anticipates engagement on both the multilateral and bilateral fronts. We're very active in both.

I think you raise an important point to say there are varying and competing interests in the region. We are there to protect Canada's national interests. I think that really outlines why it is so important that we be there and engage with all partners across the region, because there are competing narratives and competing interests, and it is important that Canada engage.

The Indo-Pacific strategy invests $2.3 billion in 24 initiatives that are to be implemented by 17 government departments and agencies. It demonstrates a seriousness and an engagement with respect to the region.

It's important that we be there. That has been well received by countries in the region. It's important that we be there, because we need to defend Canadian interests. There are competing narratives on the ground. By bringing what we bring with the Indo-Pacific strategy, we're there to demonstrate to partners that it's worth working with us, and we will continue to advocate for Canadian interests in that crowded space.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Ms. Mathyssen, you have six minutes, please.

[Lindsay Mathyssen, NDP, London—Fanshawe, ON]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

In terms of some of the details on trade with the Indo-Pacific strategy, Canada is now the chair of the CPTPP. It was sold as this grand, progressive partnership. However, it seems to be in name only. We've traded off about 58,000 Canadian jobs, damaged supply-managed sectors and sold off parts of our auto industry. The trade-offs seem to be.... It was recently reported that there will be a 0.082% increase to our GDP by 2035.

Can you give us an update on the numbers? Has that changed? Are we seeing any actual grand growth from this trade partnership?

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Generally, I don't interfere with members' questions, which are perfectly legitimate. That strikes me as a question for another committee, but still, there may be some security implications.

If you could, focus on that part, please.

[Lindsay Mathyssen, NDP, London—Fanshawe, ON]

When we talk about the Indo-Pacific strategy, a large part of that is trade, so I don't see....