In itself, the question could bring up a lot of constitutional questions around the establishment and independence of military judges. In the Fish report, one of his recommendations was to study that aspect of the act.
We have had a working group for the last two years, and the question was to determine the most effective framework for the creation of a permanent military court of Canada in co-operation with an independent authority, the Department of Justice and representatives of the military justice system. We're getting to the end of that report, and while looking at it, a lot of questions came up about concerning the deployability of civilian judges and their subjection to the code of service discipline, just to name those two.
The fact that the motion proposes to keep them as military judges—“military” is a defined term that says, “shall be construed as relating to all or any part of the Canadian Forces”—would be something to consider. Also, all the other provisions that establish military judges refer to them as being military members.
There's a lot of conflict with a lot of other provisions, like where it says that military judges cease to hold office when released from the CAF at their request and that a chief military judge must hold the rank of at least colonel. We're addressing a provision that concerns regular force military judges. We also have provisions concerning reserve force military judges that are not covered. They are a different type; they're nominated. They don't have the exact same appointment, but there are other provisions that address that. That's not covered here, but I would suggest that if something is done for one group, the other group should also be considered.