National Defence Committee on Feb. 9th, 2026

[The Chair, Liberal, Charles Sousa]

I call this meeting to order.

Good morning, everybody. Welcome to meeting number 24 of the House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence.

Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2) and the motion adopted by the committee on Tuesday, September 16, 2025, the committee is meeting to begin its consideration of the nexus between national defence, national security and the critical minerals sector.

Today's meeting is taking place in hybrid format, pursuant to the Standing Orders. Members are attending in person and remotely using the Zoom application.

Before we begin, I ask participants to consult the guidelines on the table. These measures are to help prevent audio feedback incidents and to protect the health and safety of our interpreters.

I would like to remind witnesses and members to please wait until I recognize you by name before speaking. If you wish to speak, please raise your hand, and for those on Zoom, please use the “raise hand” function, and the clerk and I will manage the speaking order as best we can. For interpretation, use your earpiece and select the appropriate channel. All comments should be addressed through the chair.

I'd like to welcome our witnesses: Dr. Michael Byers, professor, via video conferencing; Christopher Hernandez-Roy, deputy director and senior fellow, Americas program, Center for Strategic and International Studies; and Elizabeth Steyn, associate dean of graduate studies, Faculty of Law, at the University of Calgary.

You will each have five minutes to make your opening statement.

We'll start with Dr. Byers.

[Dr. Michael Byers, Professor, University of British Columbia, As an Individual]

Thank you very much.

Good morning, everyone.

I will make my comments today in English but I am happy to take questions in French.

When I received this invitation, I couldn't help but wonder why you had chosen me. I think the answer is that I have been working on issues of Arctic security and Arctic sovereignty for the last 20 years. Twenty years ago, I became very involved in an issue of national security and foreign investment.

Some of you will remember a significant interest of public policy in 2007 and 2008, when Canada's largest space company, MacDonald, Dettwiler and Associates—now known as MDA—wished to sell its space division to a large American company, ATK. The reason it became an issue of national security was that MacDonald, Dettwiler and Associates had a synthetic aperture radar satellite, RADARSAT-2, that had been built precisely to provide surveillance of Canada's Arctic waters and to measure sea ice and to essentially fulfill an Arctic sovereignty and security role, and had done so with half a billion dollars of Canadian government pre-purchased imagery.

After an extensive investigation—I believe I testified before three parliamentary committees on that issue, and others, of course, weighed in—then industry minister, the late Jim Prentice, invoked the Investment Canada Act for the first time to block the purchase of a Canadian company by a foreign company. He did so under what was called the net benefit test, because the Investment Canada Act at that time did not include a national security test. I, and others, recommended that the act be amended to include a national security test and it was. It has been amended again and I believe the government is currently in the process of adopting regulations that would provide even more content to that issue.

That's why I think I'm here. I'm not a specialist in national law. I am a specialist in international law and I can tell you that international law allows for a very broad exception for national security purposes. Blocking a sale for national security purposes does not raise issues of international law. It simply goes to the issue of the domestic legislation.

Again, I spend a lot of time looking at Arctic security issues, including with regard to China. I think it's important with regard to Chinese interest in Canadian natural resources to take a deep breath and not get overly excited. We export a lot of bitumen to China. We export nickel to China. In fact, there's a Chinese-owned company that has a mine in northern Quebec that ships nickel to China and the Prime Minister was recently in Beijing seeking to expand trading relationships with that country.

I'm not naive. I think one needs to make sure that Chinese companies are not accessing certain critical minerals in Canada. I'm thinking here of rare earth elements in particular, but I think it's important to focus on the specific minerals and to not get too excited and regard all trade with China or all investment with China on what might be broadly defined as critical minerals as necessarily a bad thing.

I also have spent a lot of time on Canada-U.S. relations. I was, for five years, a professor of international law at Duke University in North Carolina. Our relationship with the United States at the moment is unpredictable, to say the least, and requires that we not lock ourselves into any new constraints at this moment. Here I'm speaking to the fact that the Trump administration has indicated a desire to negotiate a bilateral agreement with Canada on critical minerals.

I think that Prime Minister Carney is right to point out that this issue should be deferred as part of the larger Canada-U.S.-Mexico trade agreement renegotiations. You don't give away a strong card before the poker game starts.

I'm going to close by simply saying that I am concerned by a decision that was made in 2020 to enter into a Canada-U.S. joint action plan on critical minerals. It probably was a wise decision in 2020. Under that plan, the Canadian government and the U.S. Department of Defense jointly acquired equity interests in, I believe, six Canadian mining companies so far, including Canada's only mine for rare earth elements, in the Yukon. I'm becoming concerned that this could be a problem, at least if it were to allow the United States Department of Defense to secure critical minerals, and specifically rare earth elements, in a time of shortage in Canada.

Again, I'm not looking for any governmental decision on this right now. It's proper that it's part of the CUSMA negotiations, but we need to be alert to maintain our sovereignty over rare earth elements and certain other key critical minerals.

To bring it back to the beginning of my comments, the last thing I will say on the United States is that back in 2008, the sale that Jim Prentice blocked was a sale to a U.S. company, so we have said no to purchases from the United States before for national security reasons. In worst-case scenarios, we should be prepared to do so again.

Thank you very much.

[The Chair, Liberal, Charles Sousa]

Thank you, Dr. Byers. We do appreciate and value your experience and your participation here, so thank you.

It's over to you, Christopher Hernandez-Roy. You have up to five minutes.

[Christopher Hernandez-Roy, Deputy Director and Senior Fellow, Americas Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies]

Thanks very much.

Chairman Sousa, Vice-Chair Bezan, Vice-Chair Savard-Tremblay and distinguished members of the committee, I'm very pleased to share my views with you today.

My employer, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, or CSIS, does not take policy positions, so the remarks and opinions that I express today are entirely my own and don't necessarily reflect CSIS.

Just like coal and steel production in the 19th century, and perhaps oil in the 20th century, critical minerals are now keystones of national capabilities, alongside chip fabrication, aerospace and advanced manufacturing, information technology, artificial intelligence and energy.

The relationship between mining and defence is being reshaped by a fundamental shift in how critical minerals are perceived and governed. What was once largely driven by consumer product and energy transition objectives is now increasingly framed through a national security and industrial strategy lens. This shift is unfolding against a backdrop of heavy dependence on non-trusted or adversarial jurisdictions for mining, processing and refining and is exposing defence industries to geopolitical risk, trade disruptions and coercive leverage.

In response, Canada and allied governments are moving to re-anchor mineral supply chains domestically and within trusted networks. Bilateral and multilateral instruments and agreements are increasingly explicit about strengthening the resilience of supply chains and ensuring a secure sourcing of critical minerals essential for defence, rather than for a regular consumer market or climate goals alone.

Canada can position itself as a cornerstone of national security and defence-critical mineral supply for Canada and for its allies. Canada has reserves of all 12 of the minerals that NATO identifies as essential for defence manufacturing and is in active production of most of them, in addition to other minerals on the U.S. Department of Defense's critical minerals list and on the EU's critical minerals list as well.

Trade frictions between the United States and Canada have accelerated a push to diversify defence-related mineral exports, deepening ties with leading western economies through the G7 critical minerals action plan and with Europe through the security and defence partnership and the SAFE initiative, as well as aligning more closely with NATO's rearmament agenda.

In this context, minerals themselves could become a form of defence currency, an alternative pathway for Canada to meet readiness and burden-sharing objectives, in particular the 1.5% above the 3.5% NATO hard-core commitments to defence.

On the demand side, while regular consumer demand still drives markets, defence is becoming an increasingly important market signal, but one that is not always clear in terms of which specific minerals companies will require, and in what volumes and on what timelines. Unlike EV or battery markets, defence-driven demand is mediated through classified planning, procurement systems and shifting threat assessments.

The alignment of policies and regulatory frameworks remains another central challenge in the link between mining and defence. Defence-procurement authorities, industrial-policy agencies and mineral-regulatory bodies often operate under different mandates, timelines and levels of risk. Even when there is political consensus on the need to prioritize defence-critical minerals, this doesn't automatically translate into faster permitting processes or clearer regulatory decisions.

Recent initiatives, including those in the Building Canada Act and led by the Major Projects Office, which aim to streamline environmental assessments, centralize approvals for major projects and accelerate development deemed to be in the national interest, reflect an effort to reconcile the urgency identified by the critical-minerals industry with the integrity of the regulatory framework.

Financing constraints sit at the centre of the mining-defence relationship. Defence-critical minerals projects, particularly in processing and refining, are capital-intensive and also involve technology and scale-up risk.

I have argued in the past that Canada should establish its own version of a U.S. DPA Title III to co-invest in defence critical minerals, signalling government commitment and encouraging private capital. Perhaps the new Canadian critical minerals sovereign fund will achieve some of these objectives if it focuses some of its investments on defence-critical minerals.

Processing and midstream capacity represents one of the most acute bottlenecks. Investments in rare earth processing, magnet manufacturing and recycling illustrate both the opportunity and the difficulty of building mainstream capacity fast enough to meet defence timelines and the need to quickly pivot away from adversarial sources.

Progress is being made with the Saskatchewan Research Council's rare earth facility, Rio Tinto's scandium production plant in Quebec and Ucore Rare Metals' Kingston facility, for example.

For miners, all of these dynamics force strategic choices. Some will remain focused on supplying feedstock, while others may pursue deeper integration as strategic partners to processors, defence companies or governments. Debates over strategic stockpiles, direct public equity and alignment of mineral production with defence commitments illustrate how miners are increasingly operating within a geopolitical, as well as a commercial, calculus.

Taken together, these dynamics highlight a central tension: Defence-driven strategic intent is accelerating, but the institutional, commercial and industrial mechanisms needed to translate that intent into predictable demand, bankable projects and resilient supply chains are still catching up.

Thank you very much.

[The Chair, Liberal, Charles Sousa]

Thank you.

Ms. Steyn, we'll go over to you for five minutes.

[Dr. Elizabeth Steyn, Associate Dean, Graduate Studies, Faculty of Law, University of Calgary]

Honourable Chair, vice-chairs and members of the committee, thank you for the invitation to appear before you today on this important study examining the nexus between national defence, national security and Canada's critical mineral sector.

I am a law professor at the University of Calgary, where I teach a course in critical minerals, regulatory frameworks and geopolitics. I have specialized in this area for the past six years. I am also a fellow at the Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary.

At the outset, I would like to make 10 recommendations.

First is that the Canadian definition of “critical minerals” be revised to bring it in line with our changing geopolitical realities. Our current definition states that we must have the geological potential to produce a mineral for it to be considered a critical mineral in Canada. We need to focus on minerals that are critical for Canada. By that, I mean minerals that are critical to the energy transition, the digital transition, critical infrastructure, agriculture, aerospace, advanced manufacturing, and, most importantly, national security and defence.

Second is that a clear and transparent methodology for the identification of critical minerals be designed accordingly, and that it be revised biannually in accordance with the latest scientific advances.

Third is that the 2021 Canadian critical minerals list be revised in consequence.

Fourth is that Canada make haste with the establishment of the critical minerals stockpile that was announced in budget 2025. I will note here that Eisenhower set the golden standard of a stockpile that can withstand a five-year war effort.

Fifth is that a healthy portion of Canada's increased defence budget should be set aside for feedstocks in the form of critical minerals, as well as the securing of critical minerals supply chains: production, processing, manufacturing and supply.

Sixth is that as a country we exercise vigilance when it comes not only to Chinese investments but also to those by the U.S. Department of Defense, or Department of War, particularly when they come tied to 100% offtake agreements such as we have recently seen.

Seventh, our priority as a country should be first to secure our own needs and then to provide minerals to our NATO allies. By “our NATO allies”, I'm referring predominantly to CETA, such as with the recent agreement we entered into with Germany.

Eighth, we should look to the global south for alliances when it comes to securing minerals we do not have, notably with South Africa, Namibia and Kazakhstan.

Ninth, there is a careful balance to be trod between being a useful ally to the U.S. and putting ourselves in a Greenland position. My submission is that the U.S. would rather look to Australia for sourcing its minerals at present, and that we should look to Europe for offtake markets and not unduly remind the U.S. of our riches.

Tenth, during the Second World War, we positioned ourselves to be the world's largest supplier of minerals, but we failed to build up our own military force. We should learn from that escapade, notably now that we can no longer take U.S. protection or benevolence for granted.

To summarize, Canada stands at a strategic inflection point. There can be no national security without critical minerals.

I look forward to your questions and to discussing how Canada can strengthen its defence postures through a more resilient, secure and strategically aligned critical minerals sector.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Charles Sousa]

Thank you very much.

We're going to go to our first round of questions, and we're going to start off with Mr. Kibble, for six minutes.

[Jeff Kibble, Conservative, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you to all our witnesses for your help in letting us understand the connection we're trying to make today.

Mr. Hernandez-Roy, you mentioned the 12 NATO-identified critical minerals. Which of those are the top three in terms of importance to national defence in Canada?

[Christopher Hernandez-Roy]

It's not easy to answer that, and I'll tell you why. It depends. Certain minerals are obviously required to build certain weapons systems, to build your defence industry, but that might not be where the greatest risk is. The greatest risk is where the bottlenecks are. For instance, a metal like niobium, which Canada does have reserves of but is not yet producing, as far as I recall, is one of those metals that is at the greatest risk of disruption. It's essential, for instance, in the commercial market, for strengthening car bodies. It makes a super steel alloy that makes steel much stronger. It's also essential for building aircraft and other types of vehicles that require very light and very resistant metals.

[Jeff Kibble, Conservative, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

Can you explain some of the bottleneck risks? Which minerals does that apply to?

[Christopher Hernandez-Roy]

For niobium, for things like rare earths—which is, I think, what most people focus on, certainly what the media has focused on—the risks are simply that for some of these metals, China not only controls the market but has virtually a monopoly control of the market and has engaged in price manipulation, has engaged in using its market as a trade cudgel with, most recently, the United States but other countries as well. Japan had a problem with China for a while. Its lock on certain minerals makes western industrial processes entirely dependent on it.

[Jeff Kibble, Conservative, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

Thank you.

You mentioned DPA Title III, and I saw some smiles and nods. Could you explain that a little bit more, both of you? I didn't see Dr. Byers. That seemed important, so please expand on that a little bit more.

I'll start with Mr. Hernandez-Roy.

[Christopher Hernandez-Roy]

The Defence Production Act Title III has grant-making authority to invest in critical mineral projects, mostly to get them off the ground in both the United States and Canada. This stems out of the U.S.-Canada critical minerals—I forget the exact title—agreement, road map, action plan that was signed at the tail end of the first Trump administration. The first investments in Canada weren't made until the Biden administration. One or two, if memory serves, have continued in the second Trump administration. As far as I recall, these are grants. These are not taking a stake in a mine.

[Jeff Kibble, Conservative, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

Thank you.

Ms. Steyn, you mentioned a recommendation for a five-year stockpile of critical minerals and rare earths, etc. Do you know—relative to the 12 NATO...or just maybe in general—where Canada stands in terms of a stockpile? Do we have anything? Are we at one year, two years? Do we have the capacity to do that? Perhaps you could expand there, please.

[Dr. Elizabeth Steyn]

We actually stand nowhere. We've announced an intention to start, but it is quite shocking where we are at the moment. The U.S. has announced a $12-billion critical mineral stockpile. After the First World War, they had a five-year capacity under Eisenhower. Under Nixon, they shrank it to a one-year capacity. Nixon sold it off to balance the budget. At that stage, the thinking was that wars wouldn't be long anymore because of nuclear capacity. I think we've seen recently, for instance, with the Ukraine war, that wars are fought differently. Wars can be long. That thinking stands to be qualified, but there's also Australia, which has a $1.2-billion stockpile that it's investing in.

[Jeff Kibble, Conservative, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

Thank you very much. That is shocking that we have zero stockpile.

Perhaps, Mr. Hernandez-Roy, you could expand on the risks of foreign ownership of mines. We've said we don't want the U.S. to have too much control. Would the same apply to China? In general, what are some of the risks of losing control of these, especially in the light of trying to build stockpiles that we shockingly don't have?

[Christopher Hernandez-Roy]

Before I answer that, if I could just make one brief comment about the stockpile, which is something that, in a paper I wrote on critical minerals for defence last year, I also recommended. This was back in February of last year.

There's another interesting angle to stockpiles that could be considered. Maintaining large government stockpiles is expensive and can be very static. Another thing that can be considered is the case of defence companies that have stockpiles for their own production. Let's say at the end of a given year, they have some minerals that they haven't used. Tax breaks could be given to them to encourage private companies to stockpile.

[Jeff Kibble, Conservative, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

We have only a few seconds. Can you talk about risks of foreign ownership?

[Christopher Hernandez-Roy]

I don't think all foreign ownership is clearly risky. The risk of foreign ownership is that the mineral supplies can be constrained in moments of....

[Jeff Kibble, Conservative, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

They can be shipped out of the country and taken away.

[Christopher Hernandez-Roy]

Well, Canadian authorities could do something about that, under—

[Jeff Kibble, Conservative, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

Do you feel it would be important to control the flow of these critical minerals out of Canada to potential adversaries or other countries?

[Christopher Hernandez-Roy]

I think the export and import—in this case, the export—of minerals and other commodities that are sensitive for national defence should absolutely be reviewed, yes.

[The Chair, Liberal, Charles Sousa]

Thank you, Mr. Kibble.

Ms. Lapointe, we will go over to you for six minutes.

[Viviane LaPointe, Liberal, Sudbury, ON]

Thank you, Chair.

Dr. Byers, I would like to ask you some questions related to your expertise in Arctic sovereignty and security.

How does the growing interest in Arctic resources, including critical minerals and rare earth elements, affect Canada's sovereignty and security considerations in the north?