Evidence of meeting #26 for National Defence in the 45th Parliament, 1st session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was mineral.
A recording is available from Parliament.
Liberal
Bloc
Simon-Pierre Savard-Tremblay Bloc Saint-Hyacinthe—Bagot—Acton, QC
Mr. Chair, I would like to ask a quick question regarding the presence of cameras.
Who were all these people?
Bloc
Simon-Pierre Savard-Tremblay Bloc Saint-Hyacinthe—Bagot—Acton, QC
There were about four or five photographers, but they’ve just left.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Charles Sousa
It's my impression that these were members of the media who chose to come this morning.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Charles Sousa
That happens. I just came from Washington and its congressional meetings, and Monsieur Savard-Tremblay, it's quite a spectacle to see congressional meetings.
The media is everywhere. The media was advised—
Bloc
Simon-Pierre Savard-Tremblay Bloc Saint-Hyacinthe—Bagot—Acton, QC
Yes, of course, Mr. Chair, but we are a little less used to this in our committees.
You must be big stars, gentlemen.
Bloc
Simon-Pierre Savard-Tremblay Bloc Saint-Hyacinthe—Bagot—Acton, QC
That’s fine; I made my contribution over the last weeks.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Charles Sousa
Welcome to meeting number 26 of the House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence.
Before we begin, I want to give you a quick outline of some of the things that will be happening in the coming weeks.
As you know, on Wednesday, we will not have the PBO. In his absence, we'll try to do a threat analysis on the Iran conflict. I'll have more details in the coming hours and days with respect to that. It would be a very timely event for Wednesday.
There's also a Portuguese delegation. The naval commander and his individuals will be coming. They would like to have an informal meeting on Tuesday, March 24, at 10 a.m. The clerk is trying to organize some of the deliberations with regard to their engagement with NATO and Atlantic security.
On Wednesday, March 25, the Minister of National Defence will appear on the supplementary estimates (C), and Mr. Guzman will now appear on April 13 to make up for the fact that he wasn't here previously.
Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2) and the motion adopted by the committee on Tuesday, September 16, 2025, the committee is meeting to resume its consideration of the nexus between national defence, national security and the critical minerals sector.
Today's meeting is taking place in a hybrid format, pursuant to the Standing Orders. Members are attending in person and remotely using the Zoom application.
Before we continue, I ask participants to consult the guidelines on the table. These measures are to help prevent audio and feedback incidents and to protect the health and safety of our interpreters.
I'd like to remind witnesses and members to please wait until I recognize you by name before speaking. If you wish to speak, please raise your hand. For members on Zoom, please use the “raise hand” function. The clerk and I will manage the speaking order as best we can.
For interpretation, use your earpiece and select the appropriate channel: floor, English or French. That's also available on Zoom. All comments should be addressed through the chair.
I'd now like to welcome our witnesses. I'm going to start with you, Nadia, because I'm not going to do your name justice. I have a tendency to do that in this committee, and I apologize from the outset.
We have Nadia Mykytczuk, executive director of the Goodman School of Mines, Laurentian University; Heather Exner-Pirot, director of energy, natural resources and environment, Macdonald-Laurier Institute; and Sean Boyd, chair of the board, Agnico Eagle Mines Limited.
Welcome to the three of you, and thank you for being available to us via the virtual system.
With us here live are Jim Balsillie, founder, Centre for International Governance Innovation; and Rodrigue Turgeon, national program colead, MiningWatch Canada.
I'm going to give all of you five minutes for your opening statements. That will take a good half an hour of our time. It we stick to that timeline, we'll get through them quickly. I know members would like to ask questions and have a dialogue and interaction with all of you.
Nadia, I will proceed with you first.
Nadia Mykytczuk Executive Director, Goodman School of Mines, Laurentian University
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Hello. Aanii. Good morning to everyone. Thanks to the members of the committee for this opportunity to appear today.
As the chair said, I'm Dr. Nadia Mykytczuk, executive director of the Goodman School of Mines at Laurentian University. I'm also the president and CEO of MIRARCO Mining Innovation, and I hold an NOHFC industrial research chair in biomining and bioremediation. I'm based in Sudbury, Ontario, one of Canada's historic mining regions and a global centre of mining innovation. My remarks today focus on the relationship between critical minerals, research capacity and Canada's long-term defence sovereignty.
I'd like to start with one point: Canada's defence sovereignty is inseparable from its mineral sovereignty. Modern defence systems are fundamentally materials-dependent. Advanced communications systems, aerospace sensors, autonomous systems and electrified military infrastructure all rely on secure access to critical minerals such as nickel, copper, cobalt and rare earth elements.
Canada is very fortunate to possess significant mineral resources. However, the real strategic vulnerability today is not our geology; it is our processing capacity and supply chain dependence. In many cases, Canadian minerals are exported for refining and upgrading abroad before returning as inputs into advanced technologies. This reliance on foreign-controlled processing exposes Canada and our allies to supply disruption, export controls and geopolitical pressure.
Canada's defence industrial strategy recognizes that securing supply chains is key for inputs of critical minerals and essential to operational readiness and sovereignty. Put simply, geology alone does not provide security. Domestic processing capability and innovative, integrated supply chains do.
One of the most immediate opportunities to strengthen the capability lies in Canada's legacy mine waste. Across the country, more than 10,000 historical mine waste and tailings deposits contain recoverable concentrations of nickel, copper, cobalt, rare earth elements and others. These deposits represent significant elemental reserves. In Sudbury alone, for example, legacy tailings are estimated to contain 8 billion to 10 billion dollars' worth of nickel, and it is similar for copper and cobalt.
Mine waste valorization offers several strategic advantages. First, it can provide near-term domestic sources of critical minerals. Second, these projects should have shorter permitting timelines and lower capital costs compared to new greenfield mines. Third, when paired with emerging technologies, such as biomining or other low-energy recovery methods, it can reduce energy intensity while also advancing environmental remediation and reducing long-term impacts. From a national security perspective, mine waste should therefore be reframed as a latent strategic mineral reserve available for near-term development.
Canada has begun recognizing this opportunity through initiatives such as Natural Resources Canada's mining value from waste program. However, to fully realize this potential, we need to accelerate the national tailings database, resource evaluation, processing technologies and domestic mineral upgrading capacity.
This brings me to the role of research in universities. Recovering minerals from tailings is not straightforward. These materials do not behave like primary ore bodies. Each deposit requires tailored processing approaches and piloting scale-up. This is where Canada's research ecosystem becomes critical.
Canada has a strong and growing capability in metallurgy, mineral characterization, AI applied to process optimization, technologies such as biomining, and cold region mining systems. These areas intersect directly with defence priorities related to supply chain resilience, advanced materials and energy security.
Universities and colleges, of course, are foundational to this capability. We conduct the discovery research that underpins new mineral recovery technologies. We train the engineers, metallurgists, material scientists and skilled trades required for sovereign capability. We operate piloting facilities, like those that I've built at Laurentian and MIRARCO in Sudbury, that can help move technologies from lab discovery to industrial deployment. A strong defence industrial base is therefore built not only on factories, laboratories and piloting facilities, but also on classrooms.
At Laurentian University, for example, we recently launched the minerals and mining strategy, which is designed to strengthen our role as Canada's mining university during a period of geopolitical change and rising demand for critical minerals. Many of the initiatives we've outlined in that strategy, from mineral processing and advanced materials to automation and battery technologies, align specifically with emerging defence priorities.
In closing, I would humbly like to offer six recommendations for consideration.
First, recognize mineral processing and recovery as sovereign defence capabilities.
Second, treat mine waste valorization as a strategic reserve strategy.
Third, embed mineral and materials expertise within defence research advisory structures.
Fourth, invest in secure university and applied research infrastructure supporting defence-relevant mineral innovation.
Fifth, align critical minerals workforce development with the Canada defence skills agenda.
Sixth, ensure Canadian intellectual property arising from mineral innovation is protected within procurement and commercialization frameworks.
Canada has the mineral endowment, the research capacity and the industrial expertise to strengthen allied critical mineral supply chains. The opportunity now is to connect those strengths into a coherent strategy that supports economic prosperity, environmental sustainability and national security.
With that, I close my statement. Thank you.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Charles Sousa
Thank you, Madam Mykytczuk. I appreciate that.
I'm going to alternate between those who are virtual and those who are here live, so I'm going now to Monsieur Rodrigue Turgeon.
You have up to five minutes, please.
Rodrigue Turgeon Lawyer, National program Co-Lead, MiningWatch Canada
Mr. Chair and member of Parliament for Mississauga—Lakeshore, vice-Chairs, honourable members of Parliament, members of the committee; Mr. Clerk and members of your team, good morning. Thank you for having me.
My name is Rodrigue Turgeon. I am a lawyer and co-spokesperson and co-director of the national program at Mining Watch Canada.
Founded in 1999, Mining Watch Canada brings together 25 organizations which, collectively, represent several hundred thousand people across the country. The environment, human rights, indigenous rights, transparency and accountability of Canadian mining companies, both in Canada and abroad; for the past 27 years, our mission has centred on all these issues, at both the community and public policy levels.
As international institutions erode and Canada finds itself on the front line between three geopolitical powers—China, the United States and Russia—many voices are calling for the country to exercise greater control over the mineral resources within its territory. Taken to their extreme, these fears raise the possibility that foreign states might use Canada’s so-called critical minerals for economic, industrial or military purposes in a manner hostile to the country’s security and sovereignty.
The strategies of the Canadian and provincial governments regarding so-called critical minerals all relate to the purely economic issue of supply chains. Indeed, contrary to what industry and governments would have the public believe, it is by no means mandatory that these mineral substances be used for the energy transition. However, despite the security threats that have been cited for several years, we find virtually nothing in previous and recent bills tabled in the country that would give the authorities greater leverage regarding access to and control over minerals.
At present, we observe that governments seem more concerned about scaring off foreign investors or raising trade barriers than about foreign states using minerals extracted from Canadian soil against them. Paradoxically, we are even seeing a very high level of collaboration between the Government of Canada and that of the United States, including the Department of War, in the joint development, within the country, of numerous mining projects deemed critical or of national importance, and we are witnessing a diplomatic rapprochement between the Government of Canada and China.
To ensure consistency with its strategy, the Government of Canada should clearly communicate its position to the public regarding its tolerance or refusal to allow each foreign country access to the country’s critical minerals. It should then act in accordance with its position, by avoiding collaboration with foreign entities hostile to Canada’s actual security, by denying them access to so-called critical minerals and, at the very least, by avoiding expediting the issuance of authorizations to such entities.
Under no circumstances must the country’s minerals be used for the creation or proliferation of weapons used in violation of international law, including in acts of genocide, whether employed by the country itself or by a third state.
One thing is certain: further damage to the environment, the rights of indigenous peoples and local communities is to be expected if Canada insists on increasing mining production for military, national security or national defence purposes.
Across Canada and internationally, Canada and its provinces claim to stand out for their ability to produce minerals that are not only critical but also responsibly sourced. We do not agree with this vision. Governments should enshrine the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in mining laws, recognize that clean air and clean water are vital to Canada’s national security, and focus their efforts on achieving mineral sobriety across all minerals and sectors, including national defence. In other words, Canada’s overconsumption of minerals must be reduced.
There is a cost to rushing through authorizations for mining projects. This opens the door to bad projects, which are dangerous for the safety of workers, indigenous peoples, local communities and the environment. The Government of Canada must also close the door to seabed mining for military or other purposes. The national defence strategy regarding minerals referred to as critical must not rely in any way on the use of nuclear energy.
Like a large segment of civil society, we condemn the diversion of funds and efforts intended for the energy transition. The climate emergency is not merely a vague geopolitical threat, but a real danger to national security. We cannot negotiate peace with nature.
Thank you for your attention and for considering our recommendations and our brief on the nexus between critical minerals, national security and national defence.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Charles Sousa
Thank you, Mr. Turgeon.
I appreciate that.
I will now go back to our virtual panel.
Heather Exner-Pirot, it's over to you for five minutes.
Heather Exner-Pirot Director, Energy, Natural Resources and Environment, Macdonald-Laurier Institute
Thank you, Chair and committee members, for the opportunity to speak to you today.
When we first started talking about and prioritizing critical minerals—probably around 2019—it was largely in the context of the energy transition and the need for minerals to replace fossil fuels. Following the COVID-19 pandemic, the Russian invasion of Ukraine and American concerns with Chinese rivalry, the policy focus has recently turned to critical minerals' roles in defence supply chains. After a late start, I would say that the G7 and western nations, including Canada, are starting to take the issue seriously, and some advances are being made, but this attention has also served to reveal how serious and complex the issue is.
I want to make a few points in my opening remarks to kick off the discussion.
First is how we define critical minerals. There is a clear distinction among minerals that are important to the economy and trade, minerals that are important to electrification and minerals that are essential to defence and industrial processes but have been intentionally monopolized by China. I think the focus of defence policy should be to intervene in markets for niche products that the free market can't or won't resolve on its own because the market has been manipulated. I don't think that's nickel and lithium. I think that's gallium, germanium, graphite and rare earths.
Second is the issue of stockpiles. The issue is getting thrown around without much thought or sophistication. It's obvious that stockpiles are not the solution for most critical minerals. A stockpile would disrupt normal market functions, be too expensive to manage or be too logistically difficult, or we would be stockpiling a resource that we don't have the capability to process and refine. I think the processing and refining capacity issue is much more difficult and should be the focus of coordination with allies, in coordination with manufacturers and processors. I expect those conversations are happening behind the scenes, but it would be good to bring more political attention to them.
I want to highlight one more issue. Canada excels at resource extraction, and we have ample supplies. This would be enormously helpful in the case of a protracted conflict with an adversary, as we have latent capacity to supply raw materials into NATO defence supply chains.
We have lost much of our expertise and knowledge in how to translate raw materials into energetics, munitions and products needed for weapons. Some of this is a result of ideological preferences over the last two or three decades that have shunned research for military purposes. As I understand it, we have lost internal government capability in defence labs and have precluded NSERC funding for research focused on offensive military technology.
I bring this up because the new defence industrial strategy specifically mentions nitrocellulose, which is a by-product of forestry that is essential for energetics. We need to translate raw materials into something useful for weapons, and I suspect we have lost much of that technical ability. As much as we are focused on the value-add for raw materials in the broader economy, we need to ensure we have more value-add capability in Canada in defence supply chains.
Finally, I will point out that much of China's dominance in critical minerals has come from its willingness over the last decade to invest in the supply chain counter-cyclically. That has allowed it to take much more market share, and our reliance on private investment and the free market has meant we've been largely on the sidelines. We are now in the upswing of the commodity cycle. Some shortages and scarcity will now be resolved by the market, so I think we need to focus our scarce resources on those few goods that won't be. I would say that the NATO critical minerals list and the China export restrictions list point us in the right direction.
Thank you for your attention. I look forward to questions.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Charles Sousa
Thank you very much.
I'll turn it over now to Mr. Balsillie. You have up to five minutes, sir.
Jim Balsillie Founder, Centre for International Governance Innovation, As an Individual
Thank you for the invitation to appear today.
Your study is important and timely. I encourage you to also include economic considerations in this nexus, because the economy and our security are two sides of the same coin.
Canada's policy thinking remains rooted in the 1970s, in an economy that no longer exists, which has caused a systemic erosion of our prosperity and productivity over the past 35 years. Recent strategic actions of leverage against Canada by multiple large nation-states have laid bare that our sovereignty and security were concurrently eroding over the same period because of this outdated thinking.
The digital transformation over the past 35 years has created a new kind of economy in which wealth, power and security are rooted in the ownership of intangible assets of IP and data AI. These assets behave differently in the market than tangible goods do and require different strategies. As shown in appendix 1, they have grown to dominate, making up over 92% of the S&P 500's $55-trillion total value.
As summarized in appendix 2, the tangible and intangible economies operate in opposite ways, with the intangible economy of negative rights and economic rents governed by domestic and international frameworks that are constantly changing to create winners and losers, thus incenting strategic behaviour, including leverage.
In the ensuing appendices, I will summarize the examples I present where the U.S., the EU and China have developed sophisticated capacity and strategies to utilize these legal frameworks to advance their prosperity and security via value-added products and process technologies in the realms of defence and critical minerals. Then I'll conclude with what Canada needs to do urgently.
In appendix 3, I list examples of how in 2025, the U.S. advanced their interests via legal frameworks such as their AI white paper, the GENIUS Act for tokenization, an array of tariffs and the flexing of IP march-in rights.
In appendix 4, I summarize how the U.S. national security strategy integrated these into one document, illuminating the role of strategic standards, adding resource security, including critical minerals and doing much more.
In appendix 5, I show that while we are aware of the recent high-profile U.S. exit from 66 international organizations, they doubled down their participation in three international standards organizations that govern value chains for advanced products and process technologies for critical mineral and defence sectors and for many other sectors as well.
In appendix 6, I note how the U.S. patent office concurrently created a working group to create more patents from their SMEs and insert them into global standard organizations and, by extension, into global value chains, all to lock in and profitably grow their companies.
Appendices 7 and 8 illuminate aggressive U.S. tokenization strategies for both financial and real-world assets, including critical minerals and mines.
Appendix 9 summarizes how the EU uses standards, particularly via CEN-CENELEC, for the value chains for defence and critical minerals, just as the U.S. and China do.
Appendices 10 and 11 show soaring granting of patents for mining, defence and AI, with Canada essentially absent.
Appendix 12 summarizes how China has strategically built dominance in critical mineral value chains of processing, patents and standards alongside traditional supply chains of mines.
As you can see, Canada requires a wholesale reorientation of how a sovereign nation must be governed in the 21st-century economy if we want greater global scale from our promising companies and gifted entrepreneurs. The strategies I have identified today are all “and” strategies, not “or” strategies, when it comes to capitalizing our natural resources, but they are technical and require expertise. Absent these updated approaches, Canada will again not achieve better outcomes for Canadians. The November federal budget and the recent defence industrial strategy were missed opportunities to reorient away from the failed approaches of the past.
I will close with a quote from an expert in an article stating that in this modern economy, FDI should not be an article of faith, because without shrewd insertion into value chains of intangibles, a “country can host large foreign-owned production facilities and impressive export volumes while capturing only a thin slice of the value created.”
Thank you. I look forward to your questions.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Charles Sousa
Thank you, Mr. Balsillie.
Members, I know of the report that Mr. Balsillie is speaking of, and the appendices have been distributed to the clerk. They're being translated for our purposes, but I think some of you have received them courtesy of Mr. Balsillie.
I think you brought a few hard copies, Mr. Balsillie.
Monsieur Savard-Tremblay, I'm not sure if you have a copy, but we are going to get it translated as well.
Our last witness, for five minutes, is Mr. Sean Boyd.
It's over to you, sir.
Sean Boyd Chair, Board of Directors, Agnico Eagle Mines Limited
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
My name is Sean Boyd. I'm the chair of the board of Agnico Eagle Mines Limited.
On behalf of Agnico Eagle, it's my pleasure to speak to the standing committee today on a topic that we all know is of great importance to Canada. It's one where Agnico Eagle, given our long history and expertise in mining, feels that we can be of service to the Government of Canada.
I'll focus my remarks today on three areas where we can provide some guidance to the committee.
The first is on the defence industrial strategy, particularly in the Arctic. It's nice to see a comprehensive strategy, but we feel that the emphasis, when we talk about sovereignty, needs to start with socio-economic benefits and support in communities. Strong communities are strong sovereignty.
We have some thoughts on incentives to promote defence mineral production in Canada, not only from our long experience in mining in Canada, but also from our newly created, wholly owned subsidiary, Avenir Minerals, which has a focus on critical and strategic minerals and metals in Canada. I will also talk about the potential alignment between Canadian mining companies, particularly those operating in the north, and the federal government, with opportunities for collaboration and partnership. We have specific examples on this.
It's important to have a strategy, but it's also important to ensure that we get effective and efficient execution of that strategy. That's where mining companies come in with experience and skills, particularly in the north, working with the government to achieve the objectives.
We have to remember that mining is a tough business. We're often governed by nature and economics. We can't put deposits where we'd like them to be. There's a lot of work to do, but we still see tremendous opportunity.
Agnico Eagle is Canada's largest mining company. We've grown from a very small company to be the second-largest gold producer in the world. We've done it with 85% of our business based in Canada, and we have 14,000 employees. We have seven mines in Ontario, Quebec and Nunavut. We produce more than half of Canada's gold, which was Canada's second-largest export in 2025.
We're one of the largest corporate taxpayers in Canada, at $2.7 billion. That number will be higher in 2026. We're also the largest payer in the country to indigenous groups under benefit agreements, at over $200 million. We expect that number to rise significantly in 2026.
We're deeply committed to Canada's north. We have two mines in Nunavut, including the Meadowbank complex and Meliadine in the Kivalliq region. The Hope Bay project is on our northern coast. Since 2007, which is almost 20 years ago, we've invested over $10 billion in Nunavut. We're currently roughly 22% of the GDP of Nunavut. We have 400 Inuit employees among 4,000 employees in Nunavut. That's a significant contributor to their economies.
In 2021, following the Government of Canada's decision to block its sale to a Chinese firm, Agnico Eagle purchased the Hope Bay mine on Canada's northern coast. Since that time, we've invested over $1 billion at the site. We now have a plan to redevelop and reopen this mine with the support of the Kitikmeot Inuit Association, along with an investment by Agnico Eagle of over $2 billion. We plan to announce the go-ahead on this project in the spring.
Hope Bay is an interesting project, given the time and moment we're in as a country. Although it's not on the major projects list, the timing of moving it forward and the significant investment in the Northwest Passage really send a strong signal to our allies and adversaries about Canada's assertion of sovereignty in the Arctic. It drives national economic growth. It strengthens and sustains northern communities. It develops significant and important infrastructure for the north. It creates meaningful employment and high-paying jobs, and it advances indigenous economic reconciliation. It's an important project that forms the basis of continued investment by Agnico in Canada's north, in partnership with communities and in partnership with the government.
As we all know, Russia has spent considerably more on infrastructure in the Arctic than any other Arctic nation. It has 17 deepwater ports, while Canada has none. Canada is a frontline NATO country, sharing the largest maritime border in the world with Russia, meaning we have a sizable commitment for collective security. Really, there's no time to waste on this.
The Arctic region presents Canada with an opportunity to contribute to national and collective security in a way that is uniquely Canadian and can suit our national identity, and it provides an opportunity to the federal government to demonstrate not only to the world but to Canadians the importance of the north in our future. A great start is Canada's defence industrial strategy, which places a significant emphasis on Canada's north and the Arctic and on the need to provide sovereignty in this vital region, but as we say, it all depends on effective and efficient execution.
Building mines, when you do it properly, is really about building community. When it's done in the north, it's also about building the nation. To ensure its success and wide support, Canada's approach to Arctic defence must be part of a broader socio-economic strategy that understands sovereignty as being fundamentally about people, communities, the strength of communities and the opportunities that exist in communities.
One of the keys to ensuring strong communities is education. With one-third of its 40,000 people under the age of 15, Nunavut is home to Canada's youngest population. At the same time, Nunavut has the lowest high school graduation rates, with a completion rate of only about 50% resulting in only about 300 high school graduates per year across the entire territory. Obviously, when you think about investments in mining, along with investments in defence and community infrastructure, we're going to need a lot more highly skilled workers to allow us to efficiently execute them.
I'll put this into context. As I mentioned—
Chair, Board of Directors, Agnico Eagle Mines Limited
When you look at $10 billion of Agnico spending since 2007, with plans to spend multiples of that over the next several years, the key to making this work is the coordination of the strategy with an effective procurement of skills, as well as skills training and development.
Thank you for the opportunity.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Charles Sousa
Thank you very much.
We all appreciate the witnesses being here before us.
We're going to start our first round of questions with Mr. Anderson.
It's over to you for six minutes, sir.
Conservative
Scott Anderson Conservative Vernon—Lake Country—Monashee, BC
Thank you very much.
This question is for Dr. Exner-Pirot, but I'd like Mr. Balsillie and Mr. Boyd to answer it as well.
We've talked a lot about sovereignty. Critical to sovereignty is the actual ownership of the materials. Pierre Poilievre has talked a lot about using those materials as leverage as a middle power. We don't have a lot of hard power, but we have some soft power, and we can use that as leverage.
With respect to critical and rare earth minerals, my primary concern is the monitoring of foreign ownership. Is the current 20% to 25% threshold that triggers a review sufficient?
Would you answer that, Mr. Balsillie?