National Defence Committee on Sept. 18th, 2025

[Simon-Pierre Savard-Tremblay, Bloc, Saint-Hyacinthe—Bagot—Acton, QC]

I have only two and a half minutes. My goodness, it will go quickly. It's just enough time to say hello, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Laporte, earlier, when you were interrupted, I sensed that you had something to add. I remind you that we were talking about sanctions leading to a strengthening of the Euro-Asian bloc—that is to say the relationship between Russia and China—and about India circumventing sanctions by supplying Europe with oil and gas.

Did you have anything to add on that?

[Eric Laporte]

No.

[Simon-Pierre Savard-Tremblay, Bloc, Saint-Hyacinthe—Bagot—Acton, QC]

I would still like to continue the conversation on this topic, which is the connection between the Euro-Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific, namely geostrategic strengthening. However, this may concern you more than the witnesses from the Department of National Defence.

How do you view the geostrategic strengthening of this bloc? We know that relations between India and Russia are extremely complex, if not cold. We saw it again at the BRICS+ meeting last week or two weeks ago. In any case, it's very recent. We saw that Mr. Modi was there at the beginning of the meeting and then left rather quickly.

In addition to the economic strengthening of this bloc, are there any concrete results in terms of military co-operation? When it comes to economic strengthening, we're talking about an alternative currency, among other things. However, are there any signals from a military standpoint?

[Eric Laporte]

I can start, and then I'll turn it over to the general.

Thank you for your question.

As you pointed out and as was mentioned earlier, we are really seeing this strengthening of co-operation, especially between China, Russia, Iran and North Korea. It is intensifying, but at the same time, these four countries still have their own agendas. So it's not an alliance as such, but there's a lot more coordination and co-operation among them. Separately, they have hybrid campaigns, sabotage and espionage programs, and attempts to influence the west and to undermine the status quo everywhere against our allies.

In terms of military co-operation, as we've seen, North Korea is contributing significantly to the conflict in Ukraine, but so is Iran, with Shahed drones and so on. There's increased co-operation.

I'll turn it over to General Ritchie.

[The Chair, Liberal, Charles Sousa]

Thank you.

We'll continue on to the next panel.

[Simon-Pierre Savard-Tremblay, Bloc, Saint-Hyacinthe—Bagot—Acton, QC]

In any case, it seems that the next panel of witnesses will really focus on that.

[The Chair, Liberal, Charles Sousa]

We'll now move on to the topic of panel two, which is defence and security to the Indo-Pacific region.

I would now like to invite the officials of DND to deliver their opening remarks. You have five minutes, but if you want to spare a few, that would be great.

[Ty Curran]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Given that we've covered some of these issues, I will condense my remarks as much as possible.

As we were just speaking about with the vice-chair, these are two important topics to discuss together, because Indo-Pacific security and Euro-Atlantic security are interconnected. Australia, Japan, New Zealand and the Republic of Korea are all NATO partner countries in the region, and our security in the Indo-Pacific directly impacts our security in Europe and here at home.

China, as we've already discussed, remains a critical enabler of Russia's war in Ukraine, and military co-operation between North Korea and Russia has deepened, spanning personnel, as General Ritchie raised, but also military tactics, training and, importantly, the transfer of technology.

Because our Arctic region straddles Europe and the Pacific, both regions remain crucial for our national security and economic prosperity.

The Indo-Pacific region faces many challenges: the rise of authoritarian powers threatening democratic norms and principles; diplomatic, economic and military coercion; the weaponization of trade; and the undermining of human rights and media freedom.

Notably, we see China attempting to reshape the international system to create an environment more permissible to its interests. We remain particularly concerned by China’s efforts to further militarize the South China Sea, including the use of naval, coast guard and maritime militia vessels to intimidate and threaten the ships of other states.

These activities challenge long-standing norms and international law and affect the rights of all nations to operate peacefully in international commons, whether at sea or in the air.

I'll speak briefly to our Indo-Pacific strategy and our current operations and then open up to questions.

All of this work is achieved through Canada's broader Indo-Pacific strategy, led by the Department of Foreign Affairs, and through the development of defence industrial policies that aim to strengthen, secure and diversify Canada's defence industrial base.

From deploying three Canadian navy ships to the region per year to taking part in Exercise Talisman Sabre 25 recently, which was the largest CAF deployment in a strategic multilateral exercise, the Department of National Defence continues to deliver our part of the Indo-Pacific strategy.

In particular, through Operation Horizon, which is the primary vehicle for our work in the region, we do things such as our routine transits through the Taiwan Strait, maintaining the peaceful and accessible nature of this waterway, which is indispensable to the security and prosperity of the international community.

We also work through Operation Neon, which continues to monitor United Nations Security Council resolutions against Korea. We maintain our long-standing support for the United Nations Command and the importance of denuclearization and the promotion of peace on the Korean peninsula.

This isn't something we can do alone. We have to work very closely with our partners, and it's through that work, I think, that we can continue to promote the values and the important security priorities we find within the region that have direct impacts on our work here at home.

With that, we welcome your questions.

[The Chair, Liberal, Charles Sousa]

Thank you for the opening remarks.

Ms. Cheryl Gallant, we'll go over to you. You have five minutes.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Algonquin—Renfrew—Pembroke, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Earlier this year, China's navy circumnavigated Australia and performed unannounced live fire exercises outside of its exclusive economic zone. Australia only knew of this because a commercial pilot flying overhead detected them first, before their navy or any other allied navies could.

What is the threat to Canada and North America, should China decide to pull a similar operation by covertly deploying off our shores with their navy or their dual-purpose vessels?

[Robert Ritchie]

First, I'll give some quick context.

Indeed, Australia and New Zealand were involved in that operation in February 2025. It was the first time ever that a Chinese naval task group circumnavigated Australia and conducted a live-fire exercise in the Tasman Sea between Australia and New Zealand. All nations in that region, as well as allies, are continuing to professionalize their all-domain sense capability from sea floor to space.

You did identify the dual-purpose vessels. They are problematic. We continue to work across government with all departments and agencies as well as all their sensors to be able to monitor such vessels. We continue to do that in our own Arctic.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Algonquin—Renfrew—Pembroke, ON]

How would our navy respond to an intrusion of the PLA Navy if they were to intrude in Canada's exclusive economic zone off our Pacific coast or in the Arctic?

[Robert Ritchie]

One of the missions of the binational command that is NORAD, of which we are a proud member, is maritime domain awareness. It's an integrated mission set around continental surveillance in the maritime domain. We have response capability in the Royal Canadian Navy as well as in the Canadian Coast Guard surveillance, and a range of other effectors within Department of National Defence and the Government of Canada, for a calibrated response.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Algonquin—Renfrew—Pembroke, ON]

Upon China's invasion of Taiwan, how prepared are our armed forces to mount a massive operation to evacuate our Canadian citizens, permanent residents or those with connections to Canada to repatriate them?

[Robert Ritchie]

I'll speak to Canadian Armed Forces' global readiness, and I may defer to colleagues if there are any policy components.

We do maintain the standing capability to conduct a non-combatant evacuation operation, should such a request come from Global Affairs Canada.

That said, this is a unique environment, and if we're talking about the aftermath of hostilities breaking out on the island, the current force that's postured would certainly not be suitable for that conflict. We are monitoring the different ranges of ambition of Beijing for a potential unification with Taiwan, and I can speak about that if there is interest.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Algonquin—Renfrew—Pembroke, ON]

Okay. Well, it's no secret that the PRC is trying to claim ownership of the Arctic territory. They've already set up shop, claiming they're doing research. Besides the Rangers, what actual military base has been established in our Arctic? Is Canada working on making Inuvik a full forward operating location, with all the necessary infrastructure?

[Robert Ritchie]

First, we do have a permanent presence in the Arctic that's based on 5,000 Canadian Rangers in 200 communities across the three territories. We also have Canadian Forces Station Alert. We also have 440 Squadron in Yellowknife. Then we have an army presence with the Loyal Edmonton Regiment, also in Yellowknife.

To your question, we had previously maintained three forward operating locations in Yellowknife, Inuvik and Iqaluit. Those three locations are being professionalized through the northern basing initiative. They also happen to have a correlation with our northern operational support hubs.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Algonquin—Renfrew—Pembroke, ON]

Where are you in your upgrades? What progress is there in the forward operating locations?

[Robert Ritchie]

That work is ongoing. The forward operating bases are proceeding ahead of the northern operational support hubs, but the first three northern operational support hubs are co-located—to your question regarding the forward operating location—because there are great synergies for those to occur in the same locations.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Algonquin—Renfrew—Pembroke, ON]

Under what conditions would the Royal Canadian Navy participate in the defence of Japan, the Philippines or Australia, should the PRC mount an attack against any one or all of those countries?

[Eric Laporte]

Obviously, we work very closely with our allies and consult and exercise on a regular basis, and the Royal Canadian Navy takes part in that.

Again, in the event of a Taiwan scenario or anything else, those are contingency or hypothetical at this time, and I'm not prepared to answer questions in terms of what Canada would or could do in those circumstances. Those discussions are certainly ongoing, but I don't want to prejudge any government decision.

[The Chair, Liberal, Charles Sousa]

Thank you. The time is up for Ms. Gallant.

I shouldn't say that. Time has only just begun.

It's over to you, Ms. Lapointe. You have five minutes.

[Viviane LaPointe, Liberal, Sudbury, ON]

Thank you.

Major-General, recently the world, certainly from the western perspective, watched with some trepidation when China's president hosted Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong Un at a major military parade. Much has been said about that, but I would be very interested in hearing, from your perspective, what the strategic significance is of this trilateral show of alignment and how Canada and its allies should interpret the signals it sends for global security, particularly in the Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic regions.

[Robert Ritchie]

What is clear is that those adversaries have a common intention, and that is to challenge the west and the current rules-based international order. We have been watching this for some time with great interest, alongside our allies, as we share in the classified domain.

On September 3, we assessed that to be a parade showing solidarity and demonstration, but we do not see the sophisticated level of co-operation that might be enjoyed right now alongside NATO partners. We are carefully watching certain areas where they're transferring technology, resources and drone capability as new and accelerating threats that can present challenges to both NATO and Canada on the continent.

[Viviane LaPointe, Liberal, Sudbury, ON]

Thank you.

Mr. Curran, you mentioned Operation Horizon. Could you explain the strategic objectives of that operation and how it fits with Canada's defence policy framework, particularly “Strong, Secure, Engaged”?