National Defence Committee on May 6th, 2026

[Robert Huebert]

This is my critique. We come back to the fact that we substitute numbers for what we really should be asking, which is, how does this allow Canada to deter and how does it allow Canada to fight?

We think in terms of the 2% of GDP. We say that we need to make it. That's a magical number. Let's face it: We've copied our European allies and we've had some very inventive accounting to make sure that we're at the 2%, but it doesn't address the issue. Does that 2% or does the effort that we have allow us to properly fight?

When we say 70% or 40%, the question in my mind is, how does this actually ensure that the men and women of the forces get the proper equipment so that we can deter our enemies and, if that breaks down, that we can have the ability to fight?

The numbers come in...because how else do you normalize it? How do you state that in a document? That's always a challenge we face. I think that's one of the major shortfalls. It then leads to the underlining assumption of your question, which I think is so important. How do you ensure that this policy, with whatever shortfalls it has, is an ongoing element of how we respond to this possibility of war?

That becomes much more critically important than having a single document that presumably says it all, just as the shipbuilding strategy had presumably said it all. Then again, here we are again. We've created, again, the perfect storm of building everything all at once, which means we are going to replicate exactly what the shipbuilding strategy said that we shouldn't—but at least we're getting the ships.

[The Chair, Liberal, Charles Sousa]

Dr. Huebert, thank you very much. The time is over. I'm sorry.

I'm going to Mr. Anderson.

You have five minutes, sir.

[Scott Anderson, Conservative, Vernon—Lake Country—Monashee, BC]

Thank you very much. All my questions will be through you.

Dr. Huebert, every single academic we've talked to uses the term “war”. Sometimes they use it in terms of prekinetic. Sometimes they use “grey zone”.

Can you underscore the urgency we're in right now?

[Robert Huebert]

The urgency is here.

We have pretended that the so-called Fukuyama theory, which said that at the end of history, conflict and war would not be utilized as a means of achieving objectives...was over. The reality is that from 2000 onward, it is very easy to trace how we and our adversaries have utilized force to achieve political objectives. We also have the environment where we have this great power competition. It's the Thucydides trap. Everyone loves Thucydides now.

The reality is that we are seeing increasing successes in which authoritative states are able to utilize it, which then encourages them. Russia was able to prevent Georgia from joining NATO and the EU. Russia was able to at least stop the progression of a more democratic system within Ukraine. The United States has been able to change the geopolitics of Venezuela. We still have to see what happens in terms of Iran.

[Scott Anderson, Conservative, Vernon—Lake Country—Monashee, BC]

Dr. Shimooka, can you answer the same question, please, very quickly?

[Richard Shimooka]

In the past week, we have watched Russia's efforts toward the Baltics once again, which included utilizing captured Ukrainian drones, apparently. I would point to the continual use of drones across Europe against airports. I would look at the People's Republic of China. According to the latest American intelligence estimates, they are increasing their strategic missile capacity fivefold. That directly impacts NORAD—

[Scott Anderson, Conservative, Vernon—Lake Country—Monashee, BC]

You're saying there is, in fact, an urgency.

[Richard Shimooka]

There's not just an urgency. We should have been looking at a modernization and rearmament of our military since 2016 or 2017 or so. We've basically spent the past decade or so not doing that.

[Scott Anderson, Conservative, Vernon—Lake Country—Monashee, BC]

Dr. Huebert, the current U.S. administration will be gone in two years, but the United States will not be gone in two years. Is Canada, right now, embarking on a strategy that is structural and that will make it very hard for the next U.S. administration to repair and restore relations with Canada?

[Robert Huebert]

I don't think it will.

The point you made is critically important and demonstrates the difficulty we have. The threat the Trump administration is providing in terms of economic insecurity.... His threats and rhetoric are all real. The threats we face from Russia and China are much longer-term. We also have to work with the Americans.

I think this is what's going to happen. From a political perspective, it will be very difficult for whatever Republican or Democratic government comes after Trump, but geopolitics mean we are going to have to work together if we have any realistic hope of being able to maintain deterrence. It means repairing all the damage Trump has done vis-à-vis NATO—and NORAD, for that matter—and getting our minds back to where the real threat is coming from in the long term.

[Scott Anderson, Conservative, Vernon—Lake Country—Monashee, BC]

Thank you.

Dr. Shimooka, could you answer the same question, please?

[Richard Shimooka]

We're looking at mid-terms, in a couple of months, that will create immense gridlock in the U.S. government. Major issues will probably not go through. In that situation, Canada will need to step up to some degree not just with our allies and partners in Asia or Europe but also domestically—for example, in looking at air defence systems.

You've seen the sort of pernicious attitude the Trump administration has had toward us over the past couple of years. I think it will be replaced by a government that will have a lot of difficulty just getting basic legislation through. Canada will need to increase its defence spending and have military outputs. In a meaningful way, that can help undergird the existing security system, which is in real trouble.

[Scott Anderson, Conservative, Vernon—Lake Country—Monashee, BC]

Thank you.

Dr. Huebert, we recently went to the SAHA conference in Istanbul. It's a military trade show. It seemed we went there with two conflicting messages. On one hand, we are telling the world that we would like them to buy Canadian developments. On the other hand, we are telling the world that we are going to build our own Canadian-made military things. In effect, we went to a trade show and said, “Please buy our stuff, but we're not going to buy yours.”

Is this a coherent strategy to go abroad with?

[Robert Huebert]

No, it's not, and that's an underlying theme we come back to.

It's the industrial side of what we're talking about. Remember that we tried to expand our sales to other countries. We talked about selling the LAVs to Saudi Arabia. This, of course, created a huge political blowback in that context.

I'll also remind the committee of the fact that we tried to pivot towards the Europeans in terms of what we're doing. That was called the “third option” under Pierre Trudeau. Basically, we got the Leopard 1 tanks, but that was about the only real, major benefit. The geopolitics of the threats we face mean that we will inevitably be going back to work with the Americans.

To go back to your first question—which I think is of critical importance—one way of thinking beyond the linear way we do.... It goes back to Richard's point about the mid-term elections. What happens to the United States because of the destabilization Trump introduced? We know that our enemies will be mounting whatever campaigns they have, whether it's grey cyber or what have you, to further facilitate that divide. What happens if United States society comes almost to the point of violence within itself? How do we respond? Again, how does our industrial policy prepare us for that type of scenario? It's a low-probability one, but I think it's one we increasingly have to realize, in these new geopolitics we're talking about—

[The Chair, Liberal, Charles Sousa]

Dr. Huebert, thank you so much. I'm sorry to cut you off.

Ms. Lapointe, it's over to you for five minutes.

[Viviane LaPointe, Liberal, Sudbury, ON]

Thank you, Chair.

Ms. Exner-Pirot, this committee undertook a study that looked at the nexus between defence and critical minerals. Many expert witnesses came forward and told us that national security is about a lot more than just critical minerals in the ground. It's also about ensuring that we have sovereignty over the processing and supply chains around those minerals. I thought it was really interesting that you touched upon that in your opening statement.

Can you expand on that point? As you do, can you speak in reference to the defence industrial strategy talking about wanting to build on existing Canadian strengths and what that means for regions that already have expertise in mining, processing and advanced industrial technology?

[Heather Exner-Pirot]

The obvious backdrop to this is that China has spent the last two decades gaining market share and monopolizing some processes such that it's very difficult to find a product or component that doesn't go through China. In the event of a conflict with China, that would obviously be a huge problem. They have already been willing to weaponize or use export restrictions to harm western economies, and they certainly would do so to a defence industrial buildup if they could.

We need to find solutions to produce these products ourselves in the face of the fact that the free market is not free. The free market is not sufficient because the Chinese are actively manipulating it.

Now you have to get to the question of how we can respond to this. We are a free-market society and generally laissez-faire. However, we're in a situation where, for national security reasons, we must have sufficient supply of these.

On the Canadian side, we mine most minerals, as I think we've all established. It's probably not the mining aspect that is the difficult problem to solve. Of the five phases all the way up to a component that gets put into a fighter jet or a tank, it's the three processes in between and making those work that are difficult.

Companies will make money off of copper, zinc, lead and iron, but it's going to be very hard for them to make money off of refining gallium, for example, which is just a small, niche market where it's very difficult to compete with the Chinese. In Canada, I would say that we have 34 critical minerals, and we not going to do the refining, the processing and the advanced manufacturing of these advanced alloys and minerals.

For me, it is essential that we work with our allies. I'm saying there are five layers, but for some it might be three or four, and for others it might be six. Whatever we produce and refine, we should make sure we know there is someone in the alliance that can take a product and make it into a component for a weapons system on the other side—if it's not us. That is the difficulty in all of this. Normally, the market would be the one to coordinate these things, and we're saying that in this situation, the market is not acting optimally, so governments have to intervene.

That's kind of where we're at.

[Viviane LaPointe, Liberal, Sudbury, ON]

We saw an announcement last week by Chinese Premier Li Qiang, who described a plan to create new regulations to protect access to their resources. It's certainly one way to ensure that a country is facilitating the proper development and utilization of their mineral resources. Would you suggest that Canada take a similar approach to safeguard our mineral resource security—of course, working with trusted allies?

[Heather Exner-Pirot]

I would have to say that it depends on the commodity and the source.

However, in general, I'm very anxious about the trend that we're seeing of countries putting new export restrictions on goods. We're obviously in a fractured geopolitical environment, and critical minerals are being used for leverage. In the last few weeks, Zimbabwe put export restrictions on some of the things it produces. Today, Guinea put export restrictions on bauxite, which is an essential element in aluminum. Everything is going to be more expensive and have increased costs, and everyone is going to be more vulnerable because of this trend.

It's tricky, but Canada—especially working in coordination with Australia—has such tremendous global market-setting power. It might be difficult for Canada to do these things alone, but we could coordinate with Australia and some other trusted allies to make sure that we aren't coercing or restricting exports and that people we have free trade agreements with have access to our commodities and know that we are reliable and not a nation that puts caveats on everything we export.

[The Chair, Liberal, Charles Sousa]

That was a great response.

I'm sorry, Ms. Lapointe, but I'm going to Monsieur Savard-Tremblay for two and a half minutes.

[Simon-Pierre Savard-Tremblay, Bloc, Saint-Hyacinthe—Bagot—Acton, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Leuprecht, you also appeared before the Standing Committee on Industry and Technology in November 2025. You said that the federal public service, the Canadian economic ecosystem and research and innovation currently lack the necessary structure to implement this program. You also said that the procedures and policies put in place over the past 30 years served to reduce the size of the Canadian Armed Forces and curb spending. At the time, the document wasn't yet available to the public. Do you stand by your verdict?

[Christian Leuprecht]

It seems that the urgency isn't really there. Following the Prime Minister's famous speech in Davos, I would have expected much more action much more quickly.

I understand that there are certainly political sensitivities within the government caucus. However, take for example the announcement of the Canada impact+ research chairs program. Hardly any research chairs are focusing on defence issues. I could give you a dozen other examples showing a lack of alignment between the government's announcement and the actual work being done at the national level.

[Simon-Pierre Savard-Tremblay, Bloc, Saint-Hyacinthe—Bagot—Acton, QC]

You're in this industry. Yet you haven't received any word that, even though it hasn't been done yet, it's coming soon.

Has contact been made with the research chairs?

[Christian Leuprecht]

As we say in English, hope dies last. The situation is desperate, but not hopeless.

Indeed, I hope that the government is changing its approach.

The four of us are saying that it must act much more quickly. If it doesn't, we'll soon end up in a situation where we'll strongly regret not making adjustments. This will have been at the expense of our political and economic sovereignty. We can already see on a daily basis the impact of failing to maintain the instruments of government power to safeguard our sovereignty.

[Simon-Pierre Savard-Tremblay, Bloc, Saint-Hyacinthe—Bagot—Acton, QC]

The document refers to an 85% increase in federal defence research and development spending. You said that, to date, few research chairs have been contacted. Admittedly, there may well be other laboratories or research institutes outside academia. However, you don't find at all that these investments will lead to an increase in capacity.