Well, that's the problem: We don't have the proper insights that have to come with a functioning critical ability to look at evergreen processes and to understand these policies.
I'll return to Canada's shipbuilding strategy. That was brought forward as an example of how to do these types of procurements. There was a general acceptance that it was a bipartisan approach to addressing the issue that has always plagued Canadian shipbuilding for both the navy and Coast Guard: How do you avoid building everything at once and in the most expensive way and instead spread it out so that you retain the technology and you do not run into this boom-and-bust cycle?
Of course, everybody accepted that it was a good process. It seemed to make sense in terms of dividing things between the two coastlines, but we had a political process where we added a third shipbuilding centre. There has been no good reflection, really, on how come we moved away from what the shipbuilding strategy said.
Of course, I'll point out that we are now building for the Coast Guard—as we should have been doing since 1985, when we first said we were going to do it—three different classes of big icebreakers at the same time in four different shipyards. In other words, everything that the shipbuilding strategy said we should not do, we are doing. I'm asking why we don't have an understanding of how come that has occurred so that in moving forward with the industrial defence strategy, we are not simply replicating the political factors that came forward that basically said to the shipbuilding strategy, “Hey, don't do this”, and then we're doing this. Why did that occur? That is my question to you.