Thank you very much, Chair.
To start, I want to thank the committee for holding this timely meeting to discuss this topic and for inviting me to speak. It's very much appreciated.
NORAD modernization is clearly a critical topic of conversation, not just in Canada's bilateral defence relationship with the United States, but in its broader diplomatic relations as well.
Successive U.S. administrations have highlighted the growing threat of adversary systems, particularly, but not limited to, the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation. These include a qualitative improvement in existing and new systems, such as in low-level cruise missiles and hypersonic missiles, as well as a quantitative increase in the number of systems. I'd point to the March 25 statement by General Anthony Cotton, commander of U.S. Strategic Command, to the Senate armed services committee in the United States, which provides a detailed, unclassified survey of the emerging threats today.
These developments are not new. China's buildup of its strategic nuclear forces started over a decade ago, and Russian systems were at least five years before that. The reality is that, to some degree, both the United States and Canada were tardy in their initial response, but have made some significant moves over the past decades to address this challenge.
The Trump administration has made homeland defence a signature component of its defence policy for its second term and is attempting to pursue an aggressive modernization agenda, officially known as the golden dome for America, or GD4A. This involves a large networked array of different surveillance and targeting systems, as well as new and improved capabilities intended to defeat these threats. A key enabler will be a highly advanced, AI-driven data processing capability that will improve the sensitivity and reactiveness of the entire system.
It should be noted that many of the key programs that will improve homeland defence, like the space-based communication layer, are already facing significant delays. The administration seems more willing to pursue technically risky, space-based in nature capabilities, due to the capability and survivability advantages offered by them, over more traditional ground and air-based systems. The technical feasibility of the space-based interceptor program, which is arguably the centrepiece of the golden dome for America system, is deeply in question and its cost is likely to be extreme. I'd point to the work of former congressional budget analyst Todd Harrison at the American Enterprise Institute as a leading voice in this area.
Canada, for its part, has also realized the need to address these threats. The 2022 announcement concerning NORAD modernization and earmarking of approximately $38 billion was a good first step, but the process is seeing delays in program execution, in part due to austerity measures placed on the Department of National Defence over the past few decades. This is in front of the backdrop of an aging set of capabilities, a large portion of which was acquired during the Mulroney era, over 30-plus years ago.
Consequently, Canada's contribution to the existing NORAD capabilities is highly limited in the face of this new threat environment and the delivery of new systems will potentially take over a decade to accomplish in full. For example, the purchase of the F-35s for the Royal Canadian Air Force fleet, which is arguably one of the most critical defence capabilities we provide to NORAD, is now being questioned for the fifth time in 15 years. A full operating capability is likely to slip beyond 2032.
A deep bipartisan consensus in the United States has pushed Canada to do more in this area. The frustration over the lack of alacrity and actual defence deliverables is palpable. It is one of the core impediments to the bilateral relationship today. The relatively limited state of Canada's contribution to NORAD must be addressed.
Canada must play a stronger role in this area by becoming more proactive in its efforts. There are areas where the U.S.'s plans for the golden dome have obvious deficiencies and if Canada was agile and reactive, it could complement their efforts to create a more secure North America. This approach could help build a stronger foundation for the two countries' bilateral relationship going forward.
Thank you.