Evidence of meeting #13 for Natural Resources in the 39th Parliament, 2nd Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was aecl.

A recording is available from Parliament.

On the agenda

MPs speaking

Also speaking

Gordon Edwards  President, Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility
Karen Gulenchyn  Medical Chief, Department of Nuclear Medicine, Hamilton Health Sciences and St. Joseph's Healthcare Hamilton
Brian McGee  Senior Vice-President and Chief Nuclear Officer, Atomic Energy of Canada Limited
Thomas Perry  Department of Medicine and Department of Anesthesiology, Pharmacology & Therapeutics, University of British Columbia

11:10 a.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative Leon Benoit

Good morning, everyone.

Under Standing Order 108(2), we are continuing our study of nuclear safety issues, including safety issues at the Chalk River nuclear reactor.

We have four witnesses before the committee today. We have with us, from the Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility, Gordon Edwards, president. We have, from Hamilton Health Sciences and St. Joseph's Healthcare Hamilton, Karen Gulenchyn, medical chief, Department of Nuclear Medicine. We have, from Atomic Energy of Canada, Brian McGee, senior vice-president and chief nuclear officer. And we have by videoconference, joining us at noon from the University of British Columbia, Dr. Thomas Perry, Department of Medicine and Department of Anesthesiology, Pharmacology and Therapeutics. He will just come in and give his five- to seven-minute presentation at that time. Because that witness was requested by the New Democratic Party, I'll have the New Democratic member, Ms. Bell, question that witness first. She can, of course, direct her questions to anyone else if she so chooses.

Let's get right to it. There will be five- to seven-minute presentations. I ask the presenters to stick to that. We will follow the order of speakers on the orders of the day, starting with Mr. Gordon Edwards, president, Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility.

Go ahead, sir.

11:10 a.m.

Gordon Edwards President, Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. I'm pleased to be here. My name is Gordon Edwards, and my background is in mathematics and physics. I've acted as a consultant, part time, on nuclear matters for over 30 years. I have been qualified as an expert on nuclear safety matters by federal courts, royal commissions, and tribunals in both Canada and the United States. I'm a co-founder and am president of the Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility, a non-governmental organization based in Montreal.

I'm pleased that the parliamentarians on this committee are looking into nuclear issues that ultimately affect all Canadians. I believe that parliamentary accountability of Atomic Energy of Canada Limited should be regularized. Once a year at least, I believe, AECL should be required to appear before a parliamentary committee to update its members on accomplishments and unresolved problems. Had this been the practice, parliamentarians would have had a better context to work with during the isotope crisis. They would have known that AECL was many years behind schedule in bringing the two MAPLE reactors online.

These brand-new isotope production reactors, as you know, were intended to replace the NRU reactor some years ago. It was the intention of AECL to retire the NRU reactor permanently by 2005 at the latest. Although the MAPLE reactors were started up half a dozen years ago, serious defects in construction and design affecting the control rods, the shut-off rods, and the control of the power level have prevented them from performing their intended function--the production of isotopes.

Parliamentarians would also have known that AECL had over two years to perform all the safety upgrades on the 50-year-old NRU reactor, including the task of connecting an emergency power supply to the reactor pumps. AECL had not done this by December 2007, although the CNSC had been told two years earlier that all safety upgrades were completed. In fact, AECL had not even acquired the necessary equipment to carry out the job with a minimum of delay at the next opportunity--i.e., at the next maintenance shutdown.

Meanwhile, the private company, MDS Nordion, did little to alert the medical community or the other suppliers of isotopes that Canada's isotopes supply could suffer an interruption. The MAPLE reactors were way behind schedule and way over budget. Canada's entire supply of medical isotopes was depending upon a geriatric reactor past its retirement date that was not operating according to modern standards of reactor safety, yet no heads-up was apparently given to the other players.

As you know, an article in the Canadian Medical Association Journal on Monday charged that the isotope crisis could have been avoided if MDS Nordion had simply cooperated more closely with Europe's two large-scale isotope suppliers, Nuclear Research and Consultancy Group in the Netherlands and the Institut National des Radioéléments in Belgium.

It seems that this private company, MDS Nordion, the only agency that is making a profit from Canada's isotopes business, has managed to escape responsibility for the isotopes crisis in the eyes of the government. In my view, it's a perfect example of “lemon socialism”: the private company takes the profits and the public gets the lemons.

I believe the firing of Linda Keen was unjustified and unwise. In my view, she was just doing her job. It was a classic example of shooting the messenger rather than listening to the message.

The message is that AECL is not functioning as well as it should, and something should be done about that. The message is also that MDS Nordion is not doing its job of ensuring an uninterrupted supply of isotopes for the medical community, nor alerting the medical community properly of possible difficulties.

CCNR has always held that the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission should not be reporting to Parliament through the Minister of Natural Resources but through another ministry. That way, when a conflict develops between the nuclear regulator and AECL, there would be two voices at the cabinet table instead of just one. The Minister of Natural Resources, who is responsible for AECL, finds himself in a conflict of interest, forced to choose between the developer or the regulator. This is not correct. Unless this situation is rectified by having CNSC report to a different minister, I see little prospect for Canada to have a truly effective, independent nuclear regulatory agency.

It seems clear that the isotope crisis was caused by actions and omissions of AECL and MDS Nordion rather than by CNSC, who merely blew the whistle. Firing Linda Keen will not prevent future shortages of isotopes. The MAPLE reactors may never operate as planned, despite the fact that their cost has soared beyond all expectations.

There is another dark cloud on the horizon, one that all parliamentarians should be concerned about. AECL is still using highly enriched uranium target elements in order to produce molybdenum-99 for sale by MDS Nordion. Highly enriched uranium is an immediately weapons-usable material. Any criminal or terrorist organization obtaining a few kilograms of HEU could make a powerful nuclear explosive device. The presence of such strategic nuclear material at Chalk River explains why the bus that carried journalists to tour the NRU reactor after it restarted had several guards armed with machine guns.

With a change of administration in the United States following the upcoming elections, it is entirely possible that the shipments of this strategic nuclear material from the United States to Canada will be stopped. Thus we may be facing a new isotope crisis in just a few years' time.

There is a U.S. federal law called the Schumer Amendment, which seeks to eliminate all traffic in weapons-usable nuclear materials. Some years ago, the Nuclear Control Institute in Washington, D.C., launched a lawsuit in U.S. Federal Court to prevent any further shipments of highly enriched uranium to Chalk River.

11:15 a.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative Leon Benoit

Mr. Edwards, you're a little over six minutes, so I would ask that you wrap up very shortly.

11:15 a.m.

President, Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility

Gordon Edwards

I'm almost finished.

It already has enough highly enriched uranium for two or three atomic bombs. One of the outcomes of that lawsuit is that AECL and MDS Nordion have both promised U.S. authorities that they will work to eliminate the use of HEU as a target material to produce isotopes and convert to non-weapons-usable material instead. This is entirely feasible. For example, Argentina produces all of its molybdenum-99 using low-enriched uranium.

AECL and MDS Nordion have made little progress in this direction. I believe the processing facility that was built in conjunction with the MAPLE reactors is not large enough to accommodate an easy conversion to low-enriched uranium.

To conclude, I believe the CNSC should be reporting to a minister other than the Minister of Natural Resources. I believe AECL should be accountable to Parliament on a regular basis. I believe Parliament should become involved in the question of weapons-usable nuclear materials being used at present or that may be used in the foreseeable future. I also believe Parliament should be involved in the investigation and documentation of the status of the Chalk River site, which is heavily contaminated with radioactive materials of many different kinds, from many different sources, and which constitutes an important undocumented portion of Canada's national debt.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

11:15 a.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative Leon Benoit

Thank you very much, Mr. Edwards.

We will go now to Karen Gulenchyn from the Hamilton Health Sciences and St. Joseph's Healthcare Hamilton.

Go ahead, please.

11:15 a.m.

Dr. Karen Gulenchyn Medical Chief, Department of Nuclear Medicine, Hamilton Health Sciences and St. Joseph's Healthcare Hamilton

Thank you, Mr. Chair and committee members, for the opportunity to appear before you today.

As you know, I'm Karen Gulenchyn. I'm a specialist in nuclear medicine and internal medicine, and I've worked in this field since 1979. I'm currently the medical chief of the Department of Nuclear Medicine at Hamilton Health Sciences and at St. Joseph's Healthcare, and I am an associate professor in the departments of radiology and medicine at the Faculty of Health Sciences at McMaster University. I am also a member of the group of experts that was called together last December by the Minister of Health to provide advice on the medical isotope supply.

I thought I'd take a minute to explain nuclear medicine, a specialty I'm very proud to practise. Nuclear medicine is concerned with the use of radioactive materials, which are known as radiopharmaceuticals, for the diagnosis and treatment of a wide number of diseases. The majority of our diagnostic tests are applied to heart disease and cancer. The majority of treatments are for thyroid disease and thyroid cancer. Approximately 30,000 diagnostic and 300 therapeutic doses of medical isotopes are administered across Canada each week.

Technetium-99m is the most widely used isotope. It is the radioactive daughter of the parent molybdenum-99, the material that is produced in the reactor at Chalk River. Molybdenum-99 is transported from Chalk River to MDS Nordion in Canada for processing and is subsequently transported to the companies that make generators. Those companies are located in multiple countries, but the majority of the molybdenum is actually shipped to the U.S.A.

Because molybdenum-99 is radioactive and has a relatively short half-life of 66 hours, transportation of this product requires special and detailed arrangements to ensure the safety and reliability of supply. The generators are purchased by imaging facilities, hospitals, and radiopharmacies, and those generators continue to make technetium during their lifetimes, which is washed from the generator column by sterile saline and then compounded into a series of radiopharmaceutical doses that are administered to patients in the morning. Those radiopharmaceutical doses have a half-life of about six hours, the half-life of technetium. And it's quite a production in the morning to get all the radiopharmaceuticals ready. It's a very interesting thing to observe.

Of course, smaller and more remotely situated nuclear medicine departments usually receive a single generator weekly, and that renders them more vulnerable to disruption in supply than a large central facility that has on hand a large number of generators that are received at intervals through the week. I'm telling you this because I think this illustrates both the complexity and also the tenuous line of supply that exists between the manufacturers and the patients.

My involvement in this matter, firstly, was as the medical chief of the Department of Nuclear Medicine in Hamilton. Throughout this disruption of supply, I was responsible for triaging patients and for arranging alternate isotopes, specifically sodium fluoride, for bone scans, which we can produce with our own cyclotron at Hamilton Health Sciences. In fact, working with colleagues at the Cross Cancer Institute in Alberta, we were prepared and ready to implement a protocol to use that material should the shortage of isotopes have continued through to the end of January, which at one point was what we were hearing.

As well, I was responsible for communicating to medical staff and the public regarding the limitation of supply. As a member of Ontario's PET Steering Committee, I was responsible for providing advice to the Ontario government as to how other radiopharmaceuticals produced at Ontario's three medical cyclotrons might fill some of the gaps in isotope supply. And finally, as an adviser to Health Canada, I was providing advice on the impact on patient care and advice regarding alternative diagnostics and treatments.

So what was the impact on patient care? Well, we gathered information from colleagues in my own region, in the provinces, and from across the country. And we observed that there was a variable adverse impact on patient care, with the most severe occurring in eastern Canada, in smaller centres, and in rural areas without access to alternative technologies or the ability to access alternate supplies of isotopes.

We estimated that about 10% of the examinations being deferred because of this supply disruption could result in serious harm to the patient, and an additional 50% of deferred examinations could result in delays in treatment or in additional unnecessary pain and suffering to the patient. Finally, we concluded that the last 40% of diagnostic tests could in fact be safely deferred. But it must be noted that the deferral would then impact on an already over-stressed and over-burdened health care system.

I guess to many observers it might not have appeared that there was a crisis. I think this was largely due to the talented and dedicated staff who work in Canada's 245 nuclear medicine facilities and radiopharmacies. Patients were booked and rebooked to make the best use of radiopharmaceuticals. In fact, in my department the heroes were the three girls who sit on the front desk and talk to the patients every day.

Partially spent generators were transferred from centres like the Edmonton Radiopharmaceutical to more remote hospitals in order to meet the needs of the most urgent cases. In Vancouver, hospitals with a supply of technetium actually transported doses to those lacking supply so that the triage that was occurring right across the city would meet the need of the most urgent cases. However, despite those measures, had the Chalk River reactor not come online, we believe that unmanageable shortages would have occurred within a week of Parliament's decision.

We also know there was an impact outside Canada. From our colleagues in the American Society of Nuclear Medicine we learned that 84% of those surveyed indicated that their practice or facility was being impacted by the molybdenum shortage, and 62% of those facilities reported that they did not have access to an alternate supply of technetium.

I will turn to another issue. It became clear early on that there were communications issues that exacerbated the situation. There wasn't clear or timely information given to the medical community on the length of the shutdown at Chalk River or about the level of supply and impending shortages. The medical community, and especially those from the nuclear medicine community, believe there is room for improvement in when and how they are engaged and in how information is communicated to them.

I understand this committee's current study is focused on nuclear safety in Canada. However, because the members are also hearing testimony concerning the health impact of the closing of the Chalk River plant, I would hope you will consider including recommendations that will ensure the security of the supply of medical isotopes for the future.

Finally, the Canadian nuclear medicine community has taken considerable pride in the fact that Canada supplies the majority of the world's medical isotopes. At present, through our affiliation with the American Society of Nuclear Medicine, we are aware that both the National Academy of Sciences and the U.S. Congress are advocating for a domestic supply of medical isotopes. That position is of course strongly supported by the Society of Nuclear Medicine, and I believe Canada's leading role in this field has been placed at risk.

In closing, I would like to thank the committee for the opportunity to appear, and I would be pleased to answer any questions you might have.

11:25 a.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative Leon Benoit

Thank you very much, Ms. Gulenchyn, for your presentation.

We go finally, for now, to Mr. Brian McGee, senior vice-president and chief nuclear officer, from Atomic Energy of Canada Limited.

Go ahead, please, sir.

11:25 a.m.

Brian McGee Senior Vice-President and Chief Nuclear Officer, Atomic Energy of Canada Limited

Thank you, Mr. Chair and committee members.

I appreciate the opportunity to speak before the committee today. I want to start by saying that the NRU reactor has operated safely. The reactor is operated by some of the most talented and capable people in the nuclear industry. We are deeply aware of and regret the impact this matter has had on the supply and delivery of medical isotopes to patients and their families around the world.

AECL is currently reviewing its own role in the events that led to today's hearing, and we expect to learn valuable lessons that can be applied in the future.

I would like to update you on the operation of the NRU reactor since we appeared last before the committee of the whole on December 11, 2007, and on the connection to the seismically qualified emergency power supplies to main cooling pumps 4 and 5.

I'd like to briefly describe the main and backup power supplies that service NRU. I will then provide a summary of NRU operational activities since December 11 and update you on isotope production.

Pumps 4 and 5 are two of eight main cooling pumps for the NRU reactor. Pumps 1, 4, 5, and 8 were designed to have two independent power supplies, a regular alternating current supply from the power grid that we light our houses and refrigerators with as well as a backup power supply that includes a diesel generator and banks of batteries to keep the pumps operating in case of a loss of alternating current supply.

The emergency power supply, or EPS, as we call it, consists of a separate bank of batteries and diesel generators, and it provides NRU with a third electrical power supply that is seismically qualified. EPS provides emergency backup power to the six safety upgrades that were installed in NRU. EPS is also designed to provide a third power supply to pumps 4 and 5.

I'd like to now update you on the status of the NRU reactor. On December 14, the work on pump 5 was completed and it was connected to EPS. Following the completion of the pump 5 connection to EPS, the reactor was safety restarted to high power in the early morning hours of December 16, 2007. Deliveries of isotopes resumed on December 18, 2007, and have continued at normal production levels since that time. As for the status of the modifications to NRU, I'm pleased to report that on February 1, 2008, the work on pump 4 was completed and it too was connected to the emergency power supply system. Work on both pumps was completed safely.

Following this most recent planned outage, the NRU reactor was restarted safely to high power just after midnight on Saturday, February 2, 2008. The reactor continues to operate safely.

There were two very minor seismic events in the area in December. Neither had any impact on NRU nor compromised its safety. Seismic events of this magnitude are not unusual.

Finally, we are maintaining regular communications with CNSC staff, and we have been open in providing them with relevant and timely information, including documentation relating to this issue and an updated safety case.

We're also providing regular updates on NRU progress, and we are participating in regular meetings with senior CNSC staff. We believe communications are strong and constructive.

In closing, I want to assure the committee that the focus and commitment of my entire team is to continue to operate the NRU reactor and all the licensed facilities on the Chalk River site safely and with due regard to the environment and Canada's international obligations.

The issues that caused the unfortunate shutdown of the NRU reactor, while important, should not distract us from working towards the future of the Canadian nuclear industry. AECL has an excellent track record of developing and delivering innovative nuclear solutions on time and on budget. Canada has one of the most stringent safety systems in the world, and this has been proven by Canada's nuclear safety record to date.

Thank you. I would be pleased to answer your questions.

11:30 a.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative Leon Benoit

Thank you very much, Mr. McGee.

We will now go directly to questions, first to the official opposition for seven minutes.

Mr. Alghabra, go ahead, please.

11:30 a.m.

Liberal

Omar Alghabra Liberal Mississauga—Erindale, ON

Thank you, Mr. Chair. I want to thank all of the witnesses for being here today.

Mr. McGee, thank you for coming. Every time I hear you talk, whether in the media or in front of the House of Commons, you are very forthright and candid in your responses, and I appreciate that.

Before I ask you any questions, I'm just curious to know whether you have had any conversation with any member of the Conservative Party or staff before coming to the committee today.

11:30 a.m.

Senior Vice-President and Chief Nuclear Officer, Atomic Energy of Canada Limited

Brian McGee

I have not.

11:30 a.m.

Liberal

Omar Alghabra Liberal Mississauga—Erindale, ON

You understand that what we're trying to do here on behalf of Canadians is to figure out how we got to where we were. I know that's of interest to you and others. So far, the only thing we've seen is the firing of the independent commissioner, Ms. Keen. It's not that we're looking to have other people fired, but we really want to get to the bottom of this and figure out why it got there and how to prevent it from getting there again.

I'm going to start by asking you a few questions.

I have a letter here from AECL to the commission dated December 23, 2005. It says that “All seven NRU Upgrades are now fully operational per the conditions specified in [1] and your agreement in [2].” It lists the seven upgrades, including emergency power supply--EPS.

Can you explain this letter to me? We know now that those power supplies were not connected. Can you explain why, on December 23, 2005, we said those power supplies were connected?

11:30 a.m.

Senior Vice-President and Chief Nuclear Officer, Atomic Energy of Canada Limited

Brian McGee

The letter says the power supplies were connected to the safety upgrades, and that is correct. They were not connected to the pumps. That was seen to be and was corresponded both to the CNSC staff and in return correspondence from CNSC staff, which we submitted to Parliament. It was always clearly documented that the EPS system was not connected to pumps 4 and 5, but the letter--

11:30 a.m.

Liberal

Omar Alghabra Liberal Mississauga—Erindale, ON

What were they connected to?

11:30 a.m.

Senior Vice-President and Chief Nuclear Officer, Atomic Energy of Canada Limited

Brian McGee

They were connected to the other safety system upgrades. That was what the letter described.

11:30 a.m.

Liberal

Omar Alghabra Liberal Mississauga—Erindale, ON

Wasn't the seven upgrades requirement by the licence to connect the EPS to the pumps?

11:30 a.m.

Senior Vice-President and Chief Nuclear Officer, Atomic Energy of Canada Limited

Brian McGee

There is no documentation that specifically says that was the requirement. There were seven safety system upgrades, of which EPS was one. EPS was designed to power the other safety system upgrades to give a seismically qualified power system to those upgrades so that their hazards qualified. In addition, EPS was to be connected to the pumps.

11:30 a.m.

Liberal

Omar Alghabra Liberal Mississauga—Erindale, ON

The letter says EPS was connected or the upgrades were done, and it doesn't specify that they were not connected to the pumps. Wouldn't it be fair to assume they were connected to the pumps, since it says they were installed and implemented?

11:30 a.m.

Senior Vice-President and Chief Nuclear Officer, Atomic Energy of Canada Limited

Brian McGee

In the absence of other correspondence, that might be a conclusion you could draw. But significant other correspondence has been submitted to Parliament that clearly articulates, both to CNSC staff and in return from CNSC staff to AECL, that the EPS was not connected to those pumps.

11:35 a.m.

Liberal

Omar Alghabra Liberal Mississauga—Erindale, ON

You say “in the absence of other documents”, but I have another document here dated March 2006. This is a licensing package that AECL submitted. In it under C3.3 it says:

Status of NRU Upgrades

The seven seismically and environmentally qualified safety upgrades identified in earlier engineering and safety reviews have been completed.

We have another document here re-emphasizing to the commission that the installation of those seven upgrades was completed. Don't you think that any person who reads that would assume that EPS was connected to the pumps?

11:35 a.m.

Senior Vice-President and Chief Nuclear Officer, Atomic Energy of Canada Limited

Brian McGee

We're getting into documentation that I don't have in front of me, so it's difficult to respond to it in a proper manner. But I think what's important is that the reactor was operating safely, and everybody agrees with that.

On the question of the licensing basis, we have clear documentation and support for the fact that we were operating not only safely but within our licensing envelope. But I expect more from my organization. If you're asking if I am dissatisfied that these upgrades, these connections to the pumps, were not done in a more timely manner, I absolutely am. I've been consistent in saying that since the evening of December 11.

If there was a misunderstanding, that's part of the lesson that needs to come out of this that both ourselves and CNSC staff have to engage in, because this didn't need to happen. At some point it became an issue, and the correspondence led us to believe that we were forthright in describing the state of the facility. We didn't try to misdirect or mislead about that at all. It was clear in the minds in my organization that the commitment was to install the seven safety systems upgrades and connect EPS to those other safety system upgrades. Within my organization, the connections to pumps 4 and 5 were seen to be an enhancement. The correspondence that flowed back and forth tended to reinforce that.

11:35 a.m.

Liberal

Omar Alghabra Liberal Mississauga—Erindale, ON

Mr. McGee, we have a situation here in which I think you're admitting yourself that this should have been installed. Why didn't it get installed? Why didn't the power supply get connected to the pumps?

11:35 a.m.

Senior Vice-President and Chief Nuclear Officer, Atomic Energy of Canada Limited

Brian McGee

As I've said, the facility operated safely--

11:35 a.m.

Liberal

Omar Alghabra Liberal Mississauga—Erindale, ON

But that's not the issue. You keep repeating that, Mr. McGee, but the licensing requirement is the job of the commission. They issue the requirements. You've accepted the requirements. I'm still curious as to why the power supply was not connected to the pumps within a year and a half.

11:35 a.m.

Senior Vice-President and Chief Nuclear Officer, Atomic Energy of Canada Limited

Brian McGee

I do keep repeating that the facility operated safely because that's my primary mission, to ensure the safety of that facility, all the facilities on that site, and the safety of my staff and the public. From my point of view in this industry, that's my primary mission, so I have to keep repeating it because I believe it.

The issue of licensing aside, I've said that I'm dissatisfied with my performance and the performance of my organization in getting those connected in a more timely manner. What's important to realize is that in the queue of priorities, given that the organization didn't see it as a safety-related issue and given that it wasn't seen to be a licensing commitment, since we did have other licensing commitments that we were meeting and we regularly met, it was not given the attention and the priority that I believe it should have been given.

The other thing I'd like to mention is that in the period of time in question there was work going on on those upgrades. It wasn't that people weren't making progress. There was progress being made, and it was intended to have them connected over a period of time. And when the CNSC concerns become evident, we accelerated the timetable for doing that.