Evidence of meeting #13 for Natural Resources in the 39th Parliament, 2nd Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was aecl.

A recording is available from Parliament.

On the agenda

MPs speaking

Also speaking

Gordon Edwards  President, Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility
Karen Gulenchyn  Medical Chief, Department of Nuclear Medicine, Hamilton Health Sciences and St. Joseph's Healthcare Hamilton
Brian McGee  Senior Vice-President and Chief Nuclear Officer, Atomic Energy of Canada Limited
Thomas Perry  Department of Medicine and Department of Anesthesiology, Pharmacology & Therapeutics, University of British Columbia

12:10 p.m.

Senior Vice-President and Chief Nuclear Officer, Atomic Energy of Canada Limited

Brian McGee

Our relationship--

12:10 p.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative Leon Benoit

Mr. St. Armand, please give the witnesses a reasonable time to answer. It is appropriate, at times, to interject if you believe you've gotten the answer, but I do believe it's proper to give Mr. McGee time to answer the question.

Go ahead, please, Mr. McGee.

12:10 p.m.

Senior Vice-President and Chief Nuclear Officer, Atomic Energy of Canada Limited

Brian McGee

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

My relationship and the relationship of my organization is with CNSC staff. I think you've heard me describe it as a professional relationship, and we have great respect for CNSC staff.

My relationship with the ex-president and ex-chair of the commission is only across the commission table. I had no other relationship with her, so I have no opinion on that, and I have no ability to form an opinion on that. My relationship is that one-dimensional.

12:10 p.m.

Liberal

Lloyd St. Amand Liberal Brant, ON

All right.

The more we delve into this, Mr. McGee--and we heard from Dr. Perry, who told us pretty clearly that, in his view, there was no serious health crisis, and we heard from Mr. Edwards this morning that the firing of Linda Keen was, in his view, not justified--it rather strikes me that we're getting to the nub of the matter, the nub of it being the protection of MDS Nordion's market share and profit margin, and AECL's involvement in that.

I just want to ask you about the relationship between those two entities. Number one, how does AECL receive funding or money from MDS Nordion, or does it receive it?

12:10 p.m.

Senior Vice-President and Chief Nuclear Officer, Atomic Energy of Canada Limited

Brian McGee

We have a commercial relationship with MDS Nordion. As the primary supplier of medical isotopes, we're paid, as would be the case in any other supply chain system, for the product we provide.

I don't have a lot of familiarity with the history of the arrangement, but I know it goes back many years.

12:10 p.m.

Liberal

Lloyd St. Amand Liberal Brant, ON

The history is less relevant to us than the current details.

What, on an annual basis, would AECL receive from MDS Nordion for the supply of isotopes from Chalk River?

12:10 p.m.

Senior Vice-President and Chief Nuclear Officer, Atomic Energy of Canada Limited

Brian McGee

I didn't come prepared with those numbers, so if I were to share them in this forum they would be just off the top of my head.

You made a statement earlier that there was a notion of protecting MDS Nordion. My focus is the safe operation of the facility and the relationship with CNSC staff. My focus is that singular.

12:15 p.m.

Liberal

Lloyd St. Amand Liberal Brant, ON

All right.

Can you estimate for us, in your capacity as vice-president at AECL, the approximate amount that would be received by AECL in a calendar year from MDS Nordion?

12:15 p.m.

Senior Vice-President and Chief Nuclear Officer, Atomic Energy of Canada Limited

Brian McGee

Thank you for the question.

It would be in the $30 million range for medical isotopes.

12:15 p.m.

Liberal

Lloyd St. Amand Liberal Brant, ON

So it's a big dollar.

12:15 p.m.

Senior Vice-President and Chief Nuclear Officer, Atomic Energy of Canada Limited

Brian McGee

It is a significant amount of money.

As I said, there is a lot of history in terms of the relationship with MDS Nordion. I don't want to go into a lot of detail, because the relationship and AECL's role and relationship go back many years now.

12:15 p.m.

Liberal

Lloyd St. Amand Liberal Brant, ON

No, we understand that.

12:15 p.m.

Senior Vice-President and Chief Nuclear Officer, Atomic Energy of Canada Limited

Brian McGee

But what I would say to you is that if you're leading to the question of whether I was driven by money, the medical isotope stream for me, as it was set up, as I inherited it, is not a particularly profitable stream. So it was not a money-driven question.

12:15 p.m.

Liberal

Lloyd St. Amand Liberal Brant, ON

All right.

12:15 p.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative Leon Benoit

Thank you, Mr. St. Armand. Your time is up.

We go now to the Bloc, to Monsieur Ouellet, for five minutes.

Go ahead, Monsieur Ouellet.

12:15 p.m.

Bloc

Christian Ouellet Bloc Brome—Missisquoi, QC

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Mr. Edwards. Earlier, in your opening remarks, you mentioned that some of the responsibility rests with MDS Nordion. We have just discussed that, but I would like to come back to the subject. In what way do you feel MDS Nordion is responsible? Did this company's involvement make the crisis worse in some way? Did it neglect to do what it could have done, for example, negotiate agreements to supply medical isotopes from other countries? What role do you think MDS Nordion had to play in this crisis?

12:15 p.m.

President, Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility

Gordon Edwards

I have to tell you, in answering this question, that I'm not privy to any special knowledge about the inner workings of MDS Nordion, but I did look at the communications they have been sending out over the last year or so.

In March of 2007, for example, they sent a letter to their clients, the people who purchased the isotopes, saying that they could be assured that the production would be ramped up and that it would be very reliable. I looked for other letters, other indications of a public nature, that Nordion may have been giving a full picture to clients--that because we're depending on a 50-year-old reactor there could be a possibility of breakdown, or at least that we are cooperating with other suppliers in order to ensure that there will be a supply in case there is an unexpected shutdown.

When you have a 50-year-old reactor--even new reactors, as we have now--and you shut down for maintenance, it's always possible that it ends up being a lot longer than you expect. This is happening right now in Gentilly, in Quebec. The shutdown is weeks longer than originally anticipated.

I think it's only prudent to have those arrangements in place and to have those alternative supplies ready to go, and to be able to notify people ahead of time. From what I've been able to perceive from my limited perspective of just gathering information that's public, I don't see any indication of any of that.

From reading the transcripts of the CNSC meetings, I am also struck by the fact that what we really have here is a rather persistent failure to communicate the whole truth. It would have been very simple I think for AECL, when it said the updates had all been satisfied, to add that there were a few things undone, and to list what those undone things were.

I think it's revealing, in fact, that Mr. McGee mentioned that the communication is primarily with the staff rather than with the commissioners. But the commissioners are the ones who are really challenged to make the decisions. I think the important thing is that the commissioners be properly informed. They, not the staff, are the ones who have the responsibility of making these decisions.

12:15 p.m.

Bloc

Christian Ouellet Bloc Brome—Missisquoi, QC

Thank you. Getting back to who is responsible for the crisis, earlier on in your testimony, Mr. Edwards, you stated that AECL was also partly responsible. I'm wondering if you had the chance to read an article that appeared recently in the Toronto Star and that reported the following:

As well, top AECL management was repeatedly hauled on the carpet before the Nuclear Safety Commission and its predecessor, the Atomic Energy Control Board, to explain poor operating practices at the Universal reactor, including foot-dragging on implementing safety upgrades ordered by the federal regulator.

In June 2005, staff at the safety commission said in a written report that the AECL staff running the aging Universal reactor were prone to “overconfidence,” “complacency” and “deficiencies in management oversight and safety culture.”

Was this what you were referring to earlier when you stated that they are responsible, or at least partly responsible?

12:20 p.m.

President, Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility

Gordon Edwards

I do believe that one of the things that was shocking to the commissioners...and not just to Linda Keen. I think anybody who reads the transcript will notice that Linda Keen, in her role as chair, gave the other commissioners ample opportunity to ask questions before she said a word. The other commissioners were quite shocked at the kind of attitude expressed by AECL toward the safety concerns.

I have to tell you that I was shocked myself this morning to hear Mr. McGee give such a complacent answer toward the so-called worst-case scenario. I think it's very important to realize that although Mr. McGee repeated over and over again that the plant was operating safely, that's not what these emergency systems are for. It's not about normal operation; it's about emergencies. So to say that it's operating safely, it's operating safely, it's operating safely is to have a complacent attitude toward what might go wrong.

One of the findings of the president's commission on Three Mile Island back in 1980, after the Three Mile Island accident in 1979, was that the principal cause of the accident was overconfidence on the part of the operators that it was inherently safe. Until that attitude changes and they stop regarding it as inherently safe, there will be more such accidents.

I also strongly disagree with the description of the worst-case scenario. I'm sure Mr. McGee knows full well that in 1952, when the much smaller NRX reactor suffered a catastrophic accident, there was a series of explosions. It blew the roof off. The core of the reactor had to be buried on site somewhere. It was too radioactive for contact, even, with humans.

So I--

12:20 p.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative Leon Benoit

Thank you, Mr. Edwards. Time is more than up here.

12:20 p.m.

President, Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility

Gordon Edwards

Okay. I just want to make sure it's recorded that I strongly disagree with this worst-case scenario presented today.

12:20 p.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative Leon Benoit

You've made the point.

Merci, Monsieur Ouellet.

We go now to the Conservative Party, Ms. Gallant, for five minutes.

February 5th, 2008 / 12:20 p.m.

Conservative

Cheryl Gallant Conservative Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and through you, to Mr. McGee.

It's my understanding that the CNSC has an office on site. They have three inspectors at AECL. We've been told that it was only in November of last year that they came to understand that the emergency power supplies to the pumps were not hooked up.

How did it come to pass that they were there for over a year, these three inspectors, and they didn't notice it?

12:20 p.m.

Senior Vice-President and Chief Nuclear Officer, Atomic Energy of Canada Limited

Brian McGee

I really can't comment on why they wouldn't have noticed it earlier. We provide full open access. We work closely with CNSC staff. I really can't provide you with any insight into the time involved.

12:20 p.m.

Conservative

Cheryl Gallant Conservative Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON

So there were no discussions that would lend to the idea that they did know that these weren't connected and just did not perceive it as an urgent situation?