Natural Resources Committee on Feb. 7th, 2008

[Claude DeBellefeuille, Bloc, Beauharnois—Salaberry, QC]

Can you give me their names? Do you have the names of those people? What was the name of your main contact?

[David McInnes]

We can certainly get that information for you.

We treated the news on the evening of the 21st most seriously. In the meetings on the 22nd we had conversations with AECL and Natural Resources Canada, and communicated quite clearly that as a result of the outage we would see a global supply shortage at that time of approximately 30%. It turned out that the actual shortage was about 35%, so we pretty much nailed the estimated number. That was the opportunity for us to clearly demonstrate to government and AECL that this was a highly serious matter.

[Claude DeBellefeuille, Bloc, Beauharnois—Salaberry, QC]

Did you directly contact the Minister of Health or the Minister of Natural Resources? Did your company contact the ministers' offices directly?

[Grant Malkoske]

We did not contact their offices directly at that time, but we certainly contacted senior representatives within Natural Resources Canada. We were of the view that we had done what we needed to do to communicate the seriousness of this issue to the operators of the facility at Atomic Energy of Canada and representatives at Natural Resources Canada.

I might also add that our actions internationally--and people were aware that we were out trying to source material—certainly demonstrated the seriousness with which we regarded this situation.

[Claude DeBellefeuille, Bloc, Beauharnois—Salaberry, QC]

On November 30, your company issued a news release stating that the crisis would have a negative impact on your financial position, an impact in the order of $4 million for the first quarter of 2008. On December 13, you corrected that, saying that, ultimately, since the reactor had been started up again, there wouldn't be any financial impact.

I'm on the outside, and I wonder whether you didn't exercise pressure for the reactor to restart as soon as possible in order protect your financial position.

[Grant Malkoske]

First of all, let me try to address the two press releases. There was one on November 30—you are correct—and another one in December. In the December press release we actually did reveal what we felt the financial impact would be on our company.

The reason for the difference as you go through time is that the picture was in flux. On November 22 we weren't sure how long it would be before NRU would restart. We left that issue between Atomic Energy of Canada and the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission to decide.

This was a regulatory issue, an issue between the licensor and the licensee. We did not intervene in that at all. So we did not put pressure on AECL and did not put pressure on the CNSC to restart. We did want to understand process, yes, because some of that would help us in our production planning in trying to outsource material from other suppliers.

Does that answer your question?

[Claude DeBellefeuille, Bloc, Beauharnois—Salaberry, QC]

Yes.

[The Chair, Conservative, Leon Benoit]

Madame DeBellefeuille, your time is up.

We'll go now to the New Democratic Party, to Ms. Bell, for up to seven minutes.

[Catherine Bell, NDP, Vancouver Island North, BC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I would like to thank all the witnesses today for appearing before us and helping us get to the bottom of what has happened here. It's very important that we come up with some ideas about how not to have this happen again.

We've heard from many witnesses with conflicting testimony, but a common thread that has run through all of it is that there was a breakdown in communication somewhere. That's where I want to focus today.

I address my first question to Mr. O'Brien. I want to thank you for your presentation and to say that I don't think we doubt that in the end there was a crisis and that this was a situation that maybe didn't need to happen.

I'll just go to one of the comments that you made in an interview on December 6, that you were managing the problem and struggling with it: “This week it's devastating, and next week potentially catastrophic”. In the next sentence you were saying, “It's been frustrating because there's really been a breakdown in communications from the federal level to the physician community and we're having difficulty, even on a day-to-day basis, determining what we can do.” So I think you also recognize the breakdown in communications.

Having said that, I want to go back to the timeline. We see that on November 22 an e-mail was sent to Natural Resources Canada officials and to an officer in the Minister of Natural Resources' office. That is supplied to us by Gary Lunn, the Minister of Natural Resources, in his testimony: “...to advise that the regularly scheduled maintenance shutdown of the reactor would be extended”. So from November 22 we have that.

Then five days later you were informed by your suppliers that there was a problem, but not a catastrophic one at that point. Then eight days later a letter of concern....

Is that a letter that you sent out, just to refresh my memory?

[Dr. Christopher O'Brien]

That was a press release sent out on December 5 after the board of directors of the Canadian Association of Nuclear Medicine and the Canadian Society of Nuclear Medicine met. We were able to canvass the impact across the country, and we said, whoa, we have major problem here. It took a couple of days for us to get that information.

[Catherine Bell, NDP, Vancouver Island North, BC]

That's 13 days from November 22. What we just heard from Mr. Malkoske's testimony was that being off-line for seven days could create a crisis. This is like a double crisis, at this point. My question would be, if there were better processes in place, what could have happened better?

Maybe these aren't fair questions just for you. Answers need to come from the minister as well.

[Dr. Christopher O'Brien]

It's actually a very appropriate question.

The nuclear medicine community used to have a seat at the table with the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission. We did have a medical advisory committee there. That was disbanded when the new administration controlling the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission came in. So we were no longer at the table. We were no longer involved in the decision-making process, which directly impacts our patients' well-being. We were working in an atmosphere of darkness, as I call it. I think this is a prime example of what happens when physicians are not involved in the decision-making process.

I do not know why that advisory committee was disbanded. One of our recommendations is that this should be reinstated, so we have those lines of communications, so that the physicians and the patients we represent, because we are the advocates of patient care, will be able to know at an earlier timeframe and be able to bring to the federal government, through the regulatory agencies, the impact this will have. We believe that was a breakdown, with our not being at the table.

[Catherine Bell, NDP, Vancouver Island North, BC]

Thank you.

One of the other things you mentioned was that you were managing the shortage. We've heard from other physicians, in Vancouver and different provinces, that they didn't have the shortage you experienced in eastern Canada and in the Maritimes. Is there is any mechanism to share those resources, where they maybe have a surplus, in a crisis situation like this?

[Dr. Christopher O'Brien]

Actually, we ran into problems with that. In order to move radioactive material from one site to another, you have to follow regulatory guidelines. That has to be approved by the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission. That's called the transportation of dangerous goods.

[Catherine Bell, NDP, Vancouver Island North, BC]

Trying to facilitate that....

[Dr. Christopher O'Brien]

Exactly.

Without having those processes in place, you cannot move a dose of isotope across the street. It's against the law and the regulations. We ran into problems with that. We were trying to distribute isotopes locally, but we ran into a barrier because we didn't have the authority to do that.

Other hospitals across Canada have different suppliers of isotopes. There were pockets that had no effect and pockets where it was devastating. That's why you had that patchwork effect.

[Catherine Bell, NDP, Vancouver Island North, BC]

Thank you.

I'll go now to Mr. Nathwani, on the seven points you made. I'm sorry, I didn't get to write them all down.

In the first one you mentioned cost-benefits and risk. Who's cost-benefits are we looking at? This is a nuclear regulator that would have to determine these things, and I'm wondering if there would be any potential for the cost-benefits to outweigh public safety in this instance?

[Dr. Jatin Nathwani]

Thank you for the question.

If such an amendment were to be put in law, this would subject the decision of the commission to this determination or tests. Therefore they would have to make a determination, whether it's staff or with assistance from the licensee, on the costs and the benefits. The commission would explicitly weigh these in making a decision and help them make a decision.

[Catherine Bell, NDP, Vancouver Island North, BC]

I'm struggling with this one, because it's a nuclear safety commission to make sure that Canadians are safe. I have an issue with a safety commissioner being responsible for ensuring cost-benefits to any supplier in the event of any nuclear incident, or perception of a nuclear incident.

That's just something I want to put out there. I don't know if you want to address that.

[Dr. Jatin Nathwani]

If I may be helpful, one could take the particularly narrow view of what safety comprises, but what is this safety all about? At the end of the day, it is to ensure that the lives of people will not be jeopardized in one form or the other. It is to try to protect the public from untoward events. That is the primary focus of that particular commission.

With respect to the notion of benefit, it is the risk averted, if you wish, in the action taken. If that is not explicitly taken into account, then you have half the picture. You're not able to come to a full understanding of the risk and the benefit, both in terms of lives gained and lives lost, as it were, and make a determination along those lines.

[The Chair, Conservative, Leon Benoit]

Thank you, Doctor, and thank you, Ms. Bell.

We now go to the government, to Mr. Allen, for up to seven minutes.

Go ahead, please.

[Mike Allen, Conservative, Tobique—Mactaquac, NB]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I have just a couple of follow-up questions on some issues that have come up previously, on the timeline.

Mr. Malkoske, I certainly heard you and Mr. McInnes say that there was plenty of discussion, starting on the 22nd, with respect to the outage, but as I think you indicated, you weren't sure then--and along with the testimony that's been given to the committee before, nobody was really sure--how long this was going to last. Certainly AECL and CNSC had the responsibility to work that out among themselves, and that certainly appears to be consistent with the timelines from the ministers as well as toward the latter part of the month, before we really got an idea of how big this would be.

I did want to say that you indicated alternate supplies.... Did I hear correctly that you had actually sent canisters or something out to these other countries to provide these isotopes?

[Grant Malkoske]

That is correct. Once we started to see this issue, and that we needed to respond to it, we were trying to facilitate any arrangements that we could--if there was incremental material available--to bring it to Canada. Part of that was sending shipping containers over to bring that material. In fact, we sent them to South Africa and to Europe.

[Mike Allen, Conservative, Tobique—Mactaquac, NB]

Nothing ever came back?

[Grant Malkoske]

We did get some material from South Africa, and the material from Europe arrived two days after Bill C-38 was passed, so it was late. I think I mentioned in my statement that it really was only an incremental amount, that it only gave us 20% of our needs, and therefore there was a shortage.