Yes, I will.
Before I start, maybe I would say that's one thing we have in common: the view that the bill is long overdue for revision.
I was noticing in reviewing some historical material for today that my organization, the Canadian Environmental Law Association, made submissions on the Nuclear Liability Act and proposals to revise it in 1984, and I myself was involved in the litigation concerning the current legislation from about 1988 to 1995.
I thank you for inviting the Canadian Environmental Law Association to appear before you. Our organization is a non-profit public legal clinic. We were established in 1970, and our mandate encompasses using existing laws to protect the environment, as well as advocating law reform.
I should say, with my apologies, my written submission was not ready on time for prior translation. It has been provided to the clerk, but I understand, with the rules of the committee, you won't see that until a later date.
I also expect that we will file a supplementary letter with more detail on potential amendments, but I'll speak to them briefly here.
We have three main submissions to make with respect to Bill C-20. Firstly, we would recommend that the bill be amended to remove the cap on liability and to remove the exemption on third-party liability, and I'll speak to each of these in turn. Secondly, we would recommend that the minimum amount of insurance and financial assurance required to be carried by operators be amended so as to substantially increase the available resources even beyond what Bill C-20 provides and to provide for the consequences of a catastrophic accident with off-site impacts. Thirdly, we would recommend that the bill be modernized to accord with principles of sustainability.
I'll speak to each of these in turn.
With respect to the first submission, to remove the cap on liability and to eliminate the exemption that is accorded to suppliers, many other nations are either in the process or have removed their liability caps. The original argument was that nuclear power generation would not be pursued for peaceful purposes without such a cap, but we would submit that's long out of date; that's no longer applicable. Nuclear power was commissioned in Canada decades ago and is well established today. Just as Germany and Japan were able to remove the cap, Canada should be able to do that, too.
Those countries that did remove the cap wanted to “normalize” their nuclear power plant operation in accordance with other fields of industrial activity and also to exhibit the confidence their government had in the safety of their reactors.
Also, as we've often argued, the provision of a cap on liability operates as a subsidy to that single form of electricity generation—that is, nuclear-powered generation. No other form of electricity generation has such an advantage. The subsidy amounts to the costs that the operators would otherwise incur to either insure for or pay the real costs of a severe nuclear plant accident. Those who bear those costs today or under Bill C-20 that might exceed that amount are the public, whose damages and claims would not be compensated except to the limited amount provided by the cap, unless government chose to step in and account for the difference, which is discretionary.
I might add that a serious accident in which radioactive materials escaped containment is a credible scenario that we do have to consider if we're going to allow this type of generation and make the rules governing its operation. In the written brief—when you get it—you'll see a citation from the Auditor General's report from 1992, echoing the fact that because we've had relatively successful accident-free operation on the part of the Canadian nuclear program doesn't mean that accidents can't happen or that we shouldn't consider what the consequences would be if they did.
In the litigation that I mentioned to you earlier, evidence was led on the part of the plaintiffs that damages for a very severe accident could extend between $375 million and $30 billion in 1990 dollars, but in that case, even the industry estimate, which I might add was based on U.S. studies because no Canadian studies had been done, was that such a severe accident could amount to $10 billion. In either case, it far exceeds the amount that is proposed under Bill C-20.
Similarly, the act proposes to cover certain potential damage from transportation of fuel to or from the nuclear power generating plants. Again, there was a contention in the evidence in another case about 10 years ago involving the shipment of mixed-oxide fuel for tests at the Chalk River reactor; the contention was whether the containers were meant to properly protect against serious, especially airborne, accidents. Again, the sufficiency of the cap would be an issue.
With regard to the issue of the act's removal of liability from third parties, as you know, in both the current act and the proposed act, the legislation exempts all of the other parties in the supply chain from any liability whatsoever. This dates from original indemnities that were provided to those suppliers by operators such as AECL and Ontario Hydro, in some cases with federal government consent. That was replaced subsequently by the Nuclear Liability Act.
First of all, I would note that no other supply chain in the electrical generation industry obtains that kind of protection from liability. I would also say that because the industry is well established today, the need to continue to provide that kind of protection is not evident.
The next point I'd like to speak to is an increase in the minimum insurance requirements. Such an increase could be done through a variety of mechanisms, such as pooling or other arrangements, so as to increase the available coverage. I spoke earlier about the fact that the coverage required could greatly exceed the amount provided by this bill.
The note I would make on that point is that in the United States, as you may know, the Price-Anderson act provides a pooling of insurance such that, depending on which dollar exchange you're using and which year you're using, the range is between $9 billion and $11 billion available from a single accident through a combination of insurance, pooled insurance, contribution from the industry, and supplement by the state. Similarly, under the pooling arrangements and state supplements in other countries such as Germany and Japan, as well as others that subscribe to the Brussels convention, much greater resources are available to those who might suffer in the event of a serious accident. I would submit that even the proposed $650 million amount here is not in any way comparable to the amount available just on the other side of our international border.
The third point is to modernize the bill in accordance with principles of sustainability. I will speak to those very briefly. I will first mention the Rio Declaration, which Canada acceded to in 1992.
One of the principles is the principle of intergenerational equity. We would submit that the provisions of this bill should explicitly meet principle 3 of the Rio Declaration. As well, principle 16 is the polluter pay principle under the Rio Declaration. National authorities should endeavour to promote the internalization of environmental costs and the use of economic instruments, taking the approach that the polluter, in principle, should bear the cost of pollution. Another way to put this in the environmental discourse is that costs of potential harm should be internalized to the activity. We would say that removing the cap, increasing the resources available, and eliminating the third-party supplier exemption would more firmly align with principle 16.
To conclude, we think the present bill needs to be amended.
I would like to note that there are multiple objectives the bill may serve. First, if the objective is to provide for compulsory insurance, we would submit that this objective can be achieved without the liability exemptions and limitations. Second, if the objective is to provide a special duty or absolute liability, this can be done, again without completely exempting non-operators and without the caps on liability, just as is the case in other jurisdictions. If the objective is to expedite compensation, this can be done, again through a provision for a special claims tribunal. Similarly, if the objective is to provide some level of protection to suppliers, this could be done by indemnity agreements and without a statutory removal of the plaintiffs' or claimants' rights.
Finally, if the objective is to promote nuclear power generation, I would submit that the committee should recognize that the mechanism of a cap on total liability and exemption of third-party supplier liability is promoting nuclear power generation by imposing the difference in cost on the public. I would submit that's not merited in this day and age.
Finally, I would request that you view the question of amending the Nuclear Liability Act as a question of what system of compensation should be in place in the event of an accident. I would submit that you not view the act primarily as a mechanism to expedite the operation of nuclear power generation facilities.
In my submission, the system we would want in place in the event of a real accident would not consist of historical legislative protection to the industry from the consequences of an accident; rather, we would want a much more significant amount of minimum insurance and pooled resources to assist accident victims. We would want a removal of that cap on liability and the exemption to third parties. We would want to retain other elements such as absolute liability, extended limitation periods, retention of jurisdiction of the courts, and a specialized tribunal, but there is no necessity for the package to include the cap on liability or the exemption for third-party suppliers in order to accomplish those means.
Thank you.