I think there's a certain amount of risk involved in any decision regarding offshore oil and gas activity. It's how well that risk is understood and analyzed and assessed that allows you to move forward. In our case, we became aware fairly quickly that what had happened in the Macondo incident was a result of failure to adhere to proper procedures. There were all kinds of warnings about an influx of hydrocarbons into the well bore in the days and even weeks before the blowout, but for some reason they were ignored.
We looked at it in the context of the rig. That rig, the Stena Carron, had just finished drilling a well in the Laurentian Basin in the middle of the winter in water deeper than at Macondo. It was in 1,600 metres of water, so it was slightly deeper than the Macondo.
I spent time on that. I was very impressed with the skill and capability and safety culture in place on the rig. I had also visited her when she transferred over to Chevron, and the thing that really impressed me very much was the commitment that Chevron and the Stena Carron people had made to something they called their “stop work authority”. That was about the most rigorous example of a positive safety culture that I've ever seen, and I've been in this industry a little over 30 years.