Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I'd like to thank the committee for this opportunity to present to you. Thank you very much for the invitation; I appreciate it.
I believe we have to acknowledge that nuclear energy isn't what it used to be. Nuclear energy in Canada is going through a mid-life crisis. When we see the failures of Atomic Energy of Canada Limited in terms of the MAPLE reactors that turned out to be a fiasco, when we see the NRU reactor that has suffered some lamentable lapses, and when we see the cost overruns in the refurbishments that are going on, all of this shakes people's confidence in the ability of nuclear technology to solve all problems. The idea is that you have a problem and you just slap some technology on it, and that solves it. One has to realize that this is the situation we're in.
Also, I think that not only is there some degradation of confidence in AECL, for example, and therefore in nuclear technology, but also in nuclear regulation. The difficulty here, I think, is that while the CNSC does excellent work on technical matters, physical matters, engineering, geology, and various things, it really does not have much expertise in the biomedical field or in the human relations field, you might say, and the result is this.
We heard Mr. Binder the other day saying that basically this is just a new technology, that's all—a new technology for dealing with the steam generators. I think that's a very short-sighted view; it's more than just a new technology. There are millions of other people who are potentially concerned about knowing what this is going to do to their communities, even what kind of fears or anxieties might arise, so it's not just a question of switching technologies.
The idea that we don't need another environmental assessment because all it is doing is substituting one technology for another totally overlooks the fact that there is a whole other constituency—a much, much larger constituency—that would have had no reason to want to intervene in the original environmental assessment about the refurbishment when it was said that the steam generators would stay on site until the year 2043.
By the way, that facility already exists, and by the way, that's where the steam generators really are, and by the way, OPG had signed a contract with Bruce Power to build a segmentation facility to take those things apart. So there really is—and this, I think, is very important to realize—nothing consequential for the nuclear industry in sending these steam generators overseas or keeping them on site. Nothing. In no way does not shipping the steam generators.... We've talked about the consequences of shipping them. What about the consequences of not shipping them?
The consequences of not shipping them are zilch, except for the fact that shipping would save Bruce Power some money, and not shipping would reduce a lot of anxiety and perhaps not exacerbate the crisis of confidence that people are feeling in nuclear technology at the present time. Why stir up the pot when you don't have to? What is the advantage to Canada--or to Bruce Power, for that matter--in sending these things overseas?
Well, I've looked at the documents. I have the documents that were signed with OPG. All the prices are blotted out, but it seems quite clear that really, as you would expect with a private company, it is the bottom line. The company is trying to reduce its volume so that it can spend less money on long-term storage costs, and that's the advantage; that's the payoff for them.
There might be another payoff as well, which I won't speculate on, but it may be just simply that it wants to demonstrate that it can send this stuff whenever it wants, wherever it wants, without anybody really stopping it.
I would like to talk about the three precedents. I've given you a handout, which includes a copy of a letter I've sent to all members of Parliament. In our opinion, precedent one is that it will be the first time Canada has exported or imported radioactive waste from a refurbished or a decommissioned nuclear reactor. The concern is that this precedent will be followed by many other such shipments. In fact, we know for sure that Bruce Power is planning other such shipments, and I'm sure all the other nuclear operators in North America are watching to see what happens.
With regard to the comparisons, I understand the comparisons with the radiation levels, the isotope shipments, and the steam generator shipments, but people know the difference between goods and garbage. It's one thing to ship goods: you have a customer who actually wants to buy this stuff, you know what you're shipping, and you know the purpose of it. Then there's garbage, which nobody wants.
People may be willing to tolerate the risk of dangerous chemical goods coming through the communities and may draw the line when it comes to dangerous, toxic chemical garbage. I think trying to equate those two on a political level is wrong. Do we want to add another stream of nuclear garbage on top of the stream of nuclear goods? That's really the question.
My point here is that we want a political process, a democratic political process, to take stock of where we are in this country and what our policies should be. It's not up to Bruce Power to decide the right thing to do. It sounds as if Bruce Power is willing to do the right thing, even if you have to shove it down our throats. The point is that not everybody agrees that it's the right thing to do, obviously. What gives Bruce Power any special expertise in knowing what the right thing to do is?
What is it, in fact, they're planning to do? They're planning to send this stuff over to Sweden.
Unfortunately, I don't have time to go into this, but I'll ask you to look at the package of information I gave you. The main point is that in terms of safety, it's a very complex cocktail of radioactive substances, which are extraordinarily toxic. Plutonium amounts to more than 90% of the radioactive content. Moreover, when this stuff is shipped over to Sweden, some of that material will end up in the waste stream. Although the Bruce Power spokesmen here said that there was no radioactivity and that this was clean metal, that is not true. If you look at the record, you will see that Studsvik has explicit limits on how much plutonium, how much cobalt-60, how much of this, and how much of that can end up in the metal according to their standards. The Studsvik representative also said explicitly that they have to blend it with 10 parts of non-contaminated metal so that--what? Does anybody want contaminated metal? No. It's so they can pass it off as if it's not contaminated.
I call that more of a scam than a business. In a sense, they're not recycling contaminated metal; they're contaminating recycled metal.
Thank you.