I understand you wanted to have a brief presentation on the duty to consult as a legal duty. I will spend a few moments on that.
When everyone thinks of natural resources in this country, your mind will automatically go to aboriginal peoples and the connection they may have to those resources. That is not a surprising feature because the place of aboriginal people in Canada has been a defining feature of this country for over 500 years. Nearly from the beginning, consultation between the crown and aboriginal peoples has been a hallmark of that relationship. From the making of treaties in the 18th century, from the surrenders of traditional lands by treaty to the use of Indian lands under the Indian Act, and more recently on section 35 and the justifications for infringements on traditional harvesting rights, consultation has been a key tool for the crown to justify its actions.
It was not surprising about seven years ago that the Supreme Court of Canada, in a series of landmark decisions, articulated a legal duty to consult on the part of the crown in order to justify its decisions that could have adverse effects on aboriginal peoples. Those decisions were the Haida Nation decision, Mikisew Cree, and the Taku River. What they articulated was a duty on the part of crown decision-makers to be informed of the implications of their actions on aboriginal people and their interests before they make decisions. This, as I say, was not a totally unique or new development, but it raised the stakes considerably for decision-makers. At its heart was a desire by the courts to ensure those decisions were well-founded, well-justified, and respectful of that relationship.
In practical terms, there was a period of some time after the court articulated that legal duty when there was some uncertainty among regulators as to what exactly they had to do. On the one hand, you had some who were fearful that this meant a complete rewriting of the regulatory regime of Canada. On the other hand, there was an extreme of people who thought it meant nothing, that it would simply be one more factor that would really have no consequence. In reality, what the court was calling for was a meaningful consultation with aboriginal people where decision-makers would pause and take into account what the issues at stake were, what the adverse impacts could be of their decisions, and then to make accommodations before a final decision was made.
The government's response was articulated in 2007 with its action plan on how the duty would be integrated into decision-making across the government. Those interim consultation guidelines were updated earlier this year, in March 2011.
I would like to pause now to run through the major steps the courts apply in terms of how the duty to consult is defined and then fulfilled by government decision-makers. It is important to stress that this is a legal duty; this is not discretionary. That is not to say that it is an impediment to either decision-making or to efficient and timely decision-making. I have often said to clients that meaningful consultation doesn't need to be a process without a time limit or something that provides a veto to an aboriginal party. It is being able to justify to a third party—in this case, the courts—that you have made an honest, reasonable effort in light of the stakes for the aboriginal party and the risk of the adverse impact of your decision to factor that into your decision-making process.
There are three key elements that need to be considered: crown conduct, potential or established aboriginal treaty rights, and potential for adverse impacts.
As for crown conduct that could trigger the duty, there are literally tens of thousands of actions by government officials at the federal level that could theoretically have an impact on aboriginal people. But in reality what the court is looking for are those actions that will have a true impact. These include land disposals, for example, which could affect aboriginal interest in lands; regulatory activity, such as assessments, which could lead to approvals or permitting, which would permit activities that could have an adverse effect on the aboriginal people.
The second element is the potential or established aboriginal rights or treaty rights. Here again, it could be that an aboriginal group with an interest in a project or in the treatment of land or a resource will articulate its opposition to the project. So the regulator or the decision-maker inside the government has to ask themselves whether there is truly an interest at stake here that relates back to section 35 of the Constitution Act, protecting aboriginal and treaty rights, which in short are mostly the traditional harvesting rights that one would expect to see as centrepieces of aboriginal culture in the past and into the present. So that second element isn't simply that an aboriginal party has an interest but that the interest relates back to section 35 and traditional activities.
The third element is potential adverse impacts. Not every decision that is made is necessarily going to have an adverse impact on the interests of the aboriginal party, but many will. So, for example, a decision to permit the construction of a pipeline that would cross an area in which traditional activity such as harvesting of caribou takes place should cause the decision-maker to ask themselves whether this is a situation in which there is a duty to consult. Changes in regulations that could change land use would be another example, as would decisions about pollution that could affect flora or animal populations.
When you add up those three elements, though, a spectrum is created. Consultation is a very generic word. At one end of that spectrum there could be a relatively weak claim by an aboriginal group. Interest might not be particularly tied to a type of fish or a type of animal to be hunted or an activity on land. The average impact is going to be very weak as well and might simply be sharing information, posting information, or sending a mail-out.
At the other end of the spectrum there could be a very strong claim if, for example, a court had recognized an aboriginal title right to land and there was going to be a decision that would permit a very destructive activity on that land. One would expect there to be a strong, meaningful consultation process. It wouldn't be a veto, but there would be an expectation of accommodation measures that would be commensurate with the negative impact on the interest.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.