Thank you very much.
Thank you both for being here. I really appreciate your comments.
I have two lines of questioning. I'm going to throw them both on the table, and then I'm just going to jump into them.
The first is the overall GOCO model, which you were talking about. It was brought in by the Harper government, and it seemed, when we were discussing it last time, to be a pretty reasonable way to get American expertise. It was described to us that one of the goals was to access American expertise and make sure that we were able to benefit from it as Canadians.
I want to explore that, but I also want to throw on the table that, in terms of the security risk, it does feel like we'll need to reconcile, as a committee and as a government, how we feel about the United States in this matter. It's personally hard for me to imagine that the United States would not know details about modular reactors in the north under our current security regime. It seems actually impossible to me. I'm not passing moral judgment on whether that's good or bad, but that's something, certainly, that needs to be reconciled as we think about the overall trajectory of this country and the way security relationships are evolving.
I guess my question for you, Mr. Leuprecht, is this: What is your sense of the testimony we heard about the GOCO model being used to access private expertise—the original policy intent of the Harper government? How much does it align with that intent, and has it provided some value in that sense? If you want, you can just expand on your comments in that space.