Thanks very much.
I'd like to thank the committee for inviting me to share these observations on the important subject of the court challenges program. I want to talk about principles that need to be brought to bear on any program of governmental support for constitutional development.
In my view, time and reflection have shown us that the court challenges program was effective in achieving its influence; it had advisors of the highest ability, strategists of considerable brilliance, and a successful track record. Time and reflection, however, put us in a position to examine drawbacks as well. Some of these are serious and foundational. I want to raise some of those today. Unless they're considered, in my view, we are not proceeding in the right direction with constitutional litigation in Canada today. The program must not simply be reinstated as it was; it should be fundamentally changed for principled reasons that I will comment upon now.
First of all, it's important to understand that the relationship between the courts and the legislature is often understood as a dialogue. If that's true, then it's also true that in a further sense, debates within cases themselves are part of that dialogue. There is a dialogue and a debate about the nature of the Constitution carried on within each case, and then between cases over time; society itself, and the law that is part of it, are dialogical. It changes over time, in part due to the debates, discussions, and self-understandings that are part and parcel of our common lives together.
It needs to be clearly understood that Canada is not the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms is not Canada. This is important to understand because there are those--in fact, quite a few--who seem to speak as if Canada will be developed, furthered, and based on the charter, which is shorthand for saying by the judiciary, or within that dialogue between legislature and the courts.
This wider perspective about the importance of society in the debate is one that's been recognized by the court challenges program itself, because it wanted to fund, and did fund, not only litigation but conferences, and even discussion between government officials and members of activist organizations on particular themes, and in recent reports suggested that it should be extended to the provinces as well. In such an environment it's important that this be done openly and fairly, and not just from one perspective.
Any method of governmental assistance for constitutional litigation needs to be aware of the problem of rights disputes in terms of society itself, and the fact that all citizens should be encouraged to be part of the dialogue that is constitutional litigation. If we assume that courts are not merely necessary, but are sufficient, for the maintenance of a constitution, we assume too much about the role of law. This is the essential point of my comments today.
For any program of constitutional litigation assistance to be just, it must be open to everyone--not just those challenging laws, but those defending them, or those arguing against a particular sort of challenge where there is no law in an area, which was the case in the same-sex marriage cases. If constitutional litigation is going to affect everyone, which it does, then those who may need assistance in relation to that litigation do not all come neatly labelled as challengers. Therefore, any program seeking to develop constitutional interpretation must do so on a neutral basis and not assist only one side of the arguments.
What is constitutional is not just what is new and challenging; it can also be what the Parliament and legislatures, federal and provincial, may have brought into place already, and the litigation history shows this. In addition, we have to realize more and more as a country that litigation is not the best strategy for a state to use as a method of nation-building or for the creation of communities of respect. There are serious drawbacks to litigation.
As Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor has noted, judicial decisions are usually winner take all. Either you win or you lose. In particular, judicial decisions about rights tend to be conceived as all-or-nothing matters. The penchant to settle things judicially, further polarized by rival special interest campaigns, effectively cuts down the possibilities of compromise.
We have been encouraging litigation as a means of nation-building and of furthering Canada. In my view, this is incorrect; we've taken a wrong tack.
While many groups have benefited from the funds they got through the court challenges program, I believe, along with many others, that there are serious problems in the way that program was set up and in the way funds were distributed. Any fair system in the future that genuinely moves towards nation-building has to be established on different principles. I'd like now to turn to a series of those.
I'll first mention what Chief Justice McLachlin said in her well-known Cooke lecture in New Zealand. She said, “Canadians have embraced their constitution as a means to achieve justice, they have not yet established a consensus on where that justice comes from and on what it’s based.”
Chief Justice Dickson, some years before, pointed out that the charter was not enacted in a vacuum and must be placed in its proper linguistic, philosophical, and historic contexts. In the Egan case a few years later, religious traditions were added to that context.
How are we to best do this task of placing the charter in the proper linguistic, philosophical, historical, and religious traditions context if we do not do it with maximal input from the people and groups who can best tell us what these are? How, indeed?
The court challenges program, by furthering just challenges, which biases it against traditional positions, and by giving funds to favoured groups, has not, in effect, rewarded those who need to be rewarded or funded in cases where many sides of issues should be properly canvassed.
In the same-sex marriage cases, for example, in which I acted for many of Canada's national religious groups, a fundamental question was never addressed anywhere, and that was whether marriage is properly a matter for the state. Constitutional rights are important, and the courts have a necessary role in defending them, particularly when the state is acting against individuals or groups. But it is a necessary role the courts have, not a sufficient one.
It was well known that hearings by the justice committee of the day were simply cancelled once the government of the time, with no caucus discussion, no discussion in the House--in short, none of the usual opportunities for analysis and discussion--simply skipped the matter of the appeal to the Supreme Court in the marriage reference.
That was not our finest hour in Canada. And in our analysis the optimal relationship between the irreconcilable views of citizens and the state with respect to same-sex marriage has suffered as a result. We have only seen the beginning of the disputes that will erupt in such areas as public education curriculum. In my view, we could have avoided much of that.
Now I'd like to turn quickly to the principles I'd like to say should be recommended in any new approach to governmental assistance for litigation.
First, any program should not operate to assist only those challenging laws, as I said earlier. Any litigation assistance program must operate, therefore, in terms of advancing the best arguments to assist the court to frame the issues before it, not to pursue a favoured outcome by one side of the argument. This was a cardinal error in the way the former program was set up.
Second, so that all citizen groups may have confidence in its fairness, any constitutional assistance program should be set up with representative fairness. Transparency and fairness apply not only to reporting requirements and accountability for any program giving out government moneys but to the question of who staffs such a program and who decides about applications.
As far as is practicable, it would seem to make sense to involve those from a variety of different groups themselves. We know from the history of litigation in this country over the last many years who these groups are. These people should be part of a board of advisors or members making decisions. This board would have full access to all materials and would make up its own report to assist the government and the public.
Currently there is a widely shared perception that the former program represented a narrow ideological band of members, leaving many groups out in the cold. Annual reports, for example, did not give a list of all the cases in which assistance was given by the program. They had only a selection of such cases. Who made up the selection? How representative was the selection reported? We don't know. That is unacceptable.
Third, once the courts have granted intervenor status to groups in a constitutional litigation, funding assistance to a certain level should flow to all sides of the litigation, subject, perhaps, only to a means test principle. This could be done on a demonstrated need basis for individuals or for charitable or not-for-profit organizations.
The elucidation by the courts of the application of the Constitution affects everyone, and it's unfair that only one side of the arguments are supported by the tax moneys of all citizens. We leave it to a judge to determine which particular bodies have an interest and valid representative status in a constitutional litigation. And it should follow, once that determination has been made, that recourse to financial assistance is possible. This avoids the chronological bias I mentioned favouring new claims against old ones, and it also gives everyone access who has an interest.
Finally, there's a need to clarify the litigation, participation, education, and advocacy in relation to charitable status. While this may be outside of the mandate of your committee, it's very important to know how many groups in Canada are threatened by the current approaches to charities in Canada.
Lastly, it is time to consider establishing a constitutional forum for stakeholders that will benefit all Canadians. The witnesses today all provided testimony on areas of their concern that could be beautifully aired in a communitarian setting before a governmentally assisted constitutional forum. This would take the pressure off a litigation framework and would ultimately present useful reports and genuine dialogue that could help the judiciary and politicians.
Thank you very much. My comments are respectfully submitted.