There will be some deference by the court to Parliament's choices in this matter—that is to say, your choices—but I do think there is a difference between procedural safeguards such as the time delay, the second physician, the signature in writing, and those kinds of things, which are all clearly within your mandate, and what one could describe as substantive safeguards, meaning that it has to be somebody who's already dying. Many of us would think that was a perfectly sensible safeguard, but that is not part of the court's elements.
If you put in some substantive requirements, such as requiring that it be terminal, you will certainly get challenges from people who want to avail themselves of the assisted-dying option. It would require a fair bit of tolerance by the court as to whether that kind of restriction would be acceptable. I don't rule that sort of thing out, but I think it would be better not to do that—not as a matter of policy, because I have nothing to say on policy, but just because it will make your law more vulnerable if it's a substantive safeguard as opposed to a procedural one.