Public Accounts Committee on Feb. 5th, 2008

[David Christopherson, NDP, Hamilton Centre, ON]

Thank you very much, Chair.

Thank you all for being here today.

I want to begin by referring back to your opening statement. You said on page 3, “Therefore, our focus must be on risk management”. So you're making it a priority, and yet the Auditor General has pointed out that in using these automatic risk-scoring systems—which apparently not that many countries are using yet—you didn't have any systemic method of determining whether or not they were actually working.

So from the beginning, I'm having some trouble understanding this. You are claiming that risk management is your focus, your priority, and yet something as obvious as having a system to review how effective an automated system it is—especially when it's not used across the system—doesn't seem to me to match up with what you are saying. It's almost as if you are saying this, but it wasn't there in reality.

Could you comment, please?

[Alain Jolicoeur]

Certainly.

The introduction of new technology like that, a new system to manage risk, is something that needs to be planned very, very specifically. In this case, it is true that in the first couple of years we were not good at collecting information in two areas. One of them was the specific results obtained by the machine; the other was creating a sample or another parallel area where, say, containers would have been opened randomly or people referred randomly, and we measured the extent to which we were doing this better than a random result.

We have done this now. Following the visit of the Auditor General, we now have a system that collects that information. Version four of our risk-scoring machine actually integrates that information; we don't even have to input it. It compares the results and gets additional information. Not only that, but a portion of it uses artificial intelligence to do something that no human being could do, to combine the risk indicators in different ways based on what you've been saying, based on past information and past results.

So that's significant progress, but it's true that at the first level, with the first package over the first two years, we didn't do enough of that. But you need that as well. You need a bit of a time period to justify what—

[David Christopherson, NDP, Hamilton Centre, ON]

I don't want to be nitpicky about this, but I have one more question before I leave it.

You talked about how much planning has to be put in place before you put in a system like that. Again, since risk management is so important, I'm having trouble understanding how you failed to put in place what would seem to be an obvious part of any new risk management process. Was it just bad management, bad planning? What was it?

[Alain Jolicoeur]

No. I believe we have developed it in the proper way, but I believe we are at a step now—

[David Christopherson, NDP, Hamilton Centre, ON]

I'm sorry, sir, again I don't want to focus a lot on it—and this will be my last time—but I'm just trying to understand how you could miss something so obvious, when risk management is what you're all about. You talked about how much planning you had to do and how important it was, and yet you didn't put in the most obvious thing: does it work?

[Alain Jolicoeur]

I don't agree with you, but I agree that we need to measure. What I'm saying is you need a bit of time to be able to do that measurement. Maybe we can disagree on when exactly it should have been started, but I have already reported to the committee on the result of that risk analysis.

[David Christopherson, NDP, Hamilton Centre, ON]

Thank you.

Further to that, you had a transition team in place. The Auditor General has noted that you dissolved that, I believe, after about six months, and you devolved or evolved the work to vice-presidents. Why the change?

[Alain Jolicoeur]

As I said in my opening statement, Mr. Chair, when we were created, we were created out of pieces of three organizations. There was absolutely no overhead, no corporation, no organization for a chair, no communication, audit, or planning. There was nothing. So for the first six months I had to create some sort of a SWAT team to keep us basically changing the wires in our house while the power was on. So we had to create the organization and still run 24/7 and deal with all of those challenges at the border, the in and out.

We had those thousands of men and women trying to protect the country. We had to do something. After six months I was surprised that we had been able to attract senior people to take these positions, to create a structure. So the challenge was moved from that task force to the real structure of the organization, but it was the same agenda, the same purpose.

[David Christopherson, NDP, Hamilton Centre, ON]

I want to raise an issue of security again.

The Auditor General has pointed out on page 13, in 5.24 and 5.25, that in applying the two pre-approval programs—customs self-assessment, CSA, and free and secure trade, FAST—that you checked the company in terms of a security clearance, but you didn't do the employees. That seems to be a major gap. Can you explain why that is and what you may be doing about it?

[Alain Jolicoeur]

The comment made by the Auditor General makes reference to how it is done by our sister organization, CBP in the United States, which goes to that additional step we have not put in place.

Our program was developed in pre-9/11 mode. We admit that we could have a tighter program. Actually what we've done is this. I went to Brussels with our colleague from the U.S. and we sold to the whole community of border organizations across the world a new approach to trade facilitation and a way to secure trade around the world, which included something called the authorized economic operator. So we have developed some sort of a standard for that very business.

I'm pleased to report that in June this year we will have achieved mutual recognition with the United States. We will be the first or second one to have achieved this. Therefore, our program will be exactly the same as the U.S. C-TPAT program. The extent to which verification will be made before an importer can be put on that list and be stamped as fit for C-TPAT will be the exact same thing on both sides. I agree, it has required a lot of action on our part to reach that point, but we're going to be able to celebrate that mutual recognition in June. They will accept our verification.

[The Chair, Liberal, Shawn Murphy]

Thank you, very much, Mr. Christopherson.

[David Christopherson, NDP, Hamilton Centre, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

[The Chair, Liberal, Shawn Murphy]

Mr. Hubbard, you have eight minutes.

[Charles Hubbard, Liberal, Miramichi, NB]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

When we look at the concept of trying to manage risks, I would assume that when we recognize the trade problems, the economic arrangements that we have with the United States, and their concerns with terrorism and so forth, our major concern really has to be the North American continent and which dangerous people would come to Canada or what dangerous goods would be delivered here. We have to protect ourselves so we'll not be seen as a conduit to attacking our neighbour to the south. I would think the Americans would be watching that very closely.

With the various agencies you work with internationally—and you talk about the systems you have—I would think that you would have a highly automated system to hear from other countries, and if a ship or a plane were leaving a certain destination for Canada, your people would get advance warning of a possible problem. Are you satisfied that within your budget and with the equipment you have and the software available to you, you have an adequate program that gives you fast information to be able to deal with possible problems before they actually arrive, or when they do arrive, in Canada?

[Alain Jolicoeur]

Mr. Chair, the question of advance information has been at the centre of our organization since we created it. What we essentially put in place, with the help of partner organizations from within Canada and from other countries, is a multi-layered approach. We basically try to stop the threat before it comes to the continent. I must say our partners in the U.S. are very comfortable with that approach. They have a similar approach, and whenever possible we do it jointly.

In our case, it involves working regularly with other border organizations in very many countries in the world. It includes having CBSA officers deployed in very many airports all over the world to do interception. It includes the deployment to ports in other countries of our CSI program people to ensure that containers of real concern are scanned. It involves receiving all that information that we have discussed before.

Regarding airlines, we don't have it all. Your question was whether we are satisfied. We're not quite there, but we've moved a long way. We are getting information on containers from freight forwarders and carriers and importers, and we're getting the ability to reconcile it. Behind it we have the risk-scoring mechanism that digests all that, and behind that we have the normal thing that everybody has, which is officers, who, day in, day out, are looking at people and goods and ensuring that the country is protected.

We have created that multi-line, multi-border approach just to ensure that we are basically more secure.

[Charles Hubbard, Liberal, Miramichi, NB]

With so many agencies...even within the United States they talk about silos. They don't work together. I do not mean to offer you a problem for this morning, but do you relate to your minister certain agencies out there that do not give you the information that would be of benefit to you? Is that a dialogue you have occasionally with the minister, to say--and I won't name any one in particular--certain agencies are not cooperating with Canada and with your organization?

[Alain Jolicoeur]

Regarding the discussions with the minister, first, they would normally be in the context of the portfolio and how we work together. I mean the Canadian agency involved with security. Regarding the work with others, the minister is involved in our discussions with the U.S. and the different systems we have in place to share information. Beyond that, we are also working with other countries.

The problem--

[Charles Hubbard, Liberal, Miramichi, NB]

I only have so many minutes.

If something should ever happen, are there records of the minutes that you would have had with the minister to point out problems that might be problems for Canada? Is there a dialogue there? Is there a record between your agency and the minister to indicate the areas where he, as a minister, should be doing further work with his colleagues internationally?

[Alain Jolicoeur]

I have conversations with the minister on security questions regularly. But I can tell you that I don't think of or see a place where obtaining the information, other than from a logistics perspective, is a problem. The limit to the exchange of information is always a legal limit. Second, and less importantly, are technical limits.

[Charles Hubbard, Liberal, Miramichi, NB]

Your budget, you indicate, is $1.5 billion, and you indicate that $100 million is for firearms. You also indicate that it's going to cost probably $700 million or $800 million. With that, I would think, you must have a promise of money in the future for that same project.

Firearms are a major problem, and I see in your report that you say you only seized 500 firearms, but you seized 10,000 weapons. With respect to firearms on the streets of Toronto, they say you are doing a very poor job of keeping those firearms out of our country. That must be a concern to you, and hopefully you're making some progress with that.

I'm concerned about the 10,000, what you call, weapons. Are these personal weapons, like knives and swords, or could they be...? For example, there are various crude weapons that can bring down aircraft today. What types of weapons are you indicating you've seized? Are they a danger to our nuclear plants? Are they like self-projected missiles, which they use in the Middle East today? Are they weapons coming to our borders that are a danger to our aircraft? What types of weapons are we talking about when you say 10,000?

[Alain Jolicoeur]

Mr. Chair, we have not seized, that I'm aware of--I'm sure I would be--missiles or those kinds of weapons. We've seized firearms and knives, and there is a whole category of weapons that I would call knives, in general, but they have all kinds of weird shapes.

In terms of our results, you're right, illegal use of weapons in this country is a big concern. We're doing better. We are investing more in that. Our seizures of firearms in the last year have increased by close to 20%. Our seizures of weapons in general at the border over the same period have increased by more than 200%. So we can show significant results.

[The Chair, Liberal, Shawn Murphy]

Thank you, Mr. Hubbard.

Mr. Fitzpatrick, you have eight minutes.

[Brian Fitzpatrick, Conservative, Prince Albert, SK]

When I look at the mandate, you have lots of competing interests here. If you're 100% on one, you may be destroying the commerce that goes on between the United States and Canada. So there has to be some smart thinking going on here or we're going to have problems.

From an industry standpoint, it would seem to me that it would have made immense sense a long time ago to have had ISO standards in place for the security of container cars. I would assume that if they were in place, we would take that into account in our risk assessments for containers. Is something like that happening in the world of commerce?

[Alain Jolicoeur]

There are different initiatives that are occurring. The most important one for us is the framework being put into place by the World Customs Organization. That would allow us to have a list of authorized operators or organizations in the business that are safer. We're doing that with the U.S. We are implementing that in Canada, as I said, so we can track and know who has touched that container and where it's coming from and so on. So that's very important.

There are other initiatives with regard to how they are sealed. They could be electronically sealed. I saw some very interesting projects in Argentina that seem to be working. So this is something we are exploring to guarantee that whoever puts something into that container and whatever is put into that container at point A, it is the same when it reaches point B. It looks simple, but it's--

[Brian Fitzpatrick, Conservative, Prince Albert, SK]

Thank you. I think you've satisfied my concern that there is work being done in this area, because it seems to me it has a lot of potential and should be fully exploited or optimized.

I'm assuming that on initial inspection at the border, on primary inspection, a combination of three things would be occurring. One would be some sort of objective risk assessment that's taking place. There has to be some profiling of people who would fall into higher-risk categories than others would, and some knowledge on that.

Another part of the criteria would be a random selection process. If somebody beat the profiling system, you could maybe pick them up in the random selection.

The third one—I don't want to underestimate it, because I know experienced police officers and people in the field and so on—would be called human judgment, based on experience, gut feelings, and so on.

Would it be a fair comment to suggest that the people at the border are using all three of these criteria in assessing people who come to the border?