Public Accounts Committee on Feb. 5th, 2008

[The Chair, Liberal, Shawn Murphy]

Thank you very much, Mr. Jolicoeur.

Monsieur Laforest, huit minutes.

[Jean-Yves Laforest, Bloc, Saint-Maurice—Champlain, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Good morning and thank you for being here.

When I read the Auditor General's report on how the services of the Canadian Border Services Agency are generally organized, I got the impression that there is no integration with regard to the various areas in which you work. Perhaps I'm mistaken, but there seems to be one strategy for airports and another for ports, and yet another for land crossings. There are different strategies for small ports and for big ones, for small airports and for big ones. There is nothing to pull all these areas together. In saying this I am referring to paragraph 5.19 of the Auditor General's report, which says that the strategic plan you developed in 2007-2008 is incomplete.

The main risks were not integrated into this strategic plan. Of course, if the main risks are not integrated, you cannot evaluate or even identify what needs to be done to prevent those risks. The implementation plan is not in line with the overall strategic planning. I would like you to comment on this.

[Alain Jolicoeur]

Mr. Chairman, that observation is important and fair. If you look at risk management, the strategic planning for an organization is targeted planning based largely on each area, rather than planning which is completely integrated. This is an important aspect of the Auditor General's report and we are working on it.

However, in each area, the planning is fairly solid now as regards specific problems, including contraband tobacco, or other issues such as illegal activities in airports. Our most recent risk analysis model is without a doubt state-of-the-art. We are world leaders in that regard.

However, something important is missing, and that is our ability to deploy resources from one area to another in a planned manner and based on a risk analysis approach which is completely integrated into the organization. This was one of the main points raised by the Auditor General. We expect our next strategic plan, not the one which will be presented in a few months, but the one after that, to be based on what the Auditor General recommended.

[Jean-Yves Laforest, Bloc, Saint-Maurice—Champlain, QC]

So what you are basically telling me is that we are doing well in each specific area. You compare yourself to other countries, but I think you would agree that your system would be much more efficient if planning were integrated and all elements were in correlation with each other.

There was another, more specific thing which struck me when I read the report, and it appears in paragraph 5.50 of the Auditor General's report which deals with containers. It says that 934 containers were loaded without authorization in the last two fiscal years. Those are details and I don't want to know how... But it says that only 21% of these containers were then examined. How can that be? I would like to understand how, in light of an approach based on risk management, it is that all containers loaded without authorization were not searched. It seems logical to me that when containers have been loaded without authorization, they all should be examined. You probably have an answer to that.

[Alain Jolicoeur]

Mr. Chairman, container examination has changed over the past few years. Four years ago, the approach we took was quite individual. The number or proportion of containers that we were able to examine had not changed very much for many years. What did change, however, was the capacity to select those containers that we wanted to examine more closely. This is now a two-level examination. For the first level, the examination is conducted with the assistance of VACIS equipment which scans 3 to 4% of all containers per year. For the second level, which is a more in-depth examination, we open and empty the container. This procedure is very costly, not only for our organization but also for the importers, who have to pay for a good portion of the expenses.

The system that we implemented, which enables us to decide in advance whether a container can be loaded onto a boat or not, gives rise to two concerns. First of all, there is a significant terrorist risk and there is a need to obtain information from the importers. We also have to involve the people who are responsible for transporting the merchandise. Occasionally, because of this system, containers are not loaded onto the boats when we have not been able to obtain all of the required information.

And now for your question. In most instances, this information is available before the container arrives. Once the container has arrived, certain information may still be missing, information which should really be verified. But such information is not necessarily missing for all containers. Indeed, as I mentioned, we really have to manage our risks. So each decision made locally deals with containers that we want to take a closer look at. A good proportion of these containers should be examined, but not necessarily just those ones.

[Jean-Yves Laforest, Bloc, Saint-Maurice—Champlain, QC]

Does this 21% also apply to the other containers that you have already authorized?

[Alain Jolicoeur]

No, it's much higher.

[Jean-Yves Laforest, Bloc, Saint-Maurice—Champlain, QC]

You therefore examine approximately 5% of these containers more closely.

[Alain Jolicoeur]

In a ratio of five to one, if I consider the 21%—

[The Chair, Liberal, Shawn Murphy]

Thank you, Mr. Laforest.

Mr. Sweet, you have eight minutes.

[David Sweet, Conservative, Ancaster—Dundas—Flamborough—Westdale, ON]

Mr. Jolicoeur, I read from the Auditor General's report, on page 8 at paragraph 5.10, that there are only two other countries that use automated systems. Which are the other two countries?

[Alain Jolicoeur]

Mr. Chair, we had a meeting in Canada about two months ago of the most advanced countries; there were five. Of the five, only three already had in place a system similar to ours—and I would say again, not quite as good as our latest version—and they were New Zealand, which has copied our system, and the United States. The other two countries, which were building one, are the U.K. and Australia.

[David Sweet, Conservative, Ancaster—Dundas—Flamborough—Westdale, ON]

One of the things that I see consistently in this report is that it's not just the collection, although there are some deficiencies there, but the bringing it into an aggregate picture that's really the challenge for you. Is it the same challenge in the other two countries as well, in dealing with the automated systems?

[Alain Jolicoeur]

Honestly, I'm not sure. I don't want to mislead the committee. I would answer as the Auditor General would answer: I don't see any evidence. I have not myself seen such an integrated plan. I won't go so far as to say it doesn't exist, but I've not seen it.

[David Sweet, Conservative, Ancaster—Dundas—Flamborough—Westdale, ON]

Also, page 20, in line with a question that was asked earlier, says there's a PAXIS system that scores level of risk for individual travellers. The Auditor General's report stated that of 22 million passengers, only 16 million were actually scored through the PAXIS system. Has that been corrected now?

[Alain Jolicoeur]

Mr. Chair, this business of risk-scoring passengers is a bit more challenging for us than risk-scoring containers. Again, we are leading the pack of two or three countries doing that, but the picture is slightly different there. Four years ago, when we started, we were at 0%. The information for risk scoring is called the personal name record. We were at 0%; we moved to 6% in the first year and gradually improved over those four years. We are now at about 82%. We are aiming for 100%.

In the other part of the system, which is advance passenger information, we are already at 90%. It involves developing systems with airlines so that we can directly access information in their databases. It's a bit complex, requiring negotiations and systems development, but we're getting there. We're not there yet, but we're getting there.

[David Sweet, Conservative, Ancaster—Dundas—Flamborough—Westdale, ON]

I wanted to lead into this next question. On page 34, at 5.85 and 5.86, the Auditor General's report clearly says you're having a significant problem with the airlines giving you clean data. It seems 36% of it is flawed and you have to scrub it yourself.

Are you planning on having some kind of penalty for airlines that don't provide you with advance information appropriately?

[Alain Jolicoeur]

Yes, Chair. We do have a system we call AMPS, the administrative monetary penalty system, that we can use to apply pressure. We will need to do that.

I can only say we are progressing. It's not as easy as it sounds. In some cases it's not necessarily only a problem with airlines, because formatting questions need to be resolved.

The simple answer is yes, we will apply additional pressure.

[David Sweet, Conservative, Ancaster—Dundas—Flamborough—Westdale, ON]

On page 15, 5.31, there's another concern because 223 smaller airports are unstaffed. Right now, or at least at the time of the report, there wasn't any cross-referencing of the general aviation data from the data that was submitted to you voluntarily from those arriving at those airports.

Is that being cross-referenced now, so that we're clearer that people are being honourable and declaring themselves?

[Alain Jolicoeur]

I think, and I may be wrong, you are referring to small airports and private planes, ensuring we can reconcile the information we have of planes arriving in Canada with some areas where we don't get the information. We have developed an arrangement with Nav Canada that will be put in place this year that will allow us to make that reconciliation, if that is what you're asking.

[David Sweet, Conservative, Ancaster—Dundas—Flamborough—Westdale, ON]

That's correct. Nav Canada has the general aviation data the Auditor General had an issue with. So that's being dealt with.

Another thing that cross-references to the.... My concern, if some of the issues still exist that the Auditor General pointed out, is that CANPASS and NEXUS are two programs people pay a fee to join, but the benefits they receive seem to defy logic, as the Auditor General points out. Maybe you can explain it. On page 14, it says CANPASS members who are in a private boat program can call ahead and be let through if no customs officers are there.

Apparently those of higher risk who are not members can phone when they arrive, but the Auditor General said more than 93% of the boaters who reported to the agency by telephone did not see an agent either.

My concern is twofold. One is obviously for security. The second is it's only going to be a matter of time until CANPASS and NEXUS members begin to hear about that and ask why they would pay this fee and do this? Could you explain that circumstance to me, please.

[Alain Jolicoeur]

Yes, and at some point I'll ask for help from my colleague, Madam Munroe.

It is a difficult area. We've been discussing these programs with the United States CBP, our equivalent organization in the U.S., in the Department of Homeland Security. The drive for the marine NEXUS program, the main thing here, has really been coming from the U.S., which believes it's a proper way to risk manage these situations. We have to think of the border as being 8,500 kilometres long, if you add the Alaskan one too. And you can talk about the lakes, the rivers, and everything. We have to have a risk management approach to these. The U.S. believes, and we've had very many discussions on this, that by risk managing it this way we reduce breaches overall—but we don't reduce breaches to zero.

The only way to have a secure approach to these large areas, where we basically cannot be, would be to have armies of people, border patrols or police, all over the country. Without them, we have to risk manage the situation.

As to your other question on NEXUS vis-à-vis non-NEXUS, well, there are different places where NEXUS can go where others cannot, but I'll let my colleague comment on that.

[Cathy Munroe, Director General, Programs and Operational Services Directorate, Canada Border Services Agency]

Just to clarify this, we have instituted a number of measures to help mitigate risk in these areas. These include working with our colleagues, such as the RCMP and U.S. border agencies, and so on, to undertake various projects and to exchange information and do what we need to do to target areas where we can focus our efforts. We also have targeted teams that go out and do unexpected verifications, if you will, in specific locations for a period of time, allowing us to collect data to do risk assessments on these various areas, as well as to provide a deterrent effect.

So it's not simply limited to the number of people who report in—but, obviously, as Monsieur Jolicoeur has indicated, we can't be everywhere.

In terms of the report-in for the NEXUS and CANPASS participants, we do have additional locations available above and beyond the regular reporting locations for these members. Certainly, because there are a lot of border communities and boaters, tourists, and so on, who use these programs, these locations are of benefit to them because they don't have to travel quite so far to report in.

[David Sweet, Conservative, Ancaster—Dundas—Flamborough—Westdale, ON]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Shawn Murphy]

Thank you, Mr. Sweet, Ms. Munroe, and Mr. Jolicoeur.

Mr. Christopherson, for eight minutes.