I think I would characterize them as a mix--a mix of the first kind, which, as you say, are good ones. They are the ones where you provide promising officers an opportunity to perform at a higher level to see how they can perform, to be exposed to a mentor, or something like that. That's part of that plan. Indeed, we plan to continue with that quite deliberately through one of our promotion programs that would be developed for a small number of officers.
The second area is when you're in a position where you have an event. In the foreign affairs and international trade department, there are a lot of events. Often we have to pull together task forces and set up special teams and so on. In finding people available at that particular moment there may well be cases, and there are cases, where we have looked for the most competent people who may not be at level and put them into jobs. So there's that sort of situation, which I think is pretty hard to avoid, and, in fact, where you need to act promptly. Those are the sorts of situations where I think the flexibility we have in the foreign service, or the rotational service, is actually a major strength for us in dealing with emergencies.
The third one is, as you say, bad planning. That's what I think we have been dealing with here in the Auditor General's report. Setting aside those other two instances, there simply has been inattention to promotions and recruitment, the sorts of things that would ensure we have at level the right number of people to fill the same number of level jobs in the department, and then to be able to rotate them around. If you have a platform like that--and I think that's what the Auditor General has been asking us to do--then you can build in these other two mechanisms to deal with emergencies or to build in some kind of learning plan.