Thank you, sir, for that question.
That's not an easy question to answer. A large part of that comes from the commanders on the ground and the troops on the ground: the commander of the Expeditionary Command; the commander of the Special Operations Command; the Forces Command. General Leslie, who visits every one of the rotations of his troops into Afghanistan--and I've accompanied him several times--went from top to bottom and talked to soldiers, to understand what's working, what isn't working. So there's a huge feedback loop there.
The other area I would mention specifically is testing. We're working with our science and technology organization, Defence Research and Development Canada. We have destructively tested all our equipment. For example, we acquired the Nyala, the RG-31. We destructively destroyed a Nyala because we wanted to understand specifically what protection levels it would deliver against a roadside bomb, a mine, or a large IED. We did find vulnerabilities and we made changes to the Nyala to make it even better. Those Nyalas have performed precisely in a parallel way to our test parameters. We knew how much TNT with high velocity fragments it took to penetrate a Nyala. There's an enormous amount of work.
Ten years ago, National Defence wasn't doing actual technical destructive testing on armoured vehicles. We started that aggressively in January 2006, when Glyn Berry was killed in a G-wagon. At that point, we said we need to know what happens to our LAVs, our Coyotes, our Bisons, our G-wagons, all logistics vehicles. The only one that we didn't destructive test was the existing heavy logistics vehicle that's in service because we felt it would just be vaporized by a large IED, so there was no point in wasting a vehicle. We proceeded immediately with the AHSVS project that was part of the Auditor General's audit.
I don't know if that helps.