Right, sir.
So in the context of running an army that's fighting a war, in a perfect world, I'd like everything today. As for the process and finances, I'd much prefer that other people resolve those. This has to be tempered with common sense, due diligence, Treasury Board regulations, Government of Canada priorities, and all the normal constraints.
At the time, trying to enhance the protection of the light armoured vehicle fleet, which led to the developmental work on the RWS and its eventual very successful fielding, there were some technical issues, as Mr. Ross has already explained, that dragged that project out. That's perhaps not the best choice of words, but it took longer than what we were hoping for. It still ended up being very quick, but I think the total time was around 32 months.
In the interim, our casualty rates for the G-Wagons--and casualties are always unacceptable--were soaring astronomically, and the number of Bisons that had been hit was quite high. In the course of our current stage of the war, we've had hundreds of vehicles damaged, or worse, by enemy action, so our fleets are starting to get depleted. Replacements are online.
If I understand the nuance of the way in which this paragraph is articulated, we started out thinking the RWS would replace the G-Wagon. As time progressed, we had to come up with other alternatives. So although they're not actually mentioned in the Auditor General's work on these four projects, other projects were rushed into service. The mobile tracked vehicle system, which is an upgrade to an existing fleet, acted as an interim or as a bridge.
I don't know if this adequately answers your question. But there were changing circumstances and availability of vehicles.