Thank you, Chair.
With your indulgence, I want to make a brief reference to the message we will deal with on Tuesday, where it's very specific to Phoenix, to keep us focused, if you will allow me, sir.
One of the key things in public life these days—and we're all in it to one degree or another—is transparency and accountability. I know this is not easy for you. It's not supposed to be. Somebody has to be held accountable. Lest you think that we get off when we go knocking on thousands of doors and the question on the doorstep is, “How did I do?”, let me tell you, you learn about transparency and certainly about accountability.
One of the things, Chair—and I have mentioned it before—that hit me the hardest, given all my years on this committee, was that in that report, there was a message to us—and it's strictly on Phoenix—from the Auditor General posing the question about who is to blame. In the context of that, he said, “It's a difficult question to answer because it's as if the Phoenix project was set up to avoid responsibility—either by design or by accident.”
Mr. Ferguson, is there anything you want to add to that? It's pretty damning, especially even the hint of somebody in the bureaucracy deliberately setting it up so that it wasn't clear who made the decisions. An accident is a little less so, but it's still hugely problematic.
Could we have your thoughts on that, sir?
Then, Mr. Wallace, to give you fair notice, I'm going to be coming to you to ask for a commitment about what you're going to do in your challenge function going forward to assure us this won't happen again.
Mr. Auditor General.