I think those ebbs and flows are something that the department would have to describe. What we identified here was that the Canadian Forces had established the optimal level for reserve soldiers at 29,000. The funding that the department was operating with was set for 21,000, and they had about 14,000 who were actually active and trained. The problem was that over a period of a couple of years, they were starting to lose about 1,000 a year.
We say, in paragraph 5.52,
in the 2014–15 fiscal year, the recruiting system’s objective was to deliver 2,200 recruits to the Army Reserve—far fewer than the 3,000 recruits needed.
The army itself had determined that they needed 3,000, but the system was able to deliver only 2,200. They still are not able to attract the numbers. They are not able to recruit the numbers that the army itself says they need.