In separating out I think the two key points the Auditor General made, the importance of life-cycle costing and the good planning assumptions, if you look at the main fleets we're talking about here, all were acquired and looked at in service support contract during the height of our mission in Afghanistan. If you think about how much we were using the previous generation of Chinooks, how much we were using C-130J, etc., during a fairly large campaign on the ground with troops dying because of improvised explosive devices, we were operating those fleets to the levels we're talking about here.
Where we stumbled, I think it was perhaps a rational assumption that we would continue to use it at that level, and therefore structured it accordingly to make sure we would have the capacity because what we don't want to find ourselves doing is my saying to the chief, “I know you have a mission, you have to deploy here, but I don't have a support contract.” But admittedly, structuring it in a way that says we're going to use all these hours is where we erred.
As we renew them, as we've done in the C-130J, which is the same contract...but when it came up for renewal period, we went back to the original equipment manufacturer, Lockheed Martin, based on international practices and reduced it. As the Chinooks come forward and the other ones come forward, we'll do the same. We'll band them and tier them, but we want to make sure that we get good value for money. There is a threshold at which we have to pay for the readiness for industry to be there and ready to surge. It's just to make sure that we're not paying a ridiculous amount for a few hours, and that's what we're trying to change.