Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you to members of your committee for your interest in this very important matter. Thank you for having me here to speak to you about the very important findings of Mr. Justice O'Connor on the actions of Canadian officials in relation to Mr. Maher Arar, his deportation to Syria from the United States, and his detention in Syria.
A second report, dealing with the establishment of a review mechanism for the RCMP's activities with respect to national security which should be released later this fall. According to what has been said, this should be a very important report.
The second report dealing with a review mechanism for the national security activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police is expected later this fall. I know that members are interested in that one also.
I wish to congratulate Justice O'Connor and all the people who have worked on that report. Justice O'Connor's report is an important document. It is shining light on a very complex and very difficult aspect of the mandate of our security agencies.
I'd like to commend, once again, Mr. Justice O'Connor and all who worked on this report. This report is a vitally important document. It provides insight into a very complex and difficult part of our security agency's work.
Some have said that all of these situations took place under a former government, but I want everyone to know that the new government of Canada and the Prime Minister very clearly indicated that we accept responsibility for all 23 of the recommendations of this report. Others have also said that in the backdrop of 9/11, there was a need to move quickly and take action on matters of security, that there were pressures at the time that had to be addressed, and what was in place at the time in terms of investigation and its capabilities may not have been optimal. The backdrop realities may be a fact of life, but there is no excuse for mistakes that were made. Decisions were made and actions were taken that had serious and grave consequences for Mr. Arar, his life, and his family. What he and his family went through was unacceptable and unjust.
Last week, right here in the House of Commons, as individual members, we stood in unity in a vote expressing our feeling and our sentiment on that matter. We reflected the sentiment that apologies are appropriate and need to be undertaken, by taking that vote and demonstrating the regrets.
By his work, Mr. Justice O'Connor has given us much to think about. In fact, he's painted a map that can help to guide us, and it is guiding us already.
Mr. Chairman, the Government of Canada accepts that report. We are going to implement its recommendations. In fact, we have already started to do so and we shall continue.
The Government of Canada accepts the report of Justice O'Connor. We will implement its recommendations; indeed we have started to do so already.
We are giving full consideration to all implementation capabilities, and we will move on all 23 of these recommendations. In the first part of the report, recommendations 1 through 11 are directly and principally concerned with the role of the RCMP and its national security work, as well as its efforts to coordinate with other agencies.
Consistent with statutory authorities, cooperation between the RCMP and CSIS is critical in these areas. I can tell you that now, on at least a monthly basis, the officials of the RCMP and CSIS meet to coordinate their efforts and align their priorities. This was not the case at the time of Mr. Arar's removal and detention; it is the case now under the new government of Canada.
Recently, under the auspices of the new government of Canada, CSIS and the RCMP signed an updated memorandum of understanding that guides their work in counterterrorism and supports joint training. In fact, a new national security corps training standard has been developed and will be delivered jointly under that memorandum of understanding.
Commissioner Zaccardelli has also informed me that the RCMP currently has four integrated national security enforcement teams in major centres across Canada. These teams include other federal agencies as well as provincial and municipal policing services. This will help to maximize our law enforcement efforts. We saw some demonstration of this last June with the arrests that were made in Toronto.
Also now in place is a centralized oversight of national security investigations from RCMP headquarters.
One of the main issues raised in the report deals with the sharing of information for public safety and national security purposes. Justice O'Connor has made recommendations on that subject.
A central issue in the report is the question of information sharing for public safety and national security purposes. Mr. Justice O'Connor makes a number of recommendations on this.
I was also pleased to read that Mr. Justice O'Connor strongly endorsed the importance of information sharing in protecting Canada's national security interests and addressing threats to our security. I am now informed that the RCMP has revised its policies on information sharing in national security operations to provide more precision and more clarity. The report will help further guide consideration in this important area.
I'm also particularly interested in the RCMP's centralized approach to managing all aspects of national security investigations, including the consistent application of caveats. To this end, I have been assured that a review is under way of all existing caveats.
I look forward to the second report of Mr. Justice O'Connor because he will clarify his thinking on the review of RCMP activities and oversight considerations. I know that is a compelling interest of my colleagues around this table.
Recommendations 12 through 15 deal with the management of relationships with foreign governments and associated human rights concerns when information is shared. This affects many departments and agencies. I can assure you that work is already under way on these recommendations. For example, CSIS has developed a new caveat to accompany all of its information that is shared with foreign agencies, to ensure that this information will not be misused.
The Canada Border Services Agency and the Department of Foreign Affairs are both now undertaking a review of information sharing practices in their areas, and in this one in particular. In addition to that, the Department of Foreign Affairs is already sharing human rights reports on various countries with security and intelligence agencies, as recommended by Mr. Justice O'Connor. This helps to support effective decision-making in this area and was a problem in the past.
CSIS has amended its procedures for foreign liaison and cooperation, as well as its targeting policy, to make it explicit that the human rights records of other countries must be taken into consideration.
Further review is going to take place in light of these particular and specific recommendations.
In his report, Mr. Justice O'Connor made recommendations, numbers 16, 17 and 18, related to consular affairs. I want to show you that my colleague, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, has committed to these steps along the lines of the recommendations as laid out by Justice O'Connor and as required.
In his report, Mr. Justice O'Connor has recommendations, numbers 16, 17, and 18, related to consular affairs. I want to assure you that my colleague, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, has committed to these steps, along the lines of the recommendations as laid out by Justice O'Connor and as required.
I am also advised that current training for consular personnel is being enhanced and made available to an increasing number of front-line staff.
I'm also advised that current training for consular personnel is being enhanced and made available to an increasing number of front-line staff.
Mr. Justice O'Connor has made other recommendations, specifically numbers 19 and 20, dealing with training and policies. I support, as I know you do, better training and clear policies in federal departments and agencies to address possible concerns related to racial, religious, or ethnic profiling. I say this recognizing that some organizations already have well-established policies and training programs in place in this area.
Nevertheless, learning is a never-ending process, and we will continue along the lines of these recommendations.
I've also asked the agencies in my portfolio to move to implementation of Justice O'Connor's recommendation 21 concerning the use of border lookouts. I can confirm, as my colleagues will know, that we took action last week, within 24 hours of the release of the report, and the Canada Border Services Agency removed the names of Mr. Arar, his wife, and family from its lookout list. There is no active lookout on Mr. Arar. In addition, all references to Ms. Mazigh and her two children have been removed from the intelligence management system, again as per Mr. Justice O'Connor's recommendation. We acted on that very quickly.
I've also written to the U.S. Secretary for Homeland Security to inform him of the report's main conclusion, that there is no evidence to indicate that Mr. Arar has committed any offence “or that his activities constitute a threat to the security of Canada”. I also informed him that I have ordered the removal--and the removal has taken place--of references to Mr. Maher Arar or his family on any of our CBSA lookouts. I shared this information with the United States to ensure that no measures or actions would be taken based on inaccurate information, and I encouraged them to follow suit.
I also want to add that in 2004, Canada and the United States have signed a protocol.
Mr. Chairman, it's important to note that there is a protocol in place between Canada and the United States to provide that each would notify the other if contemplating the removal of a national of the other country to a third country. We have sought this understanding to avoid a repetition of the circumstances of the Arar case. Our dialogue with the U.S. government is ongoing in this regard.
I believe that we are the only country to have such an understanding with the United States. The Government of Canada has already expressed its concerns to the Government of Syria with regard to the detention of Mr. Maher Arar. It is pursuing Mr. Justice O'Connor's recommendations in this regard.
Mr. Justice O'Connor's final recommendation, number 23, is that the Government of Canada should assess Mr. Arar's claim for compensation and respond accordingly. The government has already instructed counsel to contact Mr. Maher Arar's counsel to pursue mediation in this regard. That contact has been made.
Mr. Justice O'Connor reports that he has heard enough evidence about the cases of Messrs. Almalki, El Maati, and Nureddin to observe that these cases should be reviewed through an independent and credible process. He does not recommend or suggest that this be done through a full public inquiry, as was the Arar case, but he does recommend that this be done. The government is now pursuing the most efficient and capable way of doing that--and we will do that.
We must take this opportunity, Mr. Chairman, to learn from past events, so that all agencies and departments that are charged with national security responsibilities meet the needs and expectations of Canadians. The fact that this entire affair took place under a previous government does not diminish the responsibility of the new government of Canada.
After looking at Mr. Justice O'Connor's report, it is important to state that while he notes there were serious concerns about how information concerning Mr. Maher Arar was used and how agencies worked together, he does not find evidence that Canadian officials participated or acquiesced in the United States' decision to detain Mr. Arar or to remove him to Syria.