In the ones we've been involved in, just from an ops centre point of view, we haven't. But we have addressed that with the provinces. Most provinces have redundancy. They have regional offices, so that if one area went down, the rest could act.
I think New Orleans was a very unique area. If it had not been for the dikes failing, it would not have been that big a deal. But one of the things they learned from this was that they didn't exercise enough, and although they had a system in place that acted quite similarly to ours as far as its command system was concerned, the officials who were supposed to take the lead on it weren't trained. They hadn't done the training and hadn't done the practising. They found that where the people were well trained and knew the system, things worked well. Where people didn't know the system and hadn't been engaged in training and exercises, it tended to fail.
Another thing that failed was the communications system. They found by and large that the Internet system worked, but there was a real challenge in getting information from New Orleans to Baton Rouge, where the joint field office was, and from Baton Rouge back up to Washington.
There were also indications of officials failing, individual failures of not responding, as was expected of them.